The Co-Implementation of Compstat and Community Policing: A National Assessment

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A note on format

This report is organized to address the interests of different readers. The executive summary provides an overview of the project, including its major findings. A more detailed examination of how Compstat and community policing operated is divided into two additional sections depending on the methodology we used: a quantitative analysis of our national survey data and a qualitative analysis of the fieldwork we conducted at seven sites that reported fully implementing CS and CP. Multiple headings within each section help readers identify those issues of greatest importance or interest to them.
The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office) is the component of the U.S. Department of Justice responsible for advancing the practice of community policing by the nation’s state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies through information and grant resources. The community policing philosophy promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime. In its simplest form, community policing is about building relationships and solving problems.

The COPS Office awards grants to state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to hire and train community policing professionals, acquire and deploy cutting-edge crime-fighting technologies, and develop and test innovative policing strategies. The COPS Office funding also provides training and technical assistance to community members and local government leaders and all levels of law enforcement. The COPS Office has produced and compiled a broad range of information resources that can help law enforcement better address specific crime and operational issues, and help community leaders better understand how to work cooperatively with their law enforcement agency to reduce crime.

Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested more than $16 billion to add community policing officers to the nation’s streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives, and provide training and technical assistance to help advance community policing. More than 500,000 law enforcement personnel, community members, and government leaders have been trained through COPS Office-funded training organizations.

The COPS Office has produced more than 1,000 information products, including Problem Oriented Policing Guides, Grant Owners Manuals, fact sheets, best practices, and curricula. More than 500 of those products are currently available, at no cost, through its online Resource Information Center. This user-friendly publication search engine is used to make ordering or downloading these documents simple.

The COPS Office has distributed more than 2 million topic-specific publications, training curricula, white papers, and resource CDs through the COPS Office Response Center and another 2 million copies were downloaded from the web site, www.cops.usdoj.gov in FY2010 alone. The COPS Office also distributes these documents at a variety of law enforcement and public-safety conferences throughout the nation. The COPS Office participated in 45 conferences in 25 states in 2010 in order to maximize the exposure and distribution of these knowledge products.

The COPS Office launched its new, improved web site June 1, 2010. The web site, which is a resource used by law enforcement personnel from every state in the union, is now easier to navigate and is fully up to date. When state, local, or tribal law enforcement officials are looking for COPS Office grant programs to support their community policing efforts, they’ll be able to quickly find open programs, application instructions, and specific eligibility requirements. The web site is also the grant application portal, providing access to online application forms. The COPS web site is also a clearing house full of useful information. Publications on a wide range of community policing topics—from school and campus safety to gang violence—can be ordered for free through the web site’s resource library.
Dear Colleagues,

Over the last quarter of a century, Compstat and community policing have been two of the most influential policing reforms taking place in the United States. Due to the development of community relationships, problem solving initiatives, and the delegation of decision-making throughout the law enforcement agency, both reforms have significantly altered how routine police business is conducted and understood. Yet despite the continued growth and popularity of both, researchers have focused more on the strengths and weaknesses of each reform, rather than on how well these reforms operate when implemented together.

Recognizing the potential for these reforms to work in unison to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of police organizations, the COPS Office partnered with well-respected policing researchers at George Mason University. They were commissioned to conduct research on the co-implementation issue, with the main questions being: Do the two reforms work together, mutually supporting each other, or are there points of conflict, where pursuing one makes it hard to pursue the other successfully? Moreover, do they work independently, with each having little consequence for the other? This report is a result of a national survey, as well as site visits to seven police agencies that indicated they had fully implemented both reforms.

The authors present a look at the current state of co-implementation of both reforms and the types of compatibility problems they found. By seeing what local departments have been doing with Compstat and community policing, we hope that you give thoughtful consideration to the benefits you can bring to your own law enforcement agency, and we encourage you to please provide us with feedback on your experiences implementing them.

Sincerely,

Bernard Melekian, Director
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
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Executive Summary

Purpose of the Study

In the last quarter century or so, Compstat (CS) and community policing (CP) have emerged as powerful engines of police reform in the United States. CS is a strategic management system focused on reducing serious crime by decentralizing decision-making to middle managers operating out of districts or precincts, by holding these managers accountable for performance, and by increasing the police organization’s capacity to identify, understand, and monitor responses to crime problems. Community policing can be characterized as a philosophy and an organizational strategy designed to reduce crime and disorder through community partnerships, problem solving, and the delegation of greater decision-making authority to patrol officers and their sergeants at the beat level. It varies more than Compstat from place to place in response to local problems and community resources. To date, researchers have focused their energy on identifying the individual merits and weaknesses of each, but have given much less attention to how well these reforms operate when implemented in the same police agency. The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office) asked us to do research on this co-implementation issue: Do CS and CP work together, mutually supporting each other, or are there points of conflict, where pursuing one makes it hard to pursue the other successfully? Moreover, do they work independently, that is each having little consequence for the other?

This report presents findings from the first national assessment of CS and CP as co-implemented reforms. Given that systematic research on the co-implementation of CS and CP is scarce, the first purpose of this project was to illuminate the current state of implementation of each reform in the United States and the nature and extent of compatibility problems. Thus, we begin by drawing on data from our national survey to provide a profile of CS and CP in large police agencies. The purpose of the profile is to show what local police departments were doing with each reform, why they decided to adopt them, what some of the differences were between co-implementing and CP-only departments, and what some of the benefits and challenges were that arose from operating both reforms simultaneously.

In the next section, we draw upon observations from site visits to seven police agencies that reported fully implementing both CP and CS. The second purpose of this project was to learn how CS and CP operated “on the ground.” To this end, we identify seven core elements that the full implementation of CS and CP would seem to demand and present in-depth knowledge on how each of these elements was implemented. More specifically, we describe how CS and CP functioned in relation to one another, and we assess their level of integration (not at all integrated, low, moderate, or high).

Because of the popularity of CS and CP, our hope is that this comprehensive description of our findings and our assessment of CS/CP integration will deepen understanding among researchers, practitioners, and policymakers about the current relationship between these two reforms and provide a framework for decision-makers to envision alternative possibilities for co-implementation within local police organizations. A list of recommendations for integrating CS and CP based on our findings can be found in our report, *Maximizing the Benefits of Reform: Integrating Compstat and Community Policing in America* (2010).
Executive Summary

**Methodology**

To better understand this co-implementation issue, we used information from two sources collected sequentially: (1) a national mail survey conducted during spring and summer 2006 of 566 local and county police agencies with at least 100 sworn officers; and (2) intensive site visits (5 days in length) made to seven police agencies in 2006 and 2007 who reported fully implementing CS and CP, who experienced a wide variety of successes and problems with their co-implementation, and who differed in size, organization, and crime environment.

**Major Survey Findings**

I. **Prevalence of Co-Implementation of CS and CP**
   A. A large proportion of local police agencies were pursuing both CP and CS simultaneously (59 percent). CS was the latecomer and, in most cases, was being grafted onto already long-established CP programs.

II. **Nature of Implementation of CP and CS**
   A. A significant portion (1 in 4) of departments reported that both CS and CP played a major part in department operations.
   B. CP and CS were implemented unevenly with some of their features much more advanced than others:
      1. Agencies reported that the *most* thoroughly implemented features of their CP programs were getting officers to be more caring and respectful of the public (89 percent), establishing partnerships with other organizations (75 percent), getting the community to work with the police (64 percent), and embracing a wide range of goals as part of the department’s mission (56 percent).
      2. These are core features of CP, but agencies reported implementing *least* thoroughly many of the things that citizens would seem to value most: promoting community capacity for collective self-help (46 percent), giving neighborhood groups a say in department policies and practices (43 percent), and offering lots of nonlaw enforcement services (40 percent).
      3. Agencies reported that the *most* thoroughly implemented feature of CS was “hot spots policing” (83 percent). Also significant majorities reported they had succeeded in delegating authority to precinct commanders (67 percent), widely used crime statistics for operational purposes (65 percent), and were engaged in broken windows (60 percent).
      4. Regarding CS, agencies were much *less* likely to report that they had set crime-reduction goals (36 percent), had pinpointed the agency’s energies on a single mission (35 percent), and had replaced middle managers for not meeting organizational goals (21 percent).
   C. In terms of those features *shared* by both CS and CP, the implementation rate was fairly high. More than 60 percent of agencies reported having mostly or completely implemented fostering team work between units, problem-oriented policing, and using data to identify and evaluate problems.
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III. Reasons for Adopting CS or CP

A. One reason for adopting CS or CP was that at a very general level U.S. police leaders saw these reforms as supporting the same goal of reducing serious crime, but disparities between their responses also suggested that they regarded these reforms as sufficiently different to allow for the pursuit of more-or-less independent goals as well. The most popular reason for implementing CP was to increase community satisfaction (88 percent) while for CS it was to reduce crime (91 percent).

IV. Benefits and Challenges of Co-Implementation

A. According to our survey, a major benefit of operating CS and CP at the same time was improving police relationships with the community by facilitating information exchange and communication about crime problems (20 percent).

B. The major challenges of co-implementation were the strain on staffing and workload as a result of adopting both reforms (16 percent) and internal resistance to change (14 percent)—challenges well documented in the police literature on organizational reform.

C. While many departments reported encountering complex problems when co-implementing these reforms, a large minority of these departments also reported having mostly or completely overcome these problems. Close to one-third reported that they had mostly or completely resolved the challenges they faced, while 45 percent claimed they had been moderately overcome. Only 3 percent had not resolved the challenges at all.

Major Site Visit Findings

I. Level of Integration of CS and CP’s Core Elements

A. Officers overwhelmingly agreed that CS and CP were compatible, but our on-site observations suggested that this is because they worked mainly independently of one another.

B. We identified seven core elements that full implementation of CP and CS would seem to demand and judged the level of integration for each (not at all integrated, low, medium, and high). The following provides a broad definition of each element and summarizes our major findings and “integration assessment” for each element:

1. Mission Clarification
   Mission statements are a mechanism for helping establish the overarching goal of an organization’s existence.

   a) Unlike CS, there were no systematic measures of CP performance presented at regular CS meetings (e.g., satisfaction with police services) designed to reinforce the department’s focus on its CP approach.
      - Some CP values were reinforced at some sites but largely through occasional queries from top management during CS meetings.
b) Community members were not invited to participate in the CS process by identifying and discussing neighborhood priorities.
   - CS and CP were not at all integrated.

2. Internal Accountability
   Internal accountability focuses on making people in the organization feel responsible for their performance.
   a) Accountability for CS was mainly experienced by middle managers (although with varying degrees of intensity) through an internal, visible, and centralized performance management system linking districts to headquarters.
   b) Accountability for CP was focused on middle managers and specialist CP officers and was mainly decentralized (occurred within districts), externally driven (operated through police-community relationships) and informal (more contingent on individual relationships than structures).
      - CS and CP were not at all integrated.

3. Decentralization of Decision-Making
   Decentralizing operational command to the policing of specific territories in order to make the organization more flexible and responsive to local conditions.
   a) CP and CS shared a territorial focus but authority for making key operational decisions was devolved only as far down as middle managers operating out of districts, not to the rank and file at the beat level.
   b) Primary decision-making for CP fell to district commanders and CP specialists (operating individually or in units). Even where the patrol division was assigned primary responsibility for delivering CP, departments had not provided a clear way of making their work transparent to the command hierarchy, and CP therefore worked independently from CS.
      - Low integration of CS and CP

4. Organizational Flexibility
   This refers to a department’s capacity to move resources to where a problem is and to change or disrupt department routines to do this.
   a) Flexibility in shifting resources was defined in terms more compatible with CS than CP.
      - District commanders appeared to place a higher value on reassigning generalist patrol officers and specialist crime units in response to changing crime-trend priorities than on protecting beat integrity.
   b) CS and CP shared a focus on increasing resources available to departments through partnerships with local residents.
      - Low integration of CS and CP.
5. Data-Driven Problem Identification and Assessment
   Crime analysis is a knowledge base for driving strategic responses to crime and social disorder.
   a) Crime analysis under CS was centered on serious crimes rather than additional CP objectives of minor crimes and disorders.
   b) Identification and examination of crime problems by district commanders and crime analysts was more consistent with CS than with CP’s “bubble-up” approach to problem solving.
   c) Assessments of success under CS was based heavily on official crime statistics over a fairly short period (e.g., change between reporting periods or year-to-date) and not broader CP indicators (e.g., citizen fear levels, reduction in specific types of problems) measured over the longer term.
      - CS and CP not at all integrated.

6. Innovative Problem-Solving Tactics
   Crime data provide a basis for searching for, and implementing, innovative solutions to reducing crime and disorder problems.
   a) Similar to other research findings in the literature there was a considerable gap between the kind of creative problem solving called for by the original problem-oriented policing (POP) concept and actual practice.
   b) We distinguished three types of problem solving that occurred in various decision-making arenas within the department and combined different elements of POP:
      - Under CS, district commanders used crime analysis to identify serious crime problems and focus resources but with a continued reliance on traditional reactive crime strategies.
      - Under CS and CP, patrol officers were proactive but mainly in response to individual crime incidents, and they were under little pressure to use data to focus their activities on patterns of crime or disorder, or to be innovative.
      - Under CP, community policing officers, operating individually or in units, were responsive to a broad range of quality-of-life problems and valued crime prevention, but the process of identifying patterns among them and addressing their underlying causes was less developed.
      - Problem solving under CS was largely the domain of the police and did not correspond to CP’s approach of fostering close collaborations with neighborhood residents in all stages of the problem-solving process.
      - CS and CP not at all integrated.
7. External Accountability
   This element refers to the attempt to make police departments more transparent and accountable to the communities they serve.
   
a) Under CS, community members tended to be passive recipients of information on Part I crime statistics that had been selected by police departments and generally made available online.

b) Under CP, performance goals were rarely established in consultation with community members and subject to in-depth discussion and follow-up at CS meetings.
   - CS and CP not at all integrated.

General Conclusion on Co-Implementation
Aside from their common crime control focus, departments generally viewed CS and CP as separate yet broadly compatible approaches. Their simultaneous operation helped an agency respond to a broader set of goals and to engage in a wider variety of tasks than if they had implemented just one reform. Thus, they had an additive effect—one compensating for the weaknesses of the other in helping the organization respond more comprehensively to the diverse demands it confronted in its external environment. Put simply, CS lacked X and CP lacked Y: by implementing both reforms, a department gained X + Y.

This viewpoint probably speaks to a broader issue in policing and police scholarship: the lack of attention that has been paid to thinking about the relationship between these reforms compared to their individual merits and weaknesses.

This form of co-implementation (“separate but equal”) may minimize disruptions to existing organizational routines, but our evidence suggests that police leaders should seriously consider experimenting with alternative co-implementation approaches that seek to maximize the potentialities of these reforms.
Introduction

In the last quarter century or so, United States police have witnessed two major reform efforts that focus on shaping what the police do and how they do it: Compstat (CS) and community policing (CP) (Bratton 1998; Greene and Mastrofski 1988; Rosenbaum 1994; Weisburd et al. 2003; Willis et al. 2007). CS is a strategic management system focused on reducing serious crime by decentralizing decision-making to middle managers operating out of districts, holding these managers accountable for performance, and increasing the police organization's capacity to identify, understand, and monitor responses to crime problems (Bratton 1998; Henry 2002; Weisburd et al. 2003). CP can be characterized as a philosophy and an organizational strategy designed to reduce crime and disorder through community partnerships, problem solving, and other organizational changes, including the delegation of greater decision-making authority to patrol officers and their sergeants at the beat level (Moore 1992; Skogan 2006). CP varies more than CS from place to place in response to local problems and community resources (NRC 2004: 232).

Both innovations have diffused rapidly throughout the United States. CP reform became visible in the 1980s, and in a 1997 Police Foundation survey of police departments, 85 percent reported that they had implemented CP, or were trying to do so (Skogan 2006: 5). This process of diffusion was facilitated through the creation of the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office), and as CP was being institutionalized, CS burst on the scene. Originating in 1994 in the highly visible New York City Police Department (NYPD), CS quickly spread across large police departments. Another Police Foundation survey showed that by 2000, fully one-third of police departments with 100 or more sworn had implemented CS or a similar program, and an additional one-fourth was planning to do so (Weisburd et al. 2003). According to our 2006 survey, this CS implementation figure has increased to 60 percent and practically all police agencies (97 percent) now report implementing CP (see Figure 1 on page 18).

Researchers are still trying to determine what the effects of these reforms have been and what their future prospects are (NRC 2004; Weisburd and Braga 2006); however, it is also important to know just how well these two reforms work together in a police agency. Do they work together, mutually supporting each other, or are there points of conflict, where pursuing one makes it hard to pursue the other successfully? Moreover, do they work independently, that is each having little consequence for the other? The COPS Office asked us to conduct research on this co-implementation issue to learn what lessons could be gleaned from the experiences of U.S. police agencies that had tried to pursue both CS and CP.
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Introduction

The Compatibility Issue

Compstat’s supporters speculate that it complements and supports community policing and even improves it (McDonald 2000: 250; McDonald 2001: 27, 55). This thinking casts doubt on compatibility or integration as an issue at all. Given that these reforms originated at different times, from different sources, and for different purposes, we may rightly be skeptical about any viewpoint that asserts a natural synergy between them, even more-so when we consider that to date there is little scientific evidence to support these claims. This may explain why others are more cautious and adopting a “wait-and-see” approach (Skogan 2006: 99). Our own prior research on CS indicated that although some elements of CS were compatible with CP, there were also some tensions and incompatibilities as well (Willis et al. 2004a, 2007). Moreover, what we do know is that the theories about effective organizations that underlie the two reforms appear to be quite different.

In 1960, Douglas McGregor proposed two theories for understanding human motivation within organizations (Theory X and Theory Y) that provide a useful conceptual tool for describing and comparing the essential features of CS and CP (McGregor 1960). CS focuses more heavily on key elements of Theory X, and CP is built around Theory Y.

Theory X

This approach focuses on accomplishing results through a high degree of structure and control over the organization. People are given well-defined jobs and held accountable. There are consequences for performance, resulting in rewards, withholding of rewards, or even punishment. CS is a strategic management system in which a police department focuses on its core mission (stated as a measurable outcome) and then makes middle managers responsible for finding ways to advance that mission. Designed primarily to improve internal operations, it places little emphasis on extra-organizational interference in defining or pursuing the organization’s mission. Top-down control is highly valued, although authority can certainly be delegated to accomplish the organization’s core objectives. Under CS, there is a particularly strong emphasis on accountability and tracking an individual’s performance guarantees consequences.

Theory Y

This approach finds ways to encourage people to exercise initiative and creativity in identifying and solving problems. Instead of top-down, the energy for accomplishment bubbles up from the bottom and people are encouraged to work in teams. Authority is delegated downward, not to merely carry out the details of top management’s direction, but rather because the lowest level of the organization is likely to be most knowledgeable about what the problems are and how best to deal with them. Outside organizational influence is greeted as natural and, within bounds, a healthy way for the organization to succeed. CP celebrates a broadening of the police mission to include just about anything that citizens want to bring to the attention of the police. It emphasizes the decentralization of CP projects to the lowest organizational level, to sergeants and patrol officers working beats. Its aim is to have patrol officers working closely with the community and identifying their needs. This identification is supposed to be the principal motivation for working hard, not the direction of the organizational hierarchy. Thus, accountability has not figured heavily as a priority.
Introduction

Of course, there are similarities, too, between these reforms (e.g., their shared focus on crime) but for now this sketch of their broad differences is sufficient to suggest some caution before automatically assuming that they naturally complement each other. In the site visit portion of this report, we provide a more detailed comparison of the specific elements of each reform doctrine to more fully understand their potential for similarities and differences.

We also present findings from the first national assessment of CS and CP as co-implemented reforms. Given that there is very little systematic research on the co-implementation of these reforms, the first purpose of this project was to illuminate the current state of implementation of each reform nationally and the nature and extent of compatibility problems. We begin by drawing on data from our national survey to provide a profile of CS and CP in U.S. police agencies. The profile shows what local police departments were doing with each reform, why they decided to adopt them, what some of the differences were between co-implementing and CP-only departments, and what some of the benefits and challenges were that arose from operating both reforms simultaneously.

In the second section, we draw upon observations from site visits to seven police agencies that reported fully implementing both CP and CS. We present in-depth knowledge on how each of these reforms was implemented and multiple insights on the experiences of police departments that have made substantial advances in implementing both. More specifically, we describe how CS and CP operated in relation to each other, and we assess their level of integration (not at all integrated, low, moderate, or high).

Because of the popularity of CS and CP, our hope is that this comprehensive description of our findings and our assessment of CS/CP integration will deepen understanding among researchers, practitioners, and policymakers about the current relationship between these two reforms and provide a framework to help decision-makers envision alternative possibilities for co-implementation.
**Survey Analysis**

**Adoption and Implementation of CS and CP in the United States**

In 2006, the Center for Justice Leadership and Management at George Mason University conducted a national mail survey of large municipal and county police agencies with 100 or more sworn according to the 2000 Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (excluding sheriff’s departments). Of the 566 agencies in this sample pool, 355 (63 percent) responded to the survey. Our survey of the nation’s largest municipal and county police agencies asked police leaders to describe whether they had adopted these reforms, which aspects of each had been implemented, and how well these two approaches to policing worked together. Respondents also were asked to describe both the benefits and challenges of implementing CS and CP at the same time.

**Prevalence of CS and CP Adoption**

We asked respondents to tell us whether their departments had adopted each reform and, if so, how big a part it played in their agency. According to the departments we surveyed, CP was clearly the more established reform: 97 percent of police agencies reported implementing CP and only 3 percent were not planning to do so (Figure 1). In comparison, 60 percent of police agencies reported implementing CS, and 29 percent were not planning to do so. Nearly all co-implementing agencies had adopted CP first and subsequently incorporated CS (93 percent).

**Figure 1. CP (n=352) and CS Adoption (n=355)**
In terms of co-implementation, 59 percent of large police agencies were pursuing both CS and CP simultaneously, suggesting how these reforms work together has significant implications for how policing is done in the United States (Figure 2).

Whether an agency has adopted a reform does not tell us the dosage of implementation, i.e., its scope and intensity. Consequently, we also asked police leaders how much each reform was a part of an agency’s organization and operations. Ninety-four percent of agencies reported that CP was at least a moderate part of their organization and operations (compared with 85 percent for CS), and 62 percent said it was a major part (compared with 55 percent for CS) (Figure 3).

As for co-implementation, a significant proportion of departments (1 in 4) reported that both CS and CP played a major role in department operations.

Figure 2. Co-Implementation of CP and CS (n=355)

Figure 3. Percentage of Implementing Agencies Reporting Levels of CP (n=341) and CS Adoption (n=213)
What did CS and CP Look Like?

Of course, we know that CP and CS can vary in their content from department to department, and even departments that claim not to have adopted a particular reform may have adopted some of its features. To gain an overview of what each reform looked like in this sample, we listed 19 organizational programs and practices. We asked each respondent to indicate to what degree the department had implemented the reform. Our data suggested that CP and CS were implemented unevenly, with some aspects much more developed. In general, large numbers of departments indicated that the implementation of CP and CS were still “works in progress,” making it hard for us to get a “pure picture” of just how well these two reforms worked together.

Here is what the picture looked like for those features commonly associated with CP doctrine. They are listed from most-widespread to least in terms of substantial implementation.

Figure 4 shows that most departments felt that getting officers to be more caring and respectful of the public was the most advanced feature of their CP programs. They also valued establishing partnerships with other organizations and getting the community to work with the police. Slightly more than half felt that they had made strong advances in getting the department to accept a wide range of goals for the department’s mission. These are core features of CP, but many of the things that citizens would seem to value most are least thoroughly implemented: promoting community capacity for collective self-help, giving community groups a say in department policies and practices, and offering lots of nonlaw enforcement services.

Figure 4. Implementation of CP Elements
For the elements unique to CS, there was a greater range in the extent of implementation across the elements (Figure 5).

Most departments said they were engaged in hot-spots policing (concentrating police resources at high crime places and times) and significant majorities reported that they had succeeded in delegating authority to precinct commanders, were widely using crime statistics for operational purposes, and were engaging in broken windows policing. In comparison, the last three features are interesting because they were markedly less popular among police departments, yet they were highly valued components of the original NYPD CS model (Silverman 1999). Agencies were much less likely to report that they had embraced a single, focused mission, had set specific crime-reduction goals, and had replaced middle managers who failed to meet their goals. Finally, Figure 6 shows those features shared by both CP and CS.

Figure 5. Implementation of CS Elements

![Bar chart showing implementation of CS elements]

% mostly or completely implemented

Figure 6. Implementation of Shared CP and CS Elements

![Bar chart showing implementation of shared elements]

% mostly or completely implemented
The Co-Implementation of Compstat and Community Policing: A National Assessment

Survey Analysis

Figure 7. Reasons for CP Adoption*

For all but one of these elements, the implementation rate is fairly high—more than 60 percent of all police departments. The top three are all related to problem-oriented policing (POP), a key focus of both reforms. POP also embraces innovation, but getting people and organizations to try something new is probably the hardest thing to do. Despite this challenge, the majority of departments reported substantial implementation of this element.

Do CS and CP Share the Same Goals?

Now that we have a sense of what CP and CS reform looked like across the nation, we can turn our attention to the relationship of these reforms to each other: What kind of partners did they make? Did they have much in common? If departments had strikingly different motivations to adopt CP compared to CS, then this could tell us whether police leaders see the reforms as serving separate purposes or as mutually reinforcing.

Reasons for Adopting CP or CS

We asked departments to identify the five most important reasons for implementing each reform, selecting from a list of 15 possible options. The top three reasons that departments cited for adopting CP were to increase community satisfaction with the police, to be better able to respond to the priorities of individual neighborhoods, and because of a request from the community to do so. These reasons are followed by outcome-oriented goals, including to reduce fear and to reduce crime. Figure 7 depicts the reasons that at least 40 percent of departments claimed as the impetus for CP implementation.
The Co-Implementation of Compstat and Community Policing: A National Assessment

Survey Analysis

Figure 8. Reasons for CS Adoption*

The top three reasons given for CS adoption were to reduce crime, to be responsive to the priorities of individual neighborhoods, and to increase efficiency of service (Figure 8). At least 50 percent of all departments implementing CS reported adopting it for each of these reasons.

This shows that departments implemented CS for mostly different reasons than they adopted CP. CS was regarded, first and foremost, as a mechanism to help the police organization reduce crime, while CP was viewed as a way to respond to community needs and priorities. Interestingly, however, a significant majority of departments implemented CS to respond to citizen needs, defined as “neighborhood priorities.” Moreover, the pressure to implement CS is more likely to come from within the police department (to increase management’s direction over field operations), while CP is more likely to be adopted in response to external forces, such as pressures from the community or local government. Finally, increasing resources was not a motivation for CS adoption as it had been for CP. Under the 1994 Omnibus Crime Control Act, COPS awarded billions of dollars in grants to police departments that oftentimes stipulated CP implementation. This is not the case for CS, whose implementation has not been supported on a large scale through federal grants. Finally, unlike CS, two important goals of CP implementation were to increase citizen participation in police programs and improve the public image of the police department.

*The number of cases for this chart varied by question and ranged from 186 to 212 departments that reported implementing CS.
Combining the reasons for adopting CS and CP in a single diagram helps us distinguish similarities and differences more clearly. At a very general level, three common factors provide the impetus for the adoption of CP and for CS among at least 50 percent of departments: to reduce crime, to reduce fear of crime, and to be responsive to the priorities of individual neighborhoods. For both CP and CS, these were three of the top five reasons for adoption. Nevertheless, disparities between these responses also suggest that large numbers of police leaders regard CS and CP as sufficiently distinct to allow for the pursuit of more-or-less independent goals as well. For example, the most popular reason for implementing CP was to increase community satisfaction, while for CS it was to reduce crime (Figure 9).

**Co-Implementation: Exploring the Relationship between CS and CP**

We have seen how there appears to be some overlap but also some noteworthy differences in the major objectives for each reform and that many departments are well along the road to implementation, but the question of whether to co-implement still remains. What can departments that have not co-implemented these reforms learn from those that have? Are co-implementing departments different from those that only operate CP and what benefits and challenges do they experience?

**A Comparison of Co-Implementing and CP-Only Departments**

We have already noted that the majority of co-implementing departments first adopted CP and subsequently implemented CS. Knowing why co-implementers chose to add CS to their CP approach, whether co-implementers valued and implemented different policies and practices, and whether co-implementation brought benefits above and beyond those achieved by CP alone, might help other departments decide whether they should co-implement.
To begin to address these questions, we first compared co-implementing departments and those implementing only CP on a variety of factors. Identifying differences between the two types of departments helped to elucidate why co-implementers chose to adopt both reforms versus merely maintaining their CP focus.

Initially, all departments were asked directly whether CP and CS were compatible. Police executives overwhelmingly reported that they were. About half of all respondents perceived that these reforms were “absolutely compatible,” and when combined with those who found the reforms at least “somewhat compatible,” this proportion climbed to 91 percent. Despite this strong feeling of their compatibility, results presented in Figure 10 clearly demonstrate that departments that were co-implementing these reforms felt significantly more strongly about the degree of compatibility than those departments that were not. This finding suggests that one factor influencing the decision to co-implement may be perceived compatibility of the two reforms.

Table 1, on page 26, compares the two types of departments (co-implementing versus CP-only) on membership and accreditation status, CP statistics and reasons for adoption, and sworn and civilian personnel counts. P-values less than .05 identify characteristics for which there is a significant difference between co-implementers and those implementing CP only.

---

1. Two methods were used to make this comparison. The first method was the least sophisticated approach, simply comparing responses to select questions for the two groups. Table 1 displays those results. The second, more statistically advanced approach, applied factor analysis using 20 questions about policing strategies and their importance to the vision and operation of the departments, and these factors were subsequently included as variables in a logistic regression predicting co-implementation versus community policing implementation only. See the Appendix, Table A-1 for the logistic regression results. The full statistical methodology behind the analysis is available from the authors. Both comparisons are limited in that they relied on data collected at only one point in time, so it is not possible to conclude whether observed differences between the groups may be reasons for adoption or products of co-implementation versus only implementing community policing.

2. $X^2 = 31.2, df = 3, p < .000$. Since this information comes from a survey, it is not possible to be certain whether perceptions about compatibility influence departments’ decisions about co-implementation or whether operational decisions have influenced departments’ perceptions about compatibility.
### Table 1. Responses to Select Questions by Implementation Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership and Accreditation Status</th>
<th>Co-Implementation (mean/%)</th>
<th>CP-Only (mean/%)</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERF member</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IACP member</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>.965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALEA Accredited</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Accredited</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>.643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of CP (1=major, 2=moderate, 3=minor)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Years Implemented CP</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Chiefs Since CP Began</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>.031*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons Adopted Community Policing</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Grant Requirement</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>.029*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Grant Requirement</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce Crime</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>.002*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce Fear</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>.571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease Top Management’s Direction of Field Operations</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve Public Image of Police</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>.005*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be Responsive to Priorities of Individual Neighborhoods</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Citizen Participation in Police Programs</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>.229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Counts</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sworn to Civilian Ratio</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sworn</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Civilian</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Sworn on Patrol</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>.431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Sworn CP-dedicated (no CFS)</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Sworn 1st Line Supervisors</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>.771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Civilian 1st Line Supervisors</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>.541</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*One can be 95 percent confident that there is a significant difference between the two groups.
Based on this comparison, it appeared that departments with larger numbers of sworn and civilian personnel tended to co-implement. Departments reporting co-implementation had an average of 688 sworn personnel, versus only 233 sworn in departments implementing only CP. After removing two very large departments that skewed the results, the difference shrank to about 250 personnel, and the average for co-implementing departments was 475 sworn personnel (Figure 11): clearly this is still a considerable difference. Co-implementing departments also reported twice as many civilians than CP-only departments.

Furthermore, while not quite statistically significant, co-implementing departments appeared to have a lower sworn to civilian ratio, meaning that they had fewer sworn officers per civilian personnel than their CP-only counterparts. This may indicate more civilianization among co-implementing departments than departments solely implementing CP.

It is conceivable that higher levels of civilianization could be a by-product of increasing the number of civilian crime analysts within co-implementing departments. In fact, the mean number of civilians whose primary responsibility was crime analysis or CS in co-implementing departments was 3 compared to 1 person in departments implementing only CP. However, the same held true for the number of sworn officers holding that position. Co-implementing departments averaged 2.5 sworn crime analysts, while CP-only departments had an average of 0.9 sworn crime analysts. When accounting for the size of the sworn and civilian force overall, these differences disappeared. The proportion of civilian crime analysts out of the total number of civilians did not differ between co-implementing and CP departments. The same was true for the ratio of sworn crime analysts to the total sworn. As such, it seems that co-implementing departments’ apparent increased civilianization cannot be credited to increasing the proportion of staff dedicated to crime analysis or CS.

* Figures reflect averages upon removal of two very large departments, whose sworn and civilian force sizes were inflating the averages for co-implementing departments.

3. The means are .022 crime analysts per total civilians for CP-only and .025 for co-implementers. The t-test statistics are t=-.72, degrees of freedom = 319, p=.475.

4. The means are .004 sworn analysts per total number of sworn for CP-only and .005 for co-implementers. T-test statistics are t=-.51, degrees of freedom = 321, and p=.613.
In addition to being larger and potentially more civilianized, significantly more co-implementing departments reported being members of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), a progressive police professional organization (Figure 12). We can speculate that the adoption of new reforms is valued among members of this network—increasing the pressure to adopt or make claims of adoption. Conversely, no difference was found when we looked at a department’s membership in the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), another major professional organization for U.S. police. The fact that nearly all departments (97 percent) reported being members of IACP helps explain this finding (Figure 12).

The desire for accreditation could be another reason why some departments choose to co-implement. Nine percent more co-implementing departments reported having accreditation from the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) than CP-only departments. This difference is not quite statistically significant, but it is fairly large. Perhaps the process of review and reflection about policies and procedures that departments experience as part of the accreditation process is one impetus for reform adoption.

Another observed difference between co-implementing and CP-only departments was that co-implementers experienced greater turnover in the chief’s position since CP had been implemented in their departments. Increased turnover might invite more change by increasing the ease with which new reforms can be successfully introduced, but this finding is misleading. The average number of years that co-implementing departments had been implementing CP was 1 year longer than among those only implementing CP. Co-implementing departments had been implementing CP for an average of 14 years versus 13 years among departments only implementing CP. Although a year is a fairly short amount of time, when this difference was accounted for, there was no longer an appreciable difference between the groups on chief turnover (.237 chiefs per year for CP-only departments versus .238 chiefs per year for co-implementers).5

To this point, we have focused on general background characteristics that might help explain why some departments are more likely to co-implement CS and CP than others. Doing so provides a map of the terrain of co-implementation so that those departments thinking about implementing both reforms can plot their own place in this national picture. Asking these two different groups why they implemented CP provides a more direct means of helping departments decide whether to implement CS. Our survey showed that co-implementing departments envisioned CP in more strategic terms than CP-only departments.

5. The difference is accounted for by dividing the number of chiefs since community policing began by the number of years since community policing began and comparing these figures.
When asked to identify their reasons for implementing CP, considerable differences were found between co-implementing and CP-only agencies on three questions (Figure 13). First, many more departments implementing only CP reported that they were influenced by a state grant supporting this approach (32 percent versus 21 percent of co-implementing departments). Second, significantly more CP-only departments reported adopting CP in order to improve their public image (59 percent versus 44 percent). And finally, many more co-implementing departments adopted CP in order to reduce crime (65 percent versus 48 percent of CP-only departments). Therefore, it appears that CP-only departments were more motivated by the need to secure resources and legitimacy than a desire to be strategic with regard to crime. This conclusion is supported to some degree by responses to a question about the strength of the role currently played by CP in departmental operations. Co-implementing departments reported a stronger role for CP than CP-only departments. Thus, CP reportedly played a major role among co-implementing departments and only a more moderate one within CP-only departments.

In summary, compared with CP-only departments, co-implementers were larger and more civilianized departments. Co-implementers claimed to integrate CP more fully into their operational plans and have more strategic motivations for implementing CP than CP-only departments. Co-implementing departments also had increased exposure to progressive ideas through their membership in PERF. Yet, co-implementation did not seem to be connected to an increased opportunity for change presented by leadership turnover. These findings suggest that those departments that perceive CS and CP to be compatible, and are interested in developing a CP program that focuses on strategic outcomes (such as reducing crime and fear of crime) and improves their public image, might consider also adopting CS.
How do Co-Implementers Differ from Community Policing-Only Departments?

While helpful, focusing on departments’ claims about why they implemented one or both of these approaches tells us little about how these two types of departments differ in what they value most about these policing approaches and in how fully these reforms operated. A more sophisticated analysis was used to compare co-implementers and CP-only departments in terms of the features that were considered most important to their vision of policing and the degree to which these features were implemented. Our findings showed that co-implementing and CP-only departments differed in four ways:

1. Police executives in co-implementing departments were more likely than CP-only departments to report that they valued being *data driven*. Data driven meant using crime statistics to identify and prioritize crime problems, using data to analyze these problems, and implementing hot-spots policing. Although community policing also encourages the use of data to assist in problem solving, the emphasis on crime data as the core mechanism for identifying important problems over community input is characteristic of the CS philosophy, and so these findings are consistent with what might be expected.

2. Co-implementing departments placed a higher value on delegating authority and responsibility to the district/precinct commander level than CP-only departments. Although CP also supports decentralization to this level, it also tries to take this further down the organizational structure by empowering officers at the line level. CS, however, empowers middle managers who subsequently use accountability in the chain of command to achieve results. As such, this measure is also consistent with what might be expected when comparing co-implementing departments to CP-only departments.

3. Co-implementing departments both supported and reported actually replacing middle managers if they failed to achieve their goals. This component is a flagship feature of the CS paradigm and therefore quite consistent with adding CS to existing CP operations.

4. Police executives of co-implementing departments were more likely to report that working with the community and building community capacity to solve crime and disorder problems was less important to their agency’s vision and less likely to be fully implemented. Developing a capacity to build relationships within communities, or to work in partnership with communities, is not an explicit goal of CS, which helps explain this finding. This is inconsistent with the claim among co-implementing departments that CP, on average, plays a stronger operational role than among CP-only departments. Perhaps this is one aspect of CP on which CP-only departments place more emphasis.

In conclusion, the patterns that emerged from this comparison of co-implementing and CP-only departments has suggested that co-implementers were: (a) larger departments that had been implementing CP for a while; (b) considered CP a major part of the organization and operation of their department; (c) valued being data driven and used data to prioritize problems; (d) sought to reduce crime; (e) replaced middle managers when goals were not met; and (f) were less committed to working with community members to reduce crime.

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6. See footnote 4 for an explanation of the technique and Table A-1 for the results.
Benefits and Challenges of Implementing CS and CP: Are They Compatible?

Now that we have identified the characteristics of co-implementing departments, in this final section of the survey analysis we turn to the process of co-implementation and some of the benefits and challenges co-implementers face. We asked co-implementing departments to report what benefits they experienced from operating both reforms simultaneously and the challenges they had faced. Eighty-eight percent of co-implementers listed at least one benefit to co-implementation, while 75 percent articulated at least one challenge. This suggests that co-implementation can be challenging, but ultimately, most departments reported experiencing improved operations or outcomes as a consequence of their effort.

Benefits of Co-Implementation

Co-implementing departments reported experiencing an assortment of benefits as a consequence of co-implementation and departments that had been co-implementing for longer reported more benefits to community collaborations and relationships. A few benefits were voiced by a substantial minority of co-implementers. One in five co-implementing agencies reported that dual implementation of CP and CS had improved their external information sharing, communication, cooperation, and collaboration. This most commonly reported benefit may appear surprising when we recall that co-implementing departments were much less likely to prioritize working with the community and trying to build community capacity to solve crime and disorder problems than CP-only departments. A plausible explanation for this finding—that CS can play an important role in improving police-community relationships—is that this benefit was not so much a motivating factor for co-implementation as it was an unanticipated benefit.

Other commonly reported benefits were improved community satisfaction with the police, improved police-community relations, and increased knowledge among the community about the police (19 percent); reduced crime, increased safety, and an enhanced ability to meet departmental goals (17 percent); and better allocation of resources to areas of need (15 percent). Fifteen percent of these departments also mentioned that a benefit to co-implementation was that one reform was a tool for effectively implementing the other. Other benefits offered by at least 5 percent of co-implementing departments are provided in Figure 14 on page 32. Most of these benefits are what CS proponents would hope for: improved internal accountability, better identification of crime trends and prioritization of issues, increased efficiency, a more holistic understanding of crime problems (including at the neighborhood level), increased internal information sharing, and increased police ‘ownership’ of neighborhoods.

Challenges to Co-Implementation

In addition to these benefits, departments also experienced an array of challenges to co-implementation (Figure 15 on page 32). The most frequently reported challenge was the strain on staffing and workload as result of adopting both reforms. This was reported by 16 percent of co-implementing agencies. Other common challenges reported by at least 5 percent of co-implementing departments included confusion about how CS and CP should work together; union resistance or resistance from other personnel to the changes associated with co-implementation; competition for scarce resources (not specific to personnel) between CP and CS initiatives; a continued tendency to be reactive in spite of the expectations under CS and CP to be proactive; discontinuities between the concerns of the public and their priorities and the crime concerns identified through analysis of calls for service or crime reports; conflicts between the goals and the approaches taken under the guise of each reform; and struggles dealing with dated or poor quality data and other data issues.

7. A t-test comparing the mean number of years of implementation for each reported benefit showed a difference in the mean number of years only on this benefit (t=2.57, df=123, p=.011).
Figure 14. Most Common Benefits to Co-Implementation (n=208)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefit</th>
<th>Percent Reporting Benefit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Info Sharing/Collaboration</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Satisfaction/Relations/Knowledge About Police</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce Crime/Increase Safety/Meet Goals</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocate/Target Resources Better</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One is Tool To Do the Other</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID Crime Trends/Better Data Use</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Info Sharing &amp; Collaboration</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Efficient or Timely</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prioritize Issues</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Understanding of Crime</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Accountability</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better Problem Solving/ Proactive Policing</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure Success/Outcomes</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merge Quality of Life &amp; Crime Fighting Efforts</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood-Level Crime Trends/Police Ownership</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 15. Most Common Challenges to Co-Implementation (n=208)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Percent of Co-Implementing Departments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staffing/Workload</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Resistance to Changes</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition for Funds</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being Reactive</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition Between Crime and Community Concerns</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confusion/Lack Knowledge RE: How CS&amp;CP Work Together</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing Approaches / Goals Conflict</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dated or Poor Quality Data/ Analysis Issues</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We also asked co-implementing departments to what degree they had overcome these co-implementation challenges. More than one-third reported that they had mostly or completely overcome them and less than 3 percent reported not having resolved them at all (Figure 16).

This suggests that while many departments have encountered complex problems when co-implementing these reforms, a substantial minority of the departments reported having mostly or completely overcome these problems and, for the most part, having done so within a relatively short time frame (Figure 17). Departments who reported not at all resolving their co-implementation challenges have been co-implementing the reforms for only an average of 3 years, 3 fewer years than departments that reported mostly or completely resolving their co-implementation problems. This may indicate that departments tend to overcome initial co-implementation challenges over time, and that given time, departments with less experience may report greater success in overcoming problems. Alternatively, since the nearly 18 percent of co-implementing departments that reported only somewhat resolving their co-implementation problems have been implementing for a little more than 5 years, it is also reasonable to suspect that at least some problems may prove persistent. The most frequently reported problems among these departments with persistent challenges are consistent with co-implementing departments overall—staffing and workload challenges, internal or cultural resistance to change, and competition for resources between CP and CS.
Summary of Survey Analysis

In spite of the challenges, our survey findings suggested that co-implementing departments are convinced of the value of operating CS and CP at the same time. This is shown by the fact that a majority of large police departments are currently co-implementing and that nearly all departments reported that both reforms are at least somewhat compatible, if not mostly compatible. The challenges that co-implementers reported experiencing further suggest that CS and CP are compatible. The most commonly reported challenges did not arise from these reforms working at cross-purposes, but were more general problems of organizational reform that are well documented in the police literature: lack of resources and an organizational culture that is resistant to change. Internal conflicts between CS and CP that we have observed in earlier research (for example, tensions between improving police-community relationships through CP while also adopting a CS-inspired zero tolerance approach to quality-of-life problems) were noted much less frequently among respondents (Willis et al. 2007).
Site Visit Analysis

Although valuable, the survey did not give us a context for understanding why, given their doctrinal differences, CS and CP appeared to operate so well together. What was it about how CS and CP had been implemented that could account for the high degree of compatibility reported on our survey? To gain insights on the underlying processes that shaped how CS and CP were implemented “on the ground,” we conducted short site visits to seven police departments between July 2006 and June 2007. Some of the questions we asked included: “What was the nature of the relationship between CS and CP when fully implemented in the same agency?” “Did they operate independently, at cross-purposes, or in unison, and what particular challenges and opportunities had departments confronted when operating both reforms at the same time?” We wanted to learn about these departments’ experiences so that other agencies might benefit.

We used our survey findings to identify seven large (>1,000 sworn), medium (500–999), and small (100–499) police agencies suitable for on-site fieldwork. These sites were selected because they reported fully implementing CS and CP; they had experienced a wide variety of successes and problems in implementing these two reforms; and they were receptive to having a field researcher on site for a 5-day period. From the pool of agencies that met these criteria, we also tried to achieve variety in size, organization, geographic distribution, and crime environment. The largest selected was the Los Angeles (California) Police Department (LAPD), followed by the Montgomery County (Maryland) Police Department (MCPD). The two medium agencies were the St. Louis County (Missouri) Police Department (SLC) and Colorado Springs (Colorado) Police Department (CSPD). The three smallest were in Overland Park, Kansas (OPPD), Marietta, Georgia (MPD), and Cape Coral, Florida (CCPD). A profile of these departments is shown in Table 2 on page 36.

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8. Terminology varied among sites. For the sake of convenience, we use the generic term “Compstat” to refer to these programs at their respective departments. Similarly, we refer to each department’s chief executive officer as “chief,” to precinct commanders as “middle managers” or “district commanders,” and to all geographic areas of command as “districts,” unless otherwise stated.
The Co-Implementation of Compstat and Community Policing: A National Assessment

Site Visit Analysis

Table 2. Profile of Participating Police Departments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police Department</th>
<th>Population a</th>
<th>Sworn Civilian Violent Crime</th>
<th>Property Crime</th>
<th>Median Household Income b</th>
<th>% Unemployed c</th>
<th>CP Start Date</th>
<th>CS Start Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles, CA</td>
<td>3,879,455</td>
<td>9,393 3,292 787 2,718</td>
<td></td>
<td>$44,445</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery Co., MD</td>
<td>932,131</td>
<td>1,211 440 231 2,484</td>
<td></td>
<td>$87,624</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado Springs, CO</td>
<td>376,807</td>
<td>681 313 569 4,797</td>
<td></td>
<td>$50,892</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis Co., MO</td>
<td>331,489  d</td>
<td>753 250 124 1,054</td>
<td></td>
<td>$53,186</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overland Park, KS</td>
<td>165,975</td>
<td>240 54 200 2,736</td>
<td></td>
<td>$68,404</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Coral, FL</td>
<td>142,371</td>
<td>209 124 265 3,447</td>
<td></td>
<td>$54,026</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marietta, GA</td>
<td>63,228</td>
<td>136 32 633 4,147</td>
<td></td>
<td>$40,645*e</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Bureau of Labor Statistics, April 2007. For areas in a larger MSA area, these data are presented.
d. These data were collected from the St. Louis County Police Department Fact Sheet (2004). The population is for the jurisdictions served by the police department.
e. 2000 data—Marietta’s 2006 data are unavailable.

While on site, the main research activities were: (a) observing department activities, including community, pre-CS, and CS meetings in the department and district; (b) gathering documentation; (c) using a semistructured questionnaire to interview those most familiar with how these reforms operated, including key decision-makers in the operational chain of command; (d) interviewing and observing patrol officers during ride-alongs; and (e) conducting 90-minute focus groups with six (on average) first-line supervisors. Respondents were asked to describe how the organization had implemented CP and CS, the substance of their programs, their experiences with the two reforms, their assessments of successes, disappointments, and failures, and their recommendations for improving the simultaneous operation of these reforms.

Although we did our best to learn as much as we could while on site to produce an accurate and unbiased picture of how these reforms operated, it is appropriate to note some of the limitations of our study and how we sought to overcome these. Because we were only on site for a short period, we had to rely more on in-depth interviews than direct observation. This meant that what we learned was heavily dependent upon the experiences and memories of a relatively small number of participants (approximately 25 per site, including focus group members). In an attempt to maximize the quality of what we learned, we worked with our on-site liaison to schedule interviews with those department members most likely to be familiar with CS and CP, and thus best positioned to provide useful insights. While on site, we remained open to the possibility that other knowledgeable department members might be recommended to us. When this occurred, we did our best to fit them into our interview schedule. Moreover, we tried to corroborate what we heard by cross-referencing individuals’ comments and by pressing those we were interviewing to provide us with concrete examples. In writing this report, we have tried to take into account the range of opinions that “differentially situated informants” told us and to avoid making generalizations based upon the comments of a single respondent (see Moore et al. 2004: 272). Finally, to help make this report as accurate and
even-handed as possible, we sent an earlier draft to the sites we visited. We asked them to respond to our portrait of how CS and CP worked in their department at the time we visited, paying particular attention to any factual errors. While some may have disagreed with a few of our conclusions, all agreed that our description of CS and CP was fair and accurate.

Before turning to the site visit analysis, we identify seven core elements that the full implementation of CS and CP demand and summarize our assessment of where the respective reform doctrines stand on these elements (Table 3). We then develop this comparison for each individual element as we describe how CS and CP were implemented at our seven sites.

Table 3. A Comparison of the Doctrines of CP and CS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform Element a</th>
<th>Community Policing</th>
<th>Compstat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission Clarification</td>
<td>Broadening of police mission to include wide range of objectives</td>
<td>Focusing core mission on reducing crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal accountability</td>
<td>Peripheral or nonexistent</td>
<td>Highest priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization of decision-making</td>
<td>To lowest level in the organization</td>
<td>To middle managers (district commanders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational flexibility</td>
<td>Capacity to accommodate innovation and differing needs within communities</td>
<td>Capacity to reallocate resources for effective accomplishment of crime control objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data-driven problem identification and assessment</td>
<td>Empirical analysis is expected and valued</td>
<td>Empirical analysis is essential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative problem solving</td>
<td>Innovation is expected and valued</td>
<td>Innovation is expected and valued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External accountability</td>
<td>Police consult with community on objectives and progress toward them</td>
<td>Police publicize traditional crime statistics as measures of agency accomplishments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The yellow cells represent elements where the two reform doctrines show the greatest difference. The blue cells are those where there are no appreciable differences. Those cells shaded green are where there are some differences, but they are not great.

a. In our shorter recommendations report we identify “policing methods” as a separate reform element (Willis, Mastrofski, and Kochel 2010). Unlike the shorter report, this report focuses on providing a systematic and detailed description of our findings for each reform element—every one of which obviously involves specific police practices. Consequently, we do not treat policing methods as a separate element here.

Doctrines are essentially theoretical abstractions about how things are supposed to work and not how they actually do so. We use these doctrinal principles to help structure our inquiry into how these reforms actually operated, and to identify some of the major challenges and opportunities that these departments experienced from operating CP and CS at the same time.
How were CS and CP implemented?

Our on-site observations suggested that CS and CP have been implemented “buffet style,” with police departments selecting from a wide variety of dishes and flavors. That is, police departments have picked from the various elements of these reforms and adapted them to their own tastes. This is not to say that these sites had nothing in common, but that there was significant variation in how these reforms were adapted to local circumstances. As many would likely anticipate, this was especially true of CP, an approach more multifaceted and diverse than CS.

Our fieldwork supported our survey findings that these departments had made concerted attempts to implement several of the key reform elements of CS and CP into their organizations; however, our on-site observations also suggested that these reforms operated largely independently. This independence helps explain why we did not observe the tensions between CS and CP that we observed in our previous field research in the Lowell, Newark, and Minneapolis police departments (Willis et al. 2007). Although the focus of this earlier research was on CS implementation (and not CP), because all three agencies had also implemented CP we were able to gain some insight into the co-implementation issue. We observed that the agency that had done the most to suffuse CS and CP into its structures and practices also experienced the greatest conflict between them. Statements by police officers in Minneapolis revealed how community partnerships and service competed with crime control through surveillance and law enforcement, and how answering calls for service, though valuable to community policing, conflicted with the demands of directed patrol (Willis et al. 2007: 163).

To be sure, across the seven sites, some elements such as organizing operations geographically were related, but generally CS and CP elements could be characterized as only loosely interdependent. Our observation that CS and CP were stove-piped may also help explain why respondents to our survey rarely mentioned incompatibilities or conflicts between them. Using the key reform elements identified above, we now turn our attention to a detailed analysis of how CS and CP were implemented in the departments we visited. In evaluating this relationship, we asked ourselves, “To what extent were CS and CP integrated?” Then we assessed their level of integration by applying a set of ordered-type response categories: not at all integrated, low, moderate, or high (a summary comparison of how each element worked under CS and CP can be found in the Discussion). Our judgment of each individual element was the outcome of a two step process: (1) fully describing the doctrinal similarities and differences between CS and CP outlined in Table 2 on page 36, and (2) using this doctrinal comparison as a yardstick to assess the level of integration we observed at the sites.

Mission Clarification

Mission statements are a mechanism to help establish the overarching goal of the organization’s existence. CS focuses the organization’s energies on reducing serious crime, while CP commits an organization to a wider set of objectives that includes giving equal importance to reducing fear of crime, responding to quality-of-life issues, building police-community partnerships, improving community relations, and protecting citizens’ rights.

Moreover, the process of how these goals are developed also differs. Rather than defining the community as an essential partner in identifying the organization’s mission, CS has evolved as a management responsibility essential in the first step of acting strategically, not toward a wide range of potentially diffuse goals, but rather to focus department resources on the thing that matters most (Bratton 1998). In contrast, CP requires that those who are outside of the police organization (construed generally as the “community”) play a key role in defining what the organization should be trying to accomplish (Roth et al. 2004: 20). The police are obliged to bring the community into the process of selecting objectives (Weisburd and McElroy 1988). Given the diverse expectations that the public places on police and the diversity of “communities” that have
an interest in what the police accomplish, CP has necessarily encouraged a substantial broadening of the police mission from the rather singular focus on law enforcement and crime control that flourished in an earlier reform era from the 1930s until the 1970s (Moore 1992). Thus, CP embraces the notion that what is a high priority for one neighborhood may not fulfill the needs of another. And although the nature of community participation may vary widely, it is nonetheless a constant and ongoing feature of CP—an essential part of the process of departmental guidance rather than a preliminary step to be taken once and not repeated. Thus, CP is all about promoting the more democratic aspects of guiding the police in setting major goals (Mastrofski 1998).

At the sites we visited, department-level CS meetings served a variety of purposes, but one of the most important was to help clarify the organization’s commitment to its core value of crime control. This was frequently accomplished by focusing on a variety of traditional performance indicators—most commonly Part I crimes and number of arrests. In contrast, while nearly all of those we interviewed commented on the importance of CP to their respective departments, there were no systematic measures in place for CP performance. Consequently, CP’s core objectives were all but invisible at CS meetings, suggesting to us that the mission element was not at all integrated under these reforms.

Under the auspices of CP, all seven agencies had embraced value-laden mission statements that included references to working with the public, reducing fear, or improving public safety. These were often highly publicized, promulgated through the department’s web site, promotional literature, and its annual report. Under CS, there was greater variation in how each organization articulated and reinforced its commitment to its crime control mission. Only one police department, the LAPD, had established a specific and highly visible crime-reduction goal (a 5 percent reduction in Part I crime for the first 6 months of 2007). In contrast to the crime-reduction goal of the LAPD, the CS missions of the other departments took one of the following forms (see Table 4): (1) setting a more modest goal that did not involve an explicit crime-reduction percentage from prior years’ performances (crime maintenance); (2) making statistical comparisons with crime rates for past months and years (crime monitoring); or (3) reiterating a general commitment to reducing crime and fear of crime (general crime commitment).

Table 4. CS Crime Control Mission (goals are for 2006 or 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific and highly visible crime-reduction goal</th>
<th>Crime maintenance goal</th>
<th>Monitoring of crime rates, but no specific crime goal</th>
<th>General commitment to lower crime levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAPD – 5% in Part I crimes for first 6 months of 2007</td>
<td>CCPD – Keep Part I crimes below 3,500</td>
<td>MPD – quarterly, monthly, and year-to-date comparisons</td>
<td>SLC, MCPD – commitment to low levels of crime and disorder, but no articulation of crime-reduction objectives or regular measurement of progress toward this goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPPD – Keep Part I crimes below city’s average of last 3 years; annual comparison of performance benchmarks to 19 similar cities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSPD – Keep Part I crimes below national average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


At these other departments, leadership underscored the importance of fighting crime, but the absence of a specific crime-reduction goal suggested that top executives were using crime statistics more as a management tool to gauge the internal performance of their organizations than as a measure for holding the organization and its leaders directly and publicly accountable (although this was still important).

During our interview, Chief Bratton of the LAPD said that setting crime-reduction goals was integral to the CS philosophy of “managing through goal setting and risk taking.” This was designed to make the organization highly responsive to a leadership that had staked out crime reduction and improvements in quality of life as the organization’s top priority. Without a goal, the thrust of this message was weakened and there is no “metric” to measure the performance of the organization and to reinforce the importance of its vision. Following this line of reasoning, we may infer that the reluctance of other police leaders to follow such a bold and uncompromising approach may be because of the considerable risk associated with goal setting. After all, an agency’s failure to meet a clearly defined goal could ultimately undermine the credibility of the police chief and the organization. We did not ask chiefs directly why they had not set a specific crime-reduction goal, but one reason for not doing so might have been that they were discomfited by the idea of narrowing their all-purpose service roles in favor of a single focused mission.

Finally this reluctance to set specific crime-reduction targets could be linked to something deeper—a long-standing disagreement between police and academics about the capacity of the police to reduce crime. Chief Bratton believes unequivocally that the police can affect crime rates, but our fieldwork suggested others are more skeptical (Bratton and Malinowski 2008). Across sites and ranks, other informants felt that specific crime-reduction goals were unrealistic, citing “forces” beyond their control. For example, one sergeant noted that there were fewer opportunities for break-ins at construction sites, not because of police actions but because there had been a decline in the city’s construction boom, while another respondent remarked that robberies could not be prevented because you could not put a “cop on every corner.” This ambivalence about the police role in reducing crime may help account for why some departments chose not to set crime goals, while others eschewed specific annual percentage reductions for less restrictive measures. The latter approach seems to embody this kind of uncertainty most clearly. In providing a less rigorous benchmark for success, it acknowledges the possibility that over a longer period there are some occasions when the police succeed and others when they do not. In other words, this approach acknowledges that factors outside of police control can influence crime-fighting success.

In terms of the process of developing department goals, having local community representatives regularly attend CS meetings and discuss local priorities as part of the “team” of presenters would have been one strategy for helping the organization focus on the objectives of greatest importance to its constituents. It would further help involve the community directly and consistently in department operations. Several respondents suggested that community members were welcome to attend CS, but they did not mention that this invitation extended to their participation. We could identify very few local residents at the CS meetings we attended, and we did not observe any one of them being called upon or volunteering to express community concerns. It seemed to us that CS meetings were part of an internal management system for assessing performance and a mechanism for continuously focusing a department’s energies on what its leadership believed the community wanted most. Despite the visibility and importance of these meetings to department operations, they were not used as a structure for the police to “consult the community for guidance on purposes, priorities, policies, and practices and enlist the public in jointly co-producing police services” (Mastrofski 1998: 165).
The lack of community involvement at CS should not be used as an indicator of a lack of commitment to CP. CP was clearly prized by all the police leaders at the departments we visited. These chiefs were highly visible in the communities they served and each spoke of the importance of developing police-community partnerships and being responsive to community concerns. Chief Velez of the CSPD, for example, said that he not only cared about what the public thought the police should do, but he also wanted to incorporate what they cared about into police plans. Chief Flynn of the MPD also spoke passionately about his department’s commitment to CP. This approach from the top is consistent with the oft-repeated claim that CP is “not a program, but a philosophy,” meaning that a leadership’s first task is to articulate a set of “values” that guide employees, who exercise considerable freedom in devising ways to achieve objectives consistent with those values (Sparrow et al. 1990). We did not measure the commitment of line officers to CP, but our research suggested top leadership had worked hard to communicate and disseminate many of the core values of CP throughout the organization. Across sites, interviewees acknowledged CP’s emphasis on establishing relationships with local residents, on being patient and respectful when addressing citizens’ concerns, and on handling minor complaints and quality-of-life issues.

CP values, however, were markedly less conspicuous at each department’s regular CS meetings—widely regarded as the centerpiece of the CS model. The display of crime statistics at CS is a powerful mechanism for clarifying and exalting the organization’s mission and holding district commanders accountable for their crime control efforts. Out of the CS meetings we attended at six agencies, we did not observe the systematic presentation and discussion of CP measures as a means of underscoring the organization’s commitment to its CP approach. Without practical measures for assessing results, it is challenging for top management to evaluate the organization’s CP performance (Rosenbaum et al. 2008). When we talked to specialist sergeants assigned full time to CP units, some expressed frustration about the difficulty of assessing success under this reform. It was quite possible that they could invest many hours in handling an ongoing neighborhood dispute for which there was no solution (neither parties were willing to compromise), but these efforts would go unmeasured by the department and potentially unnoticed. One of these sergeants also observed that his CP unit was one of the few that did not contribute any numbers to CS. We heard this in another department, where a supervisor of the CP unit remarked that the chronic noncrime problems handled by his officers were not tracked at CS.

The apparent challenge of measuring CP performance helps explain why at some sites CP concerns were virtually invisible at CS meetings, while at others top managers were left to convey the importance of CP to the overall vision of the organization through means other than some kind of “bottom line” measurement of performance. The value of CP during these meetings was produced by leadership asking district commanders directly about CP strategies and tactics: Had they solicited information about a crime problem from local residents and provided crime prevention tips? Were they engaging the community in the department’s outreach programs? Through their responses, district commanders demonstrated their understanding of and commitment to CP. Of the three departments that had made a deliberate attempt to incorporate community policing values into CS—the LAPD, MPD, and OPPD—CP concerns surfaced most frequently in the CS meeting of the LAPD.

When district commanders in the LAPD responded to deputy chiefs’ questions about crime patterns, like other sites they tended to emphasize traditional law enforcement tactics (such as saturated patrol or vehicle stops) targeted at specific places and times. Nevertheless, district commanders also described how they had combined enforcement approaches with aspects of CP, such as warning residents of a recent crime spike and suggesting crime prevention tips. The meeting conveyed an expectation that when proposing strategies to crime problems, district commanders should be engaging with their constituents. That deputy chiefs asked district commanders directly about the role of the community in crime responses...
appeared to encourage this approach. On occasion, we were told that top leadership would also invite officers specifically charged with dealing with neighborhood complaints and community outreach to attend the meeting and answer questions. This would appear to help reinforce the department’s focus on CP during CS meetings.

The MPD had also introduced some of the elements of CP into their CS meetings as part of a conscious attempt to give their CS program a more community oriented focus. Here, district commanders reported on the quality-of-life complaints they had received from citizens over the prior month and how they responded. These were typically brief (e.g., how many complaints received, how many resolved, and perhaps a sentence or two on those that were recurring), but this approach did at least suggest an attempt to broaden CS’s focus on Part I index crimes to include quality-of-life complaints. Similarly, in the OPPD, the chief had established specific performance indicators for the CP unit (e.g., violent and nonviolent crime rates in city schools), but these were limited to a handful of specific locations for which the unit was responsible, retained CS’s focus on traditional crime indicators, and were not addressed at the CS meeting we attended.

In sum, just as our survey findings reported, most departments had not adopted a specific crime-reduction goal that asked them to keep improving their performance. This does not imply a lack of commitment to crime control; the Part I crimes on display during CS meetings underscored the importance of crime. However, it does suggest that many police leaders may prefer not to embody the agency’s values in the kind of highly visible and tangible objective for which they could be held directly accountable.

CS’s sharpened focus on serious crime through quantitative measures contrasted with the broader qualitative approach departments adopted to assess CP, one where top management were left to form general impressions of CP performance based on middle managers’ responses. CP objectives were clearly valued but they were only stated in general terms and not supported with the kind of metrics that reinforced these departments’ commitment to crime control. Since CP was, at best, very weakly linked to the potentially powerful CS mechanism that held middle managers accountable for performance, we felt it fair to assess mission clarification under these reforms as “not at all integrated.”

The more diversified mission of CP made it difficult to harness the features of this reform to this particular CS element. Adapting the mission clarification element of CS to CP implies developing a system that can monitor success on the wide variety of problems that officers are frequently called upon to handle, many of which are not now readily measured by most U.S. police agencies. Despite some attempts to come up with other indicators, departments continued to invest most of their attention and effort in recording official crime data. The limitations of this approach for evaluating performance was noted more than a decade ago by one of the authors of this report and is still relevant today: “A contemporary police department’s system of performance measurement remains substantively rooted in the perspective of the reform waves that were gathering force in the 1930s under the leadership of August Vollmer, J. Edgar Hoover, the Wickersham Commission, and others” (Mastrofski 1996: 209).

To a significant extent, CS defines what matters to the organization by the priority it affords the measures it uses; thus, it suggests a useful way of harnessing top management’s objectives to data on CP. If good policing is something more than making arrests and seizing guns, then including alternative means to measure success (such as scientific surveys on residents’ perceptions of fear of crime, neighborhood decay, and quality-of-life problems) would seem to be one critical step toward changing this feature of traditional police culture.
Internal Accountability

Both CP and CS aim to make people in the organization feel responsible for their performance. CS does this by holding district commanders directly accountable for reducing crime in front of top management at department CS sessions, while CP tries to encourage officers to take ownership of crime and other problems in their beats. CS stresses motivating people by comparing their actual performance to expectations and rewarding or punishing them accordingly—Theory X management. CP leaders have wanted to give the rank and file a chance to self-realize (at Maslow’s highest level by solving community problems), and they are expected to do so naturally when given sufficient training, opportunity, resources, and rewards. That is, CP stresses motivating people by inspiring them to accomplish valuable things—Theory Y management. Given these differences, we wanted to know how these approaches worked together.

Similar to mission clarification, our fieldwork suggested that accountability under CS and CP was not at all integrated. Internal CS meetings at the department-level helped top leadership hold district commanders routinely accountable for crime (although rarely in the same type of pressure-cooker environment as the NYPD) but not for CP. Asking district commanders to report on or respond to a series of questions bearing directly on the crime problems in their districts allowed headquarters to exert direct control over district commanders for meeting those objectives they considered most important. In contrast, accountability under CP occurred mainly between the police and the community, within districts, and under less “scripted” conditions that gave district commanders broad discretion in deciding how to respond to community concerns. Not only was accountability under CP more decentralized and externally driven than under CS, it also appeared to be experienced least intensely by those whom CP tries to hold most responsible: generalist patrol officers.

Not long after CS was implemented in the NYPD, its meetings quickly garnered a reputation for being harsh and unpleasant. In our interview, Chief Bratton explained that when he took command of the NYPD, the tense atmosphere during CS was designed “to effectively shake up the organization”—an organization in a state of inertia. He continued that he wanted to take the opportunity to correct the misconception that other agencies had to adopt a similar approach. According to Bratton, CS’s accountability mechanism could and should be adapted to suit a department’s own needs. This is what he had done in the LAPD. Noting the different culture on the West Coast compared with the East Coast, he said that CS meetings he ran were more relaxed in LA than they were under him in New York (Bratton and Malinowski 2008).

This distinction raises the question of how accountability under CS and CP operated at the different sites we visited. Because CP does not have a similarly strict and well-defined accountability mechanism, we were particularly interested in how much and in what ways command staff and line officers were made to feel responsible for their performance. Did CS’s accountability mechanism in some way influence the way that police were held accountable for doing CP and accomplishing its goals?

None of the sites we visited had recreated the kind of confrontational CS atmosphere that was a hallmark of the NYPD model. In fact, several of the chiefs said they had deliberately tried to avoid such an approach, regarding it as inappropriate and counterproductive. For example, Chief Petrovich of the CCPD reflected that his management style was not heavy-handed, and he felt that he had “great people” doing their job. Similar to Chief Bratton’s observation about needing to shake up the complacent and underperforming NYPD, he commented, “If you have to threaten people, then maybe you have another problem.” A high-ranking officer in another department remarked that an adversarial approach was unhelpful because it promoted conflicts between deputy chiefs and their district commanders.
Other than being questioned in front of one’s peers or being threatened with admonishment from the department’s highest-ranking officials, there are other features of CS meetings that can heighten accountability. For example, district commanders not knowing in advance which specific crimes or crime trends they may be called upon to explain intensifies the sense of having to be familiar with all the crime problems in a district. The tone of inquiry and the nature of the questions during the meeting can also convey a clear message about the level of expectations for performance, as can the depth of the examination. Finally, systematic follow-up on issues raised at prior meetings ensures that district commanders are held continuously responsible for what happens in their beats.

When we used these criteria for our assessment, there was a lot of variation in how CS’s accountability mechanism operated across sites. Our impression of accountability was that it was highest in the LAPD, where district commanders were held directly responsible for reducing crime in their districts and contributing to the department’s overall crime-reduction goal. At weekly CS meetings, crime comparisons (prior month and year-to-date) showing decreases and increases in Part I crime rates were displayed and district commanders were questioned primarily on the latter (shown in red). Arrest statistics were also shown, and these were used as another indication of whether a crime problem was being addressed satisfactorily. The expectation appeared to be that any increase in a particular crime should be matched with a corresponding increase in that crime’s arrest rate. While measuring arrest rates is not a very good indicator of whether a crime problem has actually been resolved, it does provide some indication of police activity, and in this sense, may be useful for gauging a district commander’s commitment to mitigating a crime problem.

District commanders could obviously anticipate being asked about crime increases, but the content of CS meetings was determined separately by the CS unit. Moreover, deputy chiefs in the LAPD, who had met earlier in the week to examine the crime data and decide what questions to ask at the upcoming meeting, determined the direction of the meeting by asking a salvo of specific questions about crime problems. In all the other departments we visited, senior command staff might raise a handful of questions, but for the most part district commanders exerted greater control over the meeting by choosing how to report on crime in their districts. Thus, by exercising much greater top-management control over the CS agenda, the LAPD attempted to shape police priorities more than did other departments, which gave middle managers a freer hand.

The tenor of the overall meeting in the LAPD was not confrontational, but the atmosphere was stern and respectful, and it was clear that the performance of district commanders was being assessed. Deputy chiefs referred to crime data from previous CS periods and asked questions on why crime was increasing. They also asked what district commanders were doing about a particular crime problem, whether and why they thought it was working, and what alternative crime responses they had considered. District commanders were expected to show that they were familiar with crime patterns, to have at least thought about the possible underlying causes of these problems, to have come prepared with a wide array of responses, and to account for the successes or failures of their crime strategies. Not only was the line of questioning uncompromising for the period under review, district commanders were also asked follow-up questions from prior CS meetings: deputy chiefs were rarely satisfied with a district commander’s initial response and each district commander was scrutinized for nearly an hour. Detectives were also required to attend CS and to answer frequent questions about their progress on solving cases.

Because the actions of district commanders at the other sites were not subjected to the same high level of scrutiny as those in the LAPD, accountability was experienced less intensely. Still, whatever form it took, requiring district commanders to report on crime in their beats sent a message, albeit much less forcefully, that they were being held accountable for their performance. At the CS sessions in the MPD and CCPD, district commanders were expected to be acquainted with problems in their districts and to demonstrate an effort to deal with these problems. Unlike the LAPD, however, they were not under similar
pressures to provide detailed strategic plans (increasing patrol would often suffice as a response). Moreover, they were much more likely to have to respond to questions that were informational (“Have you had a response to the letter you sent to X [business owner]?”) rather than inquisitorial (“Why did you choose this strategy and how do you know it is working?”). The former is obviously a less intimidating and demanding approach to assessing performance. In those departments where district commanders were required to answer questions on how they were responding to problems in their districts, we were much more likely to hear about “panic” before the meeting or district commanders suddenly requesting additional crime information before presenting than we were at those sites where accountability measures were less stringent.

Accountability for reducing crime was experienced least intensely in those departments where operational command changed with each shift, or where district commanders were not required to report on crime problems in their districts and explain their response to top command. In the OPPD, primary decision-making was temporally-focused and fell on shift commanders with the rank of captain who were in charge of policing the entire city during certain periods of the day or night. Statistics for Part I crimes were presented on a monthly basis at the department’s CS meeting, but they were not broken down by shift, nor were shift commanders asked to present on crime patterns and explain their deployment decisions. Moreover, shift commanders shared responsibility for planning and implementing strategies with the bureau commander of tactical operations and his subordinate, the major of the patrol division. By dividing accountability between positions and across shifts, exactly whom to hold responsible for the organization’s crime performance was less clear than at those sites where operational command was geographically based.

Finally, CS’s crime accountability mechanism was least stringent in the SLC and MCPD. Here, crime was one of many departmental concerns addressed at the CS meeting. Different units gave status reports on their activities in the past month (e.g., overtime issues, recruitment issues), and district commanders did not have to respond to questions from command staff on the crime trends and patterns in their districts. In fact, before the meeting in the MCPD, district commanders were asked to provide a slide that selected one crime trend in their district and to report briefly on the response. On the whole, they were not required to answer questions on why they chose to respond a certain way, nor to justify their selection of a particular crime strategy.

Because the actions of district commanders were not subject to careful scrutiny in many of these sites’ CS programs, participants frequently characterized CS as an arena for information-sharing and improving communication between units in the police department rather than as an effective and relentless tool for assessing performance. For example, one respondent in the CSPD referred to CS as just another staff meeting, while a respondent in the MPD said that communication was the biggest “key word.” Other respondents were more cynical, believing that the lack of accountability coupled with the display of last month’s crime data made CS largely a waste of time. One respondent commented that these meetings were just a recapping for the chief and senior command staff on what happened the previous month and were “completely worthless.” These criticisms are probably a little too harsh: even in a generally supportive atmosphere, the possibility of looking inadequate in front of top leadership and one’s peers focuses a district commander’s attention on trying to do well.

Unlike CS, CP did not have a similarly centralized and visible mechanism for measuring and providing consequences for performance. This did not mean that mechanisms for experiencing accountability under CP did not exist, but it did make them more difficult to observe. Given our short time on site, this made it particularly challenging for us to assess how accountability under CP worked. Fortunately, our interviews, focus groups, and ride-alongs allowed us to discuss this issue directly with line personnel. We have already noted how, at least in some departments, some accountability for CP was experienced through CS meetings, but this does not explain how accountability for CP may have been experienced outside
of this formal setting. What mechanisms were in place for holding command staff and line officers responsible for CP goals and strategies, including identifying community priorities, planning responses with local residents, and putting these plans into action?

Our fieldwork suggested that the burden for CP duties fell most heavily on district commanders and specialized CP officers operating individually or in units (CPOs).9 In contrast to CS, which tried to tighten control between the district level and top management, accountability for CP mainly occurred within districts and through regular face-to-face meetings with local residents. In most departments, district commanders and CPOs attended monthly or quarterly community meetings. Like CS, accountability at these meetings was experienced mostly by district commanders who: (1) Had to demonstrate an understanding of district problems; and (2) Were required to do so through dialogue in a public setting. Despite these similarities, accountability under CS relied heavily on the attendance of high-ranking police officials at CS sessions. It follows that the absence of top leadership at local community meetings meant that accountability for CP was experienced less acutely and that district commanders had wider discretion to run these meetings as they saw fit.

CP puts particular emphasis on pushing authority and responsibility down the rank hierarchy, so we were particularly interested in how those at the bottom of the organization—sergeants and patrol officers—experienced accountability under CP. According to CS doctrine, grilling precinct commanders on their crime-reduction efforts is supposed to “reinforce the patrol officer’s desire to combat crime” (Silverman 1999: 194–5). It does so through district commanders conveying the pressure they experience under CS down the chain of command. A district commander who has been rebuked in CS for an inadequate strategy may presumably return to her district and chastise her line officers. CP takes a different approach. It does not try to reinforce management control over line officers through essentially negative means (the threat of punishment or fear). Rather it recognizes and embraces their considerable discretion and tries to channel decision-making by emphasizing the intrinsic worth of the CP approach. This is accomplished by promoting CP values and beliefs to win over the “hearts and minds” of the lower ranks and by putting some mechanisms in place that help convert CP rhetoric into reality (Lurigio and Skogan 1994: 315).

According to its supporters, a principal mechanism for heightening responsibility for CP among the rank and file is requiring that they attend and manage local beat meetings (Skogan 2006). Empowering officers to take personal ownership of their beats through this particular organizational structure designed to build closer relationships with local residents was not something we observed at the sites we visited. From time to time, sergeants and patrol officers may have attended the meetings described above, but they were not required to take on the kind of leadership role assumed by district commanders. Thus, it was permissible to sit to the side, or to address individual complaints in one-on-one interactions. As a result, those at the lowest levels of the organizational hierarchy were not an integral part of the process that helped strengthen the commitment of district commanders and CPOs to local community needs.

Instead, accountability for CP among patrol officers depended heavily on the influence of their immediate supervisor or patrol sergeant. In a traditional patrol assignment, annual performance evaluations can play an important role in establishing accountability for individual performance. At each site, these appraisals generally required that an officer’s immediate supervisor rate and sometimes comment upon an officer’s performance in a number of different areas (e.g., conduct and

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9. Terminology varied across sites for those officers with a specialized community policing assignment. To minimize confusion, we refer to all these officers as community policing officers (CPOs).
discipline) including CP and/or problem solving. However, based on what we heard, sergeants generally viewed annual evaluations as tools that helped managers make administrative decisions (e.g., promotion, job assignment, training needs) and not as a major opportunity to convey expectations about the goals and strategies of CP.

These expectations were more likely to be transmitted informally when sergeants chose to offer guidance, counsel, encouragement, or censure to officers as they carried out their regular patrol duties. The many different styles of front-line supervision imply wide variation in how accountability for CP was experienced by rank-and-file officers (Engel 2001). Unlike CS where top management uses CS sessions to articulate and clarify more uniform expectations for performance throughout the organization, CP performance at the rank-and-file level was based on a number of factors including a sergeants’ understanding of community policing, the value they placed on this approach, and how much and in what ways they chose to address it with their subordinates. Thus, the success of CP was largely contingent upon the will and skill of individual sergeants and their relationship with their officers. In this respect it contrasted sharply with CS’s focus on making the organization responsive to leadership direction by controlling and coordinating managerial accountability (for which the creation of regular CS meetings played an important part).

In sum, the departments we visited expected their officers to be engaged in fighting crime and doing CP, but accountability under these reforms operated independently. Our findings suggest that these organizations had adopted two different models of shaping performance under these reforms. The CP strategy for accountability was distinguished by its focus on the intrinsic beliefs of individuals, while CS sought to improve performance through a more traditional command-and-control approach. Under CS, all seven departments had adopted some kind of crime meeting where leadership could call on district commanders to account for their crime performance. Although more collegial than confrontational and more efforts- than results-oriented, these formal meetings were intended to operate as a mechanism for enhancing top-down control within the organization.

District commanders were similarly empowered under CP, but control was decentralized and performance was not part of the kind of accountability structure that was in place for CS. Unlike CS, which strengthens the link in the chain of command between headquarters and the districts in a way that revitalizes the traditional control elements of police organizations (Weisburd et al. 2003), under CP it was largely left up to district commanders to decide which CP objectives to pursue, how to pursue them, and whether they were being met. With no measurement systems in place for systematically recording and tracking community concerns, it was difficult for top management to hold district commanders directly accountable for their CP efforts. Our fieldwork suggested that it was through face-to-face interactions with residents at community meetings, rather than more formal structures for assessing performance, that accountability for CP was primarily experienced. Among the rank and file, responsibility for CP was similarly decentralized to the district level, and first-line supervisors and their subordinates exercised considerable discretion in deciding how to implement this approach.
Decentralization of Decision-Making

A key feature of both CS and CP is decentralizing operational command so that it is focused on the policing of specific territories. This is designed to make the police organization adept at responding to the specific needs of diverse neighborhoods and the different kinds of crime and disorder problems they experience (NRC 2004: 174). Under CS, primary decision-making responsibility is delegated to middle managers in charge of districts or precincts. That is, the organization puts a higher priority on commanders who specialize in territory than those who specialize in function and gives district commanders a larger share of the department’s resources to control. Functionally specialized units—such as patrol, detectives, school resources officers, and traffic—are placed under the command of the district commander, or arrangements are made to facilitate their responsiveness to the commander’s needs.

The CP movement shares this “territorial imperative” with CS, but opinions vary on whether CP responsibilities should be assigned to specialists working independently or in units, or to generalist patrol officers (Bayley 1994: 146). By and large, CP reformers have stressed the benefits of de-specialization (Moore 1992)—that is devolving operational command to much smaller geographic areas than districts (e.g., beats) and pushing decision-making further down the organization to the rank and file operating at the beat level (Goldstein 1990).

In this section, we focus on how operational command was organized geographically under CS and CP and on the nature of decision-making autonomy. Given the similarities and differences described briefly above, to what extent was this element integrated under the two reforms? At a broad level, our findings demonstrate strong support for CP and CS’s shared emphasis on geo-based policing, but the decentralization of command had not gone much beyond middle managers operating out of districts to the rank and file assigned to beats (Mastrofski and Ritti 2000: 199). One way to conceptualize this difference is to consider the level or levels in which the organization vests responsibility for a distinct space, whether it is a beat, sector, district, or city. Aside from the OPPD, the lowest-ranking officer in the departments we visited with 24-hour responsibility for a geographic area was a captain operating out of a district. While the operational focus of both reforms was on specific territories, because decision-making power was concentrated among midlevel managers at the district level and not devolved further to generalist patrol officers operating out of beats, we assessed the level of integration of this element as low.

Organizational Structure

Six of the seven agencies we visited were partitioned into individual districts that operated relatively autonomously as command bases. Some departments (e.g., SLC) had sought to devolve geographic decentralization even further by subdividing districts into smaller sectors and giving lieutenants broad discretion for managing these particular areas. Perhaps the most vigorous attempt to take geographic organization all the way down to line officers was the LAPD’s Basic Car Plan. Under this model, small geographic units were serviced by a single patrol car to which nine officers had been permanently assigned. In addition, each basic car area was assigned a senior lead officer (SLO) who was responsible for coordinating the

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10. The OPPD was not divided into districts as called for by the doctrines of CS and CP. The focus of operational command was the entire city and this responsibility fell to a commander in charge of an 8-hour shift. Consequently, in this discussion we focus on the other six departments that were decentralized geographically (unless specifically noted).

11. The MCPD was experimenting with a geo-based management plan in some of its districts that involved teaming a sergeant with a small group of line officers and giving these teams 24-hour responsibility for a particular beat. At the time we visited this was still in its trial phases and had not been implemented department-wide. For these reasons, we don’t report on it here.
car’s activities across different shifts. Despite these attempts to devolve authority and responsibility down the organizational hierarchy, lieutenants and SLOs did not have the authority to make wide-ranging decisions without supervisory approval and did not have 24-hour responsibility for a given area.

**Decision-Making Authority**

Middle managers were empowered most under CS and felt that they could make decisions without approval from above. All the district commanders we spoke to reported that they possessed significant autonomy in managing their own districts. They were ultimately responsible for scheduling, deployment, and choosing and implementing crime strategies, and they rarely had to justify their daily decisions. Many were also responsible for meeting with local residents and making decisions about community problems, although they also seemed keen on their sergeants and patrol officers taking this kind of initiative on their own.

As for devolving decision-making authority and responsibility further down the rank hierarchy, many of the command staff and field supervisors we interviewed told us that they exhorted their patrol officers to engage in CP activities. To facilitate this process, attempts had been made to assign officers to geographic areas for relatively long periods (usually several months). Deploying officers geographically was seen as a way to help them develop familiarity with an area and to build relationships with local residents.

These efforts notwithstanding, we did not observe the kinds of major changes to existing organizational structures called for by CP reformers intended to support a much higher level of territorial decentralization. CP advocates acknowledge that line officers exercise a great deal of discretion, but seek to specifically channel the way they exercise their judgment in the direction of CP goals by providing significant relief from the pressure of responding to 911 calls and by decentralizing police operations to the beat level. These goals include developing partnerships with community members, learning about the major concerns of residents in their beats, and problem solving.

At the sites we visited, in the absence of major changes to existing dispatching systems and to resource allocation, the calls-for-service workload appeared to conflict with CP objectives. In Chicago, attempts were made to mitigate the tension between these competing priorities through (1) the creation of carefully crafted dispatching rules designed to maintain beat integrity by allocating calls selectively, and (2) through the creation of rapid response teams designed to buffer beat officers from rushing call-to-call (Skogan and Hartnett 1997: 53–4). Both measures were designed to support the decentralization of decision-making by ensuring that officers spent most of their time in their beats and would have greater opportunity to adopt a “proactive, prevention-oriented stance towards a range of neighborhood problems” (Skogan et al. 2002: 4).

Neither had our departments managed to streamline their organizational structures to put “key decisions in the hands of those supervisors closest to the work itself” (Mastrofski 1998: 163). The idea here is that primary responsibility for CP should be assigned to those who influence street-level practice most directly and who, based on their detailed knowledge, have the greatest insight into community problems. According to this vision of CP, patrol supervisors should be given the freedom to decide how best to mobilize their resources to advance the organization’s CP objectives. From this “bottom up” perspective, middle managers articulate the organization’s CP values, collect information on first-line supervisors’ activities, and review results but they allow sergeants a great deal of discretion in setting priorities and deciding on how best to respond. Again, the case of CP implementation in Chicago is instructive for illustrating how this principle can work in practice.
The Chicago Police Department institutionalized geo-deployment all the way down to the beat level in an attempt to transform the traditional day-to-day realities of all its patrol officers to comport with its CP philosophy (Skogan and Hartnett 1997: 53). The city’s 25 police districts are made up of 9 to 15 beats (279 total), with an average of 3,600 households per beat (Skogan et al. 1999: 58). There was significant variation among beats in terms of population and amount of crime, but the focus was on assigning officers to geographic areas that were small enough that they could become very familiar with those who lived there, as well as the chronic problem areas and times. Small teams of about 9–10 officers were assigned to each beat and, under the supervision of a sergeant, had 24-hour responsibility for this area. The sergeant was in charge of helping these officers identify and respond to a broad range of neighborhood problems, developing a timetable for working on them, and assigning responsibilities (Skogan et al. 2004: 18). Consistent with CP’s emphasis on decentralizing decision-making authority, sergeants were expected to try and guide subordinates’ decision-making rather than ordering them what to do (Skogan and Hartnett 1997: 101).

In sum, nearly all of these departments had engaged in a significant degree of geographic decentralization—an approach that is highly compatible with both CS and CP—by assigning command staff and patrol officers to specific areas to help foster a sense of ownership for a given turf and a sense of responsibility to local residents. In this sense it could be argued that CS and CP functioned together. But geographic decentralization had not really advanced to the level that many CP reformers have advocated—a thorough decentralization of decision-making authority to patrol officers at the beat level. Under this “bubble” up approach to CP, ideas are expected to come from patrol and not just from specialist units. Moreover, it is not enough for this type of initiative to occur “intermittently” (Moore 1992: 127), instead organizations need to be restructured in ways that specifically empower patrol officers to problem solve and build community partnerships as a significant part of their daily routine. Such an approach is highly decentralized and places a great deal of responsibility on individual officers for determining how they spend their time, and thus how they mobilize their department’s resources.

Despite a general turf orientation, CP responsibilities fell most heavily on the shoulders of specialist officers or units, which helped insulate departments from making more radical organizational changes. Generally, these CPOs were freed from calls-for-service responsibilities so that they could serve as the department’s liaison with external constituents (particularly community groups) and engage in problem-solving activities. Patrol generalists were exposed to their department’s CP philosophy and were given training, but their main responsibility was to respond to calls-for-service. The patrol officers we observed during our ride-alongs focused almost all their energies on routine patrol, answering individual calls for service, and responding to crimes identified by their superiors as a priority. A high-ranking official at the OPPD illustrated this clear division of labor when he loosely characterized first-responders (patrol officers) as short-term problem solvers while CPOs were responsible for longer-term solutions. He gave the example of having CPOs deal with those mentally ill citizens who drained police resources by constantly calling the police. Similarly, a lower-ranking officer in the SLC noted that neighborhood or CP officers were responsible for handling problems that “beat officers do not have time for.”

Despite a shared geographic focus, because the structure of geographic decentralization and decision-making had not moved down each organization to the neighborhood level we assessed the level of integration of this element under CS and CP as “low.” The closer integration of CS and CP would have heightened geographic accountability beyond midlevel management by redefining the daily realities of patrol work for those located at the bottom of the rank hierarchy (Skogan 2006). The lack of significant variation between departments may be indicating that the form of geographic decentralization we observed is all that these two reforms can tolerate, since they call for the concentration of decision-making power at different levels within the organization. On the other hand, there is probably room for departments to grant patrol officers more autonomy while still considering middle managers as the focal point of decision-making.
This is the strategy used by the Chicago Police Department, one that eschews a CP approach that relies on specialist units. To increase geographic responsibility down the chain-of-command, Chicago has reorganized around beat teams and made those at the bottom of the rank structure responsible for taking actions and producing results. As there is no systematic evidence on whether this form of geographic decentralization is possible to sustain alongside the department’s recently introduced CS program, one can only speculate on the compatibility of these reforms under such a model (Skogan 2006).

Organizational Flexibility

Organizational flexibility refers to a department’s capacity to move resources to where a problem is and to change or disrupt department routines to do this. Both CP and CS call for more flexible organizations to respond to variations in the organization’s environment. Where they differ is that CP requires flexibility in meeting the demands of diverse constituencies, while CS’s conception of flexibility is giving district commanders the capacity to move or transfer resources as they see fit to meet changing crime-trend priorities.

For CP, organizational flexibility is accomplished by: (1) placing a premium on keeping officers assigned to a given beat for a long time and buffering them from answering calls outside of this assignment, so they can learn about, bond with, and better serve, their neighborhoods; and (2) increasing the resources available to the department through partnerships with local residents, neighborhood-level community organizations, and other city agencies. An example can help illustrate the difference under (1). If beat A is experiencing a crime spike, should a district commander take officers from beat B to support beat A’s team in dealing with the spike? According to CS, the district commander has the authority to do this, but from a CP perspective shifting resources from one beat to another would be frowned upon as it undermines CP’s neighborhood focus. Instead, the officers assigned to the beat where the problem was occurring are responsible for working with local residents to come up with a collective response.

Across sites, flexibility in shifting resources was defined in terms more compatible with CS than CP—especially the organization’s reliance on specialized units to meet unpredictable demands—and as a result we assessed the level of integration of this element as low. While all appeared to have developed partnerships with local stakeholders, one of the general benefits of which was the opportunity to mobilize external resources to help resolve local problems, flexibility was not accomplished by adopting a CP approach that strongly committed the organization to keeping generalist patrol officers assigned to a small area for a long period. This is perhaps unsurprising, given such a high level of geographic decentralization conflicts with “the need of administrators to transfer officers for a variety of personnel and work demand reasons” (Mastrofski and Greene 1993: 97). In addition, the CP literature has paid scant attention to the issue of organizational flexibility, and thus offers little guidance to police departments on how they should reallocate resources in response to sudden and unpredictable demands.

The clearest example of this reluctance to commit resources to specific geographic areas was provided by the OPPD. In its attempt to heighten accountability and to sharpen the agency’s focus on results, it had replaced geographic with temporal or strategic deployment. All patrol cars were now equipped with a GPS (Global Positioning System) so that those cars that were available and nearest to a call could be identified and immediately dispatched without being constrained to any particular area. In addition, the OPPD used its weekly strategic deployment meetings to identify crime hot spots (concentrations of crime in specific geographic areas and at specific times) and to assign officers to patrol those areas when not answering
calls. We were told that it was important for these officers to be visible, vigilant, and proactive in these areas. In adopting this deployment approach, it had intentionally sacrificed its district-level focus (and hence its commitment to meeting the changing demands of local neighborhoods) for directed patrol and lower response times.

Our other departments (as noted earlier) had invested more heavily in geo-deployment. Officers were assigned to reporting areas within a district, but could be called upon to respond to crime problems whenever and wherever they arose. Thus, the most common practice of reallocating resources outside of normal patterns was for a district commander or first-line supervisor to direct a patrol officer away from some of their more routine activities during their shift and asking them to pay particular attention to a specific problem area.

Another key method for increasing flexibility was the creation of specialist units that were not bound to answering calls for service (unless other units were unavailable) and that could be moved either within a district or between districts. In response to serious problems, district commanders could call upon these specialist crime units. In some departments, (e.g., the LAPD and the MCPD) units for this purpose had been assigned to each of the districts. In the MCPD, for instance, district commanders were assigned SAT (special assignment teams) which could be used to address emerging crime problems. When we visited, one district commander told us that he had just assigned his SAT officers, who operated in plainclothes and in unmarked cars, to address a robbery problem he was experiencing in this district. Similarly, district commanders in the LAPD were provided with antigang, narcotics, and vice units.

In the other smaller departments, district commanders were not allocated their own special crime units or “taxi squads” and typically had to turn to headquarters when they needed additional resources to address serious crime problems. As in the LAPD and MCPD, these tended to take the form of specialized crime units that engaged in enforcement strategies. For example, in the SLC, district commanders could call upon the Community Action Team (CAT) which was responsible, according to one informant, for performing “many tasks for the street” determined by “where the crime statistics show the need is.” These tasks included tackling robberies, drug dealing, and gang crime, and it was generally expected that the CAT would be responsible for making arrests and vehicle stops. A respondent stated that the CAT was aggressive and conducted 20–25 stops per night and made 2–3 felony arrests, including arrests for warrants or parole violations. In the MCPD, district commanders could call upon the centralized PCAT (a mobile Police Community Action Team); in the OPPD it was the TAC (Tactical Support) squad. Similarly, district commanders in the MPD could call upon the Criminal Interdiction Unit (CIU) that dealt mostly with drug crimes, or the STEP (Selective Traffic Enforcement Program) unit whose primary focus was on traffic enforcement.

CS’s focus on Part I crime numbers tended to pressure district commanders into looking for any available resources to address increases in crime. As a result of this “crime counting,” it was common for district commanders to compete over centralized specialist crime units which were in high demand (or getting “worked to death” as a respondent put it), with their assignment going to that district whose crime problem was deemed most serious. Once the unit had been assigned, it played an important part in the district commander’s overall crime-reduction strategy. The district commander monitored its success carefully, as did other district commanders who were waiting for it to be reassigned to their districts when it became available.

Contrary to the call of many CP reformers for police organizations to de-specialize, all of the agencies we had visited had created individual specialist CPOs or CP units either assigned to the districts or operating out of headquarters. While the responsibilities of these units varied across sites, their primary function was to focus on activities commonly associated with CP, including crime prevention, problem solving, and community outreach. During our visits we were told that district
commanders would often call upon these officers or units to address minor offenses and instances of social or physical disorder that were persistent and affected significant numbers of people (such as complaints from local citizens and business owners about day-laborers congregating at a shopping area or neighborhood disputes). These resources could be shifted from place to place as nonroutine problems occurred, which freed up patrol officers to respond to calls for service.

The flexibility and independence associated with CPOs and CP units also helps explain why they were used as a general resource within the department. In the CSPD, for example, some CPOs spent much of their time monitoring registered sex offenders and, as in other departments, were responsible for answering high profile complaints to the city council or chief’s office. In some ways, the Zone Management Teams (ZMT) in the MPD also resembled a catch-all resource. These teams which had been established as part of the department’s CP program consisted of a lieutenant, two sergeants, six patrol officers and members from different specialized units. Rather than operate as a formal structure for a coordinated and sustained response to district-level problems (they very rarely met as a team), they provided a loosely knit group of motivated individuals from which a district commander could select on an as-needed-basis. Unlike other patrol officers, those assigned to a ZMT were expected to get out of their cars more often during their shift and meet people, because they were, as one interviewee stated, a “face for the department.” All ZMT members were also required to attend their zone’s quarterly Town Hall or community meeting. Oftentimes, a ZMT member could be called upon to handle a community complaint, but these teams were seldom engaged in systematic crime prevention efforts or long-term problem solving. As one respondent on a team put it, the zone team gave a district commander one person on each shift to whom he could say, “I need you to do this.”

So far this discussion has focused on the various personnel that are made available to district commanders within their departments, but agencies can also increase flexibility by designing organizational structures for mobilizing outside community resources. These can then be used to customize responses to the problems that suddenly arise within a given territory. The latter is a core element of CP and not usually associated with CS, but our observations suggested that this feature was shared by both reforms. All sites had worked hard to organize communities and develop partnerships with residents, business owners and building managers, and other city agencies. Not only did partnerships provide district commanders with opportunities to exchange information and get outside groups involved in enhancing public safety, these stakeholders could be called upon to assist in responding to the crime problems identified at CS (such as asking community leaders in a housing project to let residents know that any additional gang violence would result in a swift and firm police response). Similarly, district commanders and CP units called upon outside agencies (e.g., code enforcement, zoning inspectors, public works) to help resolve complaints from local residents about minor crime and disorder problems. For example, at a town meeting in one of the SLC’s districts, residents were concerned about children playing basketball in the street. In addition to talking with residents, the watch commander contacted parks and recreation to explore the possibility of converting a nearby tennis court into a basketball court.

It is probably fair to say that implementing a CP program that assigns officers to permanent beats for the specific purpose of engaging in CP activities is labor intensive, expensive, and limits organizational flexibility (Skogan 2006). Moreover, in departments that cover large cities, like Los Angeles, where neighborhoods are spread out over many miles, this approach is impractical with the limited resources available. All but the OPPD had opted for a hybrid CP strategy. Generalist patrol officers learned about CP’s philosophy and were encouraged to find time to do it, but the main responsibility for CP practices fell to specialist units operating out of headquarters or individual districts. Not only does this strategy put less strain on existing resources than a more generalist, beat-based approach, its benefits include making an agency responsive to management direction and minimizing disruptions to existing organizational structures and routines (NRC 2004: 177).
The fact that both CS and CP were similarly structured with a heavy dependence upon specialist officers or units suggested to us that all seven sites were unwilling or unable to limit organizational flexibility in the ways called for by CP reformers. The risks of limiting the accomplishment of CP objectives to specialists are well-known (Moore 1992: 135; Sadd and Grinc 1994; Skogan 2006), but a benefit of this approach is that it can be an effective mechanism for making resource allocation responsive to management direction. CP units operating out of headquarters were not bound to specific neighborhoods and could be flexible about when and where they worked. Freed from responding to 911 calls, they provided all district commanders with a valuable mechanism for directing resources quickly and efficiently to nonroutine problems as they arose. In contrast, the long-term assignment of generalist patrol officers to small geographic beats coupled with a staunch commitment to keep them there (such as creating rapid response units to help maintain beat integrity as in Chicago) limits an organization’s capacity to change resource allocations and practices. It also wrests control out of the hands of middle management by placing more authority in the hands of sergeants and patrol officers in choosing how to mobilize.

Because there is tremendous variation between neighborhoods in terms of demographics, income, and crime, the decentralization of decision-making authority is seen by CP advocates as a powerful means of improving the organization’s responsiveness to their different needs and priorities (NRC 2004: 174). Those that are closest to the neighborhood are regarded as most knowledgeable about residents’ concerns and about how to handle them (including potential problem-solving resources, e.g., local churches, community activists, business owners, etc.). From this viewpoint, a potential drawback of assigning CP duties to mobile CP units is that they don’t have sufficient opportunity to develop the kind of local contacts and knowledge that supports prompt identification of emerging issues and responses that are tailor-made to specific local circumstances. This is not to suggest that these units were not well-versed in CP goals and practices (after all, a major benefit for dividing responsibilities among specialist units is that it allows agencies to focus relevant training and experience on a particular issue), but that the likelihood of them customizing police strategies and tactics was lowered because they did not work on a daily basis in the same neighborhoods that they served.

To sum up, the creation of separate specialist enforcement and CP officers and units allowed organizational flexibility under CS and CP to act in ways that were more or less independent of each other. This is illustrated well by the officer-in-charge in charge of the special enforcement unit at one of our sites. When asked about the relationship between his unit and the department’s CP unit, he replied that the former focused on serious crimes while the latter was responsible for minor issues such as abandoned cars. His rationale for this division of responsibilities was that this ensured the two units did not duplicate efforts.

District commanders could respond to unpredictable crime spikes by reassigning patrol officers and/or specialist crime units who were available to move within or between districts. CP specialists helped free up patrol officers for this purpose while also providing district commanders with a resource for supporting the organization’s commitment to CP. Where CS and CP were mutually reinforcing was in the willingness of district commanders to mobilize resources from outside the department, whether in response to crime problems identified at CS or to quality-of-life issues. In light of these findings, we assessed organizational flexibility under CS and CP as low.

12. The initial goal of the Chicago Police Department was to keep beat teams on their assigned turf for 70 percent of their dispatches (Skogan et al. 2002: 6).
The Co-Implementation of Compstat and Community Policing: A National Assessment

Data-Driven Problem Identification and Assessment

Crime analysis is fundamental to CS and CP as a knowledge base that drives strategic responses to crime and social disorder. There are, however, some important doctrinal differences: (1) CS relies on a department’s existing record-keeping system to focus the organization’s energies on serious crime, while CP solicits input from community residents to identify a broader range of minor crimes and disorders deserving of police attention; (2) CS empowers district commanders, along with crime analysts, to identify and analyze problems, while CP places higher value on sergeants and patrol officers participating in this process; and finally (3) Under CS, department responses are assessed at weekly, biweekly, or monthly CS meetings by tracking enforcement activities (e.g., numbers of arrests, levels of reported crime, and clearance rates); in contrast, CP advocates the use of additional, nontraditional measures to assess success over the long term (e.g., citizen fear and satisfaction levels, and indicators of physical and social disorder) (Goldstein 1987; Peak and Glnesor 1999: 94–96). Given these similarities and differences, was crime analysis under CS and CP integrated or did it operate independently?

Our fieldwork suggested that data-driven problem identification and assessment under both reforms was not at all integrated. All our agencies had developed sophisticated systems of record keeping and gathering data to support CS’s focus on rapidly identifying when and where serious crime was occurring, but these same systematic mechanisms were generally not in place for identifying and measuring additional CP objectives such as community problems, reductions in social and physical disorder, and citizen’s fear of crime. Furthermore, consistent with CS doctrine, the responsibility for using crime data to make strategic decisions fell squarely on the shoulders of district commanders and their executive officers. In comparison, rank-and-file officers were not major consumers of crime analysis. Finally, each organization relied much more heavily on using traditional crime indicators to assess its overall performance over a fairly short period (e.g., change between reporting periods or year-to-date) than on broader CP indicators measured over the longer term. Below, we discuss how crime and disorder problems were identified under CS and CP, how data were used, and how outcomes were assessed.

Identification of Crime and Disorder Problems

The crime analysis units (CAU) in all seven departments differed in structure (decentralized/centralized), staffing (number of personnel, level of education, and training), and level of specialization (whether analysts were assigned to specific or all Part I crimes), but they all used existing record keeping systems for the rapid collection and dissemination of crime data. Under CS, the primary source of these data was officer reports on individual crime incidents, but CAUs also collected information from other sources, including officer arrest reports and calls for service.13 The attractiveness of CS’s focus on serious crimes is that nearly all urban police agencies already have decades of experience in collecting data on individual crime incidents. What CS does is heighten the organization’s capacity to respond to sudden changes in its crime environment by increasing the speed that these data are made available for decision-making. Across sites, data were generally available within a day or two after an officer took an incident report.

Analysts tended to read all officer reports but paid particularly close attention to those serious crime incidents that were regularly presented at CS and that were reported as Part I index crimes to the FBI. Data from officers’ reports were either downloaded automatically into a database, or were entered by data entry clerks. Crime analysts then aggregated these data by type of crime for each district and/or citywide to help identify crime trends or patterns.

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13. Accident reports taken by officers were also a key source of information, particularly for identifying and responding to high accident locations. Because traffic tends to be a concern in most local communities, the analysis of these data was an important function of crime analysis units. Our focus here is on crime and disorder, so we do not examine the process of identifying traffic problems.
The four main kinds of information that crime analysts used for these purposes were: sociodemographic (the personal characteristics of crime offenders, such as race, age, and sex), modus operandi (key elements of the crime), spatial (the location of the incident), and temporal (day of week and time of day) (Boba 2005). To glean as much useful information as possible, analysts also read the narrative section of an officer’s report. All this information could then be organized by type of crime and presented in a tabular form on a spreadsheet that usually included the record number, date of report, location of crime, date and time of occurrence, method of the crime, and a brief narrative of the offender or incident. CAUs, particularly those with more than one analyst, also mapped individual incidents and applied basic statistical techniques (e.g., frequencies, percentages, means, and rates) that presented the data in a user-friendly format. Instances of more complex statistical techniques, such as regression analysis or drawing ellipses around geographic concentrations of crime, were rare.

These spreadsheets tabulating crime incidents were usually disseminated electronically to district commanders daily, who also read the arrest and incident reports for their district from the previous day. In addition, CAUs frequently sent district commanders basic statistical tables and charts describing crime patterns (pie charts, histograms, time series graphs). These were also made available to other members of the department, typically through some combination of sending them via e-mail, placing them in a folder on the department’s server, and presenting them electronically (PowerPoint), or in hard copy form, at roll call. CAUs also tended to put short summaries of their analysis in a daily crime bulletin that included crime trends, descriptions or pictures of suspects, and any other information analysts considered useful for patrol (e.g., crime alerts, upcoming events). This bulletin was also widely disseminated throughout the department.

We have already noted how CP broadens the police mandate beyond traditional crime categories, but while the agencies we visited had developed sophisticated data systems to support CS’s focus on rapidly identifying when and where crime was occurring, these same mechanisms were not in place for CP objectives. CP places great value on the policing of problems or “persistent concentrations of related incidents” that concern significant numbers of people who live or work in an area (Skogan 1999: 3, 35). These problems may be synonymous with incidents of serious crime, but they often include complaints about minor crimes, physical decay, and social disorders (e.g., noise, dilapidated housing, abandoned vehicles, neighbor disputes, graffiti, prostitution) (Skogan and Hartnett 1997: 8).

Traditional information systems of the kind used by CS are in many respects inadequate for the purpose of identifying and learning about these concerns. First, more minor complaints are frequently not reported and therefore do not show up in official police records. Second, even if they are reported, they risk being labeled inaccurately because they do not fit with existing criminal or statutory codes (Skogan and Hartnett 1997: 218; Goldstein 1990: 39). Third, they require more sophisticated measures of success than merely the number of arrests or citations issued. The implication is that police departments must develop mechanisms for soliciting input from the community and for setting priorities among the concerns that are raised. As part of this “bubble-up” process, there needs to be the development of a records-keeping system that allows the police to collect information on physical decay and social disorder (not just legally defined incidents) and to record what strategies have been implemented (Skogan et al. 1999: 67).

Our observations suggested that these sites took citizens’ concerns seriously, but mechanisms were not in place that would have helped them systematically identify community problems, determine priorities, and document results, especially at the neighborhood level (CP’s primary focus). For example, the SLC solicited community feedback through ongoing online and mail-in card surveys, and officers in the CSPD were expected to record in a database at least one problem that they had been working on over the previous 4 months. While both attempts display a willingness to broaden the police mandate beyond serious criminal matters, neither is accurately characterized as a new mechanism for ensuring that the police and community work together closely to identify and analyze problems.
How Were Data Used?

Consistent with CS doctrine, the responsibility for using crime data to make strategic decisions fell squarely on the shoulders of district commanders and their executive officers. These managers read officer reports daily to familiarize themselves with what was going on in their areas and used the materials provided by crime analysts as a tool to mobilize resources. They had not, however, been given much additional training in analyzing crime data and so the information disseminated through CS had not resulted in a major restructuring of daily decision-making. District commanders were highly sensitized to what was going on in their areas, but this improvement in the speed and focus of their responses had not resulted in radical departures from past practices to try things they had rarely done.

Under CP doctrine, patrol officers, as with CS, are not expected to make decisions about district-level policy, personnel issues, and resource deployment, but unlike CS, “fuller use” of their professional skills and creativity is supposed to be made by giving them significant latitude to decide when and where to patrol (Goldstein 1990: 27; Skogan 2006a: 37). Using crime data is an important part of this process because it helps patrol officers, in consultation with their sergeants, to identify and set priorities. In this respect, the rank and file should not be passive recipients of crime data, but apply it along with their local knowledge as part of a more deliberative approach to identifying and reducing problems in the course of their daily work.

Much of the crime data produced by the CAUs and presented at CS were made available to the rank and file through computer databases, e-mail, or at roll call, but because CS concentrates decision-making at the district commander level, rank-and-file officers were not under similar pressure to use these data in the ways they were intended. District-level CS meetings attended by the lower ranks would have been one approach for encouraging the “bubble up” of ideas about crime priorities and providing guidance on this process, but at the few sites we visited where these meetings were actually held, they were rarely attended by the rank and file. When patrol officers did attend, they seldom participated in discussing the data on show. Nor were other structures put in place to help sergeants and patrol officers make more effective use of this resource. They did not receive special training in the kind of practical analysis skills that would have helped them use these data in ways that were not merely incident-driven, nor had the 911 call system been reorganized to shore up this kind of activity.

The absence of these kind of support structures for crime analysis helps explain why patrol was not held strictly accountable for its problem-solving efforts—under these conditions, it would have been unfair of the command staff to do so. Undoubtedly there were some good officers who worked on problems some of the time, but while some “freelance” problem solving may have taken place, this approach is more accurately described as a “collection of individual efforts” than a comprehensive organizational strategy (Skogan et al. 1999: 9). As a consequence, the way that officers used crime data to identify problems was likely to be highly variable at best, and at worst they may have chosen to ignore the data completely. We did not hear of officers making maps or calling up calls-for-service data to identify hot spots or to diagnose problems. Moreover, when we spoke to crime analysts, they remarked that it was rare for patrol officers to approach them for help on a crime problem and some doubted they looked carefully at the crime information that they were given.

Our impression was that problem identification under CS was experienced mainly as a series of directives from above. These were conveyed from district commanders to sergeants, who then used roll call as an opportunity to tell patrol officers the major crime problems for their shift, including where they should go and some of the things they should be doing (e.g., getting out of cars, writing tickets, etc.). During one ride-along, a veteran patrol officer told us that a rookie would know very little about the department’s CS program: he/she would be given information from a supervisor and directed to do something without knowing the reasoning behind the decision. In short, officers were told about crime priorities in their
districts, but they were not routinely included in the process of analyzing and discussing crime data. Aside from a few specific directives, the problem identification approach under CS from a patrol officer’s perspective generally took the form of, “here is something you might find useful, or you should keep an eye out for.”

From a CP perspective, an important mechanism for the identification of problems is regular community meetings. These provide a venue for community members, and not just the police, to define those issues that matter to them most in their neighborhoods. Of course, police can observe problems during their regular activities, but without a mechanism for systematically identifying community problems, it is difficult for police departments to know the problems that are the cause of greatest concern and are deserving of the most attention.

At the departments we observed, this “bottom up” approach was a fairly haphazard process because community meetings were not structured for the specific purpose of identifying problems and ranking them in terms of their importance to the community. So, for example, none of our departments had organized around a beat team concept designed to support this approach. Officers were instructed to be responsive to citizens’ requests on a case-by-case basis, but the primary responsibility for soliciting organized feedback on chronic problems in local neighborhoods fell to district commanders and/or specialist CPOs attending monthly or quarterly community meetings. Individual residents could obviously communicate their concerns online, or through e-mail and phone calls, but one of the main benefits of community meetings is that they can provide an effective channel for residents to rate which specific issues are most problematic. This is accomplished by the police shifting attention from the selective, anecdotal accounts of individual residents to identifying collective concerns.

Despite the important role these meetings played in fostering closer police-community partnerships, there were no standard procedures in place for how to rank, record, handle, and provide feedback on the wide variety of concerns that were often raised. At the few meetings we were able to attend, district commanders and CPOs were very attentive to community problems (some even called in officers from their day’s assignment to address individual complaints), but these were not part of CS’s formal management accountability system. Some departments took minutes at these meetings, but those we read tended to merely summarize what was discussed, including broad crime trends and tips for crime prevention. These may have included a brief update of a problem reported at an earlier meeting, but their major purpose was to provide a brief account of what transpired and not to serve as a reliable source of data for identifying and tracking problems over time. This contrasts with CS’s focus on routine data collection to promote a “big picture” approach of setting priorities, identifying trends, and developing strategies.

Moreover, while these gatherings helped departments learn something about community priorities, it was not through an organized process of linking generalist patrol officers who actually worked in the neighborhoods on a daily basis with those who lived or worked in them. One of the benefits of having beat officers attend regular and frequent beat meetings is in making them directly accountable to beat residents, while also fostering a CP model based on “close coordination” between the two groups (Skogan and Hartnett 1997: 132). The fact that many patrol officers did not attend these meetings or, if they did so, were not engaged in addressing citizens’ concerns, can help explain why patrol officers seemed to think of CP in the rather limited (yet still important sense) of providing high quality and personal service rather than as a broader organizational strategy for policing more effectively. This was especially true of the smaller departments, like the OPPD, MPD, and CCPD, or those that contracted their services to other towns (SLC), who stressed their commitment to a high level of service by responding to every call, no matter how minor. Along with addressing crime, Chief Jerry Lee of the SLC defined community policing as “providing first-class service.” This is a key feature of CP, but CPOs were much more likely than general patrol to think of CP in more strategic terms; to these specialists, CP included implementing crime
prevention approaches, building partnerships, and problem solving. This difference could be attributed, in part, to their direct involvement at community meetings, the additional training these specialist officers’ had received, and their overall commitment to a broader understanding of a CP approach.

Assessment of Outcomes

Just as data collection, analysis, and decision-making under CS and CP functioned largely independently, so too did assessments of performance. Under CS, the effectiveness of police responses was evaluated at CS meetings using traditional measures of success, such as Part I crime statistics, arrests, and, on occasion, clearance rates. The period of comparison varied across departments, but was generally the current monthly reporting period compared to the prior month and the corresponding month from the prior year. Departments also presented year-to-date statistics for each crime category for the current and prior years.

Overall, follow-up evaluations of what did or did not work were not intensive. All seven sites relied on using maps or crime statistics at CS meetings to identify whether crime activity had stopped or diminished. If a crime pattern disappeared, it was considered resolved. When asked how he knew if something had worked, one district commander replied that he spoke to his officers, while a deputy chief told us he looked to see if crime numbers went up or down. One officer said that CS got them all hyped up about an area, then they threw resources at it, but ultimately they did not know why crime disappeared. The problem of assessment is further complicated when multiple tactics are used simultaneously, making it difficult to identify which of these interventions worked best (Skogan et al. 1999: 51). Social and political pressures on police for quick success undermine attempts to validate police methods, and until this changes, it is unlikely that it will be possible for police to discern the most effective strategies.

From a CP perspective, much greater emphasis is put on evaluating the long-term reduction of crime and disorder problems through a broader mix of indicators than those captured by official crime indicators. This stems from the understanding that these traditional indicators fail to adequately capture the true extent of crime (because of underreporting by citizens or by officers deciding not to take a report) and fail to measure the impact of the police on a broad range of quality-of-life problems. Thus, CP indicators of success include levels of unreported crime and community well-being (e.g., increased usage of an area, levels of neighborhood decay), fear, and citizen satisfaction (Peak and Glensor 1999: 97). The systematic administration of surveys asking citizens to report on their victimization experiences and their assessment of the police impact on problems in their neighborhood provide “uniform and comparable” measures of police effectiveness over time (Skogan and Hartnett 1997: 218). At the departments we visited, some of these measures might have been used from time-to-time to assess the effect of police actions, but they were not administered in waves to track citizens’ responses over time, nor were they part of the regular reporting process at CS.

Additionally, long-term assessments are regarded as more reliable measures of police effectiveness than the sudden disappearance of a crime pattern, simple pre-post comparisons of crime data, or anecdotes and impressions. This is driven by CP’s focus on preventing issues of vital concern to the community from resurfacing in the future (Skogan et al. 1999: 6). Assessments are supposed to be conducted with sufficient rigor to allow agencies to learn why a particularly police strategy did or did not work. This both helps police identify the underlying conditions that give rise to problems and to become smarter organizations by learning from their experiences.
Across sites, intensive follow-ups were generally reserved for special high-visibility, problem-solving projects that were not a routine part of daily operations. Under CS, CAUs were already so busy collecting and analyzing incident data and preparing for CS that they had little time to conduct long-term evaluations of police responses, while under CP this approach to monitoring and assessing community problems was hindered by the limitations of the record-keeping system. The absence of data attempting to capture fear of crime and disorder obviously makes it difficult to track and analyze a department’s success in this area. This is not the case with crime statistics, yet a common complaint among respondents (especially sergeants and CPOs) was that they rarely knew if a particular crime response had succeeded or failed, and, more important why this should be the case. In addition, many crime analysts expressed frustration at not receiving feedback on what strategies had been implemented in response to the data analysis they had provided to patrol: Were officers deployed to an area? How long did they spend there? What did they do? Both criticisms speak to the availability (or lack thereof) of follow-up mechanisms for identifying precisely how police responses were implemented and whether desired results had been achieved.

To support our judgment of this element as not at all integrated under CS and CP, it helps to compare its operation to a vision of what a more integrated program would look like. To begin with, the kinds of uniform standards and procedures for data collection that contributed to CS’s capacity to scan for serious crime incidents in its environment would need to be revamped. Monthly public meetings could be used to identify and prioritize community problems which are then documented as official statistics and monitored at regular CS meetings. Closer integration would require that sergeants and patrol officers (not district commanders) take the lead at these meetings, working with residents to define those problems which were of greatest concern and analyzing solutions. These meetings would also provide a venue for asking residents whether they felt whatever strategies had been implemented had succeeded in reducing or eliminating a problem. Finally, integration would seem to demand that long-term assessments using a wider range of evidence were routinely conducted by CAUs to evaluate success. Citizen surveys could be conducted systematically to neighborhood residents so that the data they provided would be regarded as valid and reliable. These measures, similar to CS, could then provide an annual benchmark against which the year’s progress could be measured against previous years and across districts.

Innovative Problem-Solving Tactics

Under CS and CP, crime data are supposed to provide a basis for searching for and implementing innovative solutions to reducing crime and disorder problems. Operationally, innovative problem solving is closely associated with Herman Goldstein’s problem-oriented policing (POP) model, and so this paradigm provides a useful standard for assessing how this element worked at the sites we visited and for gauging the level of CS/CP integration that we observed (Goldstein 1979 and 1990). To this end, we identify five of POP’s core principles for guiding innovative problem-solving efforts:

1. A focus on preventing as well as reacting to a wide range of disorders and community problems, including traditionally defined crime.

2. Using crime data and other sources of information to tailor solutions to particular problems rather than relying on generalized patrol and criminal investigations.

3. Considering a range of alternative strategies to reducing crime and disorder in addition to criminal law enforcement and selecting those strategies that promise the best chance of success.

4. Proactively addressing underlying conditions that may give rise to problems rather than just responding to individual incidents as isolated events.

5. Recognizing the potential of working with other public agencies and actors outside of the police organization to define problems, brainstorm solutions, and to implement responses (Goldstein 1990; NRC 2004: 91).
To these we would add CP’s specific focus on involving local residents directly in the POP process. Partnering with community members was not a core element of the original POP concept nor of the original CS model, both of which viewed community participation as necessary only insofar as it could contribute directly to the reduction of the problem at hand (Bratton 1998; Goldstein 1990: 27). CP, however, views the community in less functional terms. Under a CP model, community participation in POP is valued for its own sake and citizen involvement is regarded as indispensable to the overall success of this process (Sherman et al. 1997: 352).

Our fieldwork, like other studies, suggested that POP under CS and CP was not characterized by the kind of analytically demanding and creative process that distinguished the original POP concept. Moreover, while each organization had adopted several of POP’s tenets, they worked in various combinations and at different levels within each organization rather than as a coherent or unified strategy. Flexibility is a hallmark of these programs and so these observations are consistent with the expectation that POP and CP “should be put into practice more like a ‘stew’ of different elements than a single type of ‘food’” (Sherman et al. 1997: 352). This does not preclude, however, the deliberate combination of specific ingredients (in this case mixing elements of CS with CP) so as to deliver as satisfying a stew as possible. We distinguished three types of problem solving based on where POP seemed to occur and which of its elements were adopted (these elements are bolded):

1. Under CS, district commanders used crime analysis to identify serious crime problems and focus resources but continued to rely heavily on traditional reactive strategies.

2. Under CS and CP, sergeants and patrol officers were encouraged to be proactive, but mainly in response to single crime incidents; moreover, they were under little pressure to use data to focus their activities on patterns of crime or disorder, or to be innovative.

3. Under CP, CPOs were responsive to a broad range of community concerns and valued crime prevention, particularly when part of a formal crime prevention program, but paid less attention to making connections between isolated complaints in order to address their underlying causes.

These variations in how problem solving operated under CS and CP and the fact that a core element of the POP model under CP—citizen participation at all stages of the problem-solving process—was not highly developed, led us to conclude that this element under CS and CP was not all integrated.

Focusing Resources through Traditional Reactive Strategies

CS did more to reinforce each organization’s traditional reactive response to crime, albeit more strategically, than it did to promote innovation. Our observations suggested that district commanders used crime data somewhat like radar to improve the speed and focus of their response to events that had already occurred. They paid particular attention to upward shifts in crime trends for particular offense categories (e.g., burglaries) and geographic areas where crime was clustered (hot spots). After the problem had been identified, district commanders tended to select from a standard toolkit of law enforcement responses and focus these on the specific times, locations, and offenders that presented the highest risk (“the surgical appliance of police resources,” as one district commander put it). The strategies that appeared to be used most often—location-directed patrol, traffic enforcement, proactive arrests, and follow-up investigations—involving police using their traditional law enforcement powers (Sherman et al. 1997: 358). Less frequently, these crime-reduction strategies involved giving local residents crime prevention tips and encouraging them to come forward with any information that might help police efforts.
The approach of concentrating resources on high-risk targets while applying traditional police tactics is similar to what policing scholars have referred to as “enforcement problem-oriented policing” (Eck 1993: 98) or “shallow” problem solving (Braga and Weisburd 2006: 145). In paraphrasing Mark Twain, a respondent seemed to allude to these definitions of problem solving when he stated that under his department’s CS approach, “Enforcement is the hammer and everything looks like a nail.” Thus, crime data was used to identify where problems were occurring, but these data were not routinely subjected to the kind of careful analysis needed for the selection of strategies designed to “actually address the problem’s most important aspects and not just its most readily obvious symptoms” (Skogan et al. 1999: 41).

Consider this fairly typical example taken from the official transcript of a CS meeting in one department, where a district commander was reporting on a recent increase in burglaries. Busy with trying to deal with the immediate threat, the district commander is under pressure to react and has to skip a more thorough analysis to figure out why the burglaries were actually occurring:

[His district] currently averaged 23 burglaries per day. In the first 12 weeks of the year, the crimes increased and decreased so they never got control of the situation. They did all the traditional enforcement strategies such as truancy, transient stops, narcotics enforcement. They looked at parolees and those individuals on probation. They put out fliers to harden the target. They thought that with the enforcement strategies and some critical arrests, they could get a handle on the burglary problem. Overall, though, it didn’t work.

Seven weeks prior to the [Compstat] meeting, the problem got worse. Suddenly they were averaging 27–28 burglaries per week for 7 weeks in a row. They were still doing the same traditional enforcement efforts, but it just wasn’t working.

Eventually, information from a new source led to the discovery that local gangs were responsible and this led the district commander to redirect his efforts toward gang members. Similarly, at a presentation at another department’s CS meeting, a standard “strategic response” slide summarizing a district commander’s reaction to a problem nightclub did not suggest the exploration of new ideas. The responses listed were: directing patrol to certain areas during specific hours, putting unmarked cars in hotspots, and doing stakeouts.

These examples illustrate how the idea of being “strategic” at CS was not so much associated with analyzing how best to tailor a response, but with targeting a variety of enforcement strategies on a specific problem all at once. The strategic component lay in district commanders using data to identify when and where a problem was occurring before using multiple interventions, in the hope that a collection of responses (rather than a single, carefully designed response) would improve the overall likelihood of success. Using multiple tactics was also a useful means for district commanders to convey to top leadership at CS that they were taking a problem seriously and working hard to resolve it quickly.

Combining responses may well be effective, but it is very different to POP’s focus on selecting the strategy that careful consideration of a number of alternatives shows to be the most promising. The first approach is driven by what a district commander thinks will work best based on his/her knowledge and experience, while the latter expects police to conduct a careful analysis to better define and understand the problem and to draw upon knowledge gained in other departments and innovations in theory and research about crime control and prevention. CS, however, had not done much to condition district commanders to look beyond their own experiences, nor had its implementation been accompanied with the kind of intensive training that would have helped district commanders search, locate, and interpret the latest research findings. Moreover, CS’s emphasis on crime numbers did more to stifle than promote the exploration of alternative strategies. The
constant monitoring of short-term fluctuations in crime levels, and the expectation that crime problems would be dealt with quickly, discouraged the careful sifting of and deliberation about patterns of crime, and a careful review and discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of various approaches.

At the CS meetings we attended, we did not observe discussions about problems that included references to processes that are well-known in police circles as supporting a POP approach—either the problem-solving guide known as SARA (scanning, analysis, research and assessment) or the crime triangle model that focuses on linking incidents based on three key elements, each represented by a side of the triangle—common offenders, victims, or locations—and tailoring responses accordingly (Eck and Spelman 1987). Instead, district commanders reported in much broader and more “generic operational terms” (Goldstein 1990: 42).

The effectiveness of targeting enforcement activities on identifiable risks has been supported by strong research evidence and is undoubtedly more innovative than traditional and less focused law-enforcement methods such as random preventive patrol and reactive arrests (Weisburd and Eck 2004; NRC 2004; Braga and Bond 2008). Nonetheless, while it could be conceded that using up-to-date crime data to identify crime patterns and deploy police resources is somewhat novel, the fact that district commanders continued to rely on parochial solutions—that is, relying on what they and others in the agency regarded as tried-and-true methods—is hardly the “strikingly” creative form of decision-making attributed to CS by some of its supporters (Silverman 1999: 123–4). While the best police response might include evoking the criminal justice process, a more innovative approach to reducing chronic crime and quality-of-life problems would suggest that the implementation of these tactics should be determined after police have considered many other possibilities including public education, changing the physical environment, enforcing civil law, mobilizing the community for social control, and so on (Braga and Weisburd 2006: 145).

The most imaginative and time consuming problem-solving approaches that involved tailor-made responses and more focused follow-up assessments came in the form of occasional special projects focused on high crime or problem areas. These projects placed greater emphasis on preventing crime through means other than the traditional law enforcement powers of threatening or making arrests and were also more likely to involve collaboration with other city agencies (e.g., code enforcement). Ordinarily, these special projects were focused on a specific area where multiple problems affecting a large number of people had been occurring over a period of many months. The high visibility of these projects inside and outside of the department meant that command staff would often refer to them when asked about problem solving within the organization. An important factor contributing to the implementation of these projects was the availability of additional resources through various government agencies. For example, the MPD had used a Federal Weed and Seed grant to target crime and disorder in a particular section of the city through setting specific goals for crime reduction, increasing enforcement initiatives (e.g., foot patrols and saturation patrols on weekends), improving data collection and analysis, implementing community education programs, and revising city ordinances. Similarly, the SLC had implemented a large-scale program to reduce residential burglaries with support from the Department of Justice, and the LAPD was engaged in a long-term, strategic problem-solving approach to tackle homelessness and improve the city’s skid-row area. Los Angeles’ Safer Cities Initiative involved the police partnering with many other city agencies, including the Mayor’s office, the City Council, and the L.A. County District Attorney.
Office-Initiated Activities

In contrast to CS, where the locus of innovative problem solving is focused on middle managers, according to CP doctrine it should be further decentralized down the rank hierarchy (Moore 1992: 103). From this perspective, sergeants and patrol officers should work with local residents in their areas of responsibility to identify crime and neighborhood problems, to brainstorm solutions, and to collaborate on problem-solving strategies. Our observations suggested that sergeants encouraged patrol officers to problem solve as part of their regular duties but that organizational support systems had not been put in place that would have fully supported POP, such as assignment to problem-solving beat teams and intensive training in the problem-solving process (Cordner and Biebel 2005: 155). This helps explain why most of the officers and supervisors we interviewed regarded problem-solving activities as synonymous with being individually “proactive” rather than as a collaborative process of identifying and prioritizing those problems that were of greatest concern to local citizens and of thinking and acting creatively. In this context, proactive largely meant “taking initiative to control a situation by anticipating events rather than responding to them” (Sherman 2002: 217).

The majority of departments used a workload analysis for patrol deployment that built-in a certain block of shift time (generally around 30–40 percent) when officers didn’t answer calls for service. How they used this “idle” time was largely left to their own discretion, but sergeants expected them to “take initiative.” In contrast to POP which calls for a sharp focus on links between individual incidents and identifying “specific substantive problems of some significance” (Cordner and Biebel 2005: 160), rank-and-file officers appeared to define problems very broadly as any single incident meriting their attention—crime, fear, public disorder, or traffic. Rather than requesting crime or calls for service analyses or the collective input of local residents to identify crime or disorder patterns, officers typically used their proactive time to patrol an area that either a supervisor or their own knowledge and experience suggested was a trouble spot. One Chief stated that the identification of a problem happens “relatively quickly,“ because “officers are aware daily of what is going on.” What patrol officers chose to target depended largely on what they observed when they were freed from answering radio calls, and how they chose to respond was not based on a careful diagnosis of the problem. Nearly all the responses we observed on our ride-alongs, or that we heard about from sergeants involved traditional practices, such as being visible, running radar to catch speeders, issuing traffic citations, taking reports, making arrests, and conducting field interrogation interviews of pedestrians. We rarely heard about officers requesting crime analysis, consulting research, or meeting with their squads to brainstorm and discuss alternatives. When we asked sergeants what they wanted out of the officers they supervised, a common response was that they were not generating complaints and that they were doing something on their shifts other than just responding to calls for service and following orders. Some departments had attempted to make the POP process more systematic by including it as part of an officer’s formal evaluation and by creating a database for tracking POP responses over time, but these evaluations continued to focus heavily on traditional indicators of success (number of arrests, traffic citations, field interrogations, etc.), and set low standards for problem-solving performance, including how these efforts were monitored.
Community Policing Officers and Units

In addition to being proactive, POP attempts to broaden the realm of police responsibilities beyond merely reacting to traditional crimes that the police themselves have defined as problems. It is also important for the police to take the concerns of local citizens seriously, and to devote more time to preventing crime in the first place than responding after the fact (Goldstein 1990: 33). Our observations suggested that departments took both of these ideas seriously and had adapted them to their existing operations most obviously by assigning them to CPOs operating either individually or in units. So that district commanders and patrol could focus their energies on responding to serious crime and answering calls for service, CP specialists were often charged with addressing any minor complaints and quality-of-life issues identified by local residents, including problems that were regarded as oft-recurring (e.g., a long-term dispute between neighbors or assisting the mentally ill). In handling these concerns, CPOs were expected to use a range of methods other than just law enforcement and to call on other city agencies for help (e.g., social services, mental health, etc.). Moreover, much of the responsibility for managing a department’s formal crime prevention programs fell to these officers. These programs were focused both on changing the conditions that encouraged offenses to occur as well as on early intervention in individuals’ lives (NRC 2004: 87). Among those that we heard about most often were programs aimed at improving public safety in rental properties (e.g., crime-free multihousing via Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design - CPTED), or at educating and promoting positive behavior for youth (D.A.R.E.®, Police Explorers, antigang initiatives).

While CPOs were responsible for problem solving, this was not their sole focus. They were also charged with many other tasks: attending community meetings, assisting with citizen police academies and police athletic leagues, coordinating neighborhood watch, writing and distributing newsletters, making presentations to community groups, and organizing community outreach events. Thus, CPOs generally combined the role of problem solver with community relations, a dual function which inevitably diminished the time they were able to devote to POP, particularly its most challenging elements. When coupled with the fact that there were only a handful of CPOs assigned to each district, this version of problem solving consumed only a fraction of each department’s resources and cannot be accurately characterized as an “integral, institutionalized part” of police management and operations (Goldstein 1990: 103).

While CPOs’ focus on community problems and crime prevention was consistent with POP, their efforts were not systematic and intensive in the ways called for by this model’s full implementation. Some CPOs scanned calls-for-service data to look for patterns, but when we asked about their problem-solving approach they did not tell us that they routinely conducted an in-depth analysis to learn about the causes, scope, and effects of a problem. Based on what we did hear, the links that CPOs identified between individual complaints or incidents were those that suggested themselves rather easily due to some common characteristic (e.g., a single address accounting for a disproportionate number of calls) and were not the outcome of a broad and persistent inquiry. Similarly, the process of selecting nontraditional responses (e.g., mediation, changing the environment, contacting other city agencies) was not the result of the kind of rigorous and uninhibited search for alternatives that is a trademark of the POP model.

14. These approaches include certifying apartment complexes where managers are trained to screen tenants and provide security through the implementation of specific safety features (e.g., deadbolt locks, improved lighting, alarms, etc.).
These comments are by no means intended to diminish the problem-solving efforts of CPOs. Many of the responses we heard about from these officers and others in the department demonstrated laudable efforts to move beyond an immediate and simple quick-fix solution toward a more problem-oriented approach. For example, when asked to describe a recent problem-solving attempt, one CPO talked about a call he had received from a local resident regarding transients who were harassing a high school girl walking down an alley. With the help of members from the sex offender unit, the CPO arrested one of the transients (who was a registered sex offender) and arranged with the owner of the alley to have it fenced off. Not only did this please the caller, the officer’s attempt to modify the physical environment sought to prevent similar problems from reoccurring at this location.

This problem-solving process, however, does not represent the kind of radical break of the “mindset of the past” advocated by POP’s principal supporters (Goldstein 1990: 102). Following this view, a response to the scenario above would entail a more inquisitive approach to see all dimensions of the problem and address its most important aspects. In this case, this might involve describing the problem’s exact nature and acquiring more information about its scope from a variety of sources. Given that complaints about disorderly behavior are not often reported to the police, the process of assessing this problem’s significance or scope would probably demand that the officer solicit information from other local residents, schools, and other patrol officers. In addition, an overall assessment would require asking the kinds of questions shown below that are representative of the approach advocated by the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing and detailed in its popular POP guides published by COPS:

- **Extent of the Problem**: Is this form of disorderly behavior an isolated incident or part of a larger pattern? To what extent does this form of disorderly behavior bother or intimidate others? Does it result in people significantly altering their behavior and routines?

- **Victims**: Who are the victims? What is their level of concern? What do they have in common? Are complaints brought to the attention of other organizations (in this case, perhaps local schools)? Are there other potential victims? Are there guardians available who could offer protection? What could victims do to protect themselves?

- **Offenders**: How many transients/registered sex offenders are in the area? What is known about them? Do they live in the area, or are they transient? What are their criminal histories? How many are under correctional supervision?

- **Locations**: Why this particular location? Are there other places where this behavior occurs? Where were the victims coming from, where were they going, and when did the incident occur?

None of this is meant to imply that the CPO’s response that we describe above was inadequate, only that POP eschews the acceptance of problems at face value and requires more thoughtful skepticism toward current practices. From this standpoint, doubting is a methodological approach (not a conclusion), and shows itself through the interrogation of taken-for-granted assumptions and a careful and comprehensive study of the problem at hand (Mastrofski 2006: 45). Through this process, useful strategies might be considered that otherwise would not have presented themselves (such as asking local schools to teach students about public safety) (Skogan et al. 1999: 47).
Problem Solving with the Community

Finally, under CP, POP requires that the police work collaboratively with local citizens. At the agencies we visited, community meetings served a variety of important purposes—enhancing police-community relations, fostering information exchange, helping the police respond to individual citizen complaints—but when it came to the problem-solving process, the role of the community was less involved. While it was commonplace for departments to distribute fliers to residents with information on how to improve home security and to present crime prevention tips at neighborhood watch meetings, we heard less about a department’s attempts to organize community residents for the specific purpose of setting priorities and then brainstorming, planning, implementing, and assessing solutions. When residents were mobilized to help, it tended to be as a resource at the behest of the police (e.g., asking volunteers to record the license plate numbers of speeders, or to report suspicious behavior) and not in the form of a mutual or co-equal partnership. Training residents in problem solving would have been an important step for encouraging the active and more equal participation of the community in problem solving, but we did not hear of this instruction being provided at the sites we visited: by-and-large police preferred to disseminate information, set the agenda, and seek buy-in for crime strategies while citizens were engaged primarily to assist police by being their “eyes and ears” in the community.

In sum, problem solving at the sites we visited had incorporated a number of POP’s core elements. Among district commanders, we observed a commitment to using crime analysis to look for groups of incidents that were related through a common victim, offender, or location. Patrol officers were encouraged to work on problems proactively and CPOs were freed from responding to calls for service in order to respond to a wide array of community complaints as best they could. Finally, nearly all sites could also point to special problem-solving projects characterized by significant planning, analysis, and assessment in an attempt to change the complex conditions that gave rise to the problem in the first place.

However, consistent with what others have observed elsewhere, overall there was a considerable gap between the rhetoric of POP and its actual practice (Braga and Weisburd 2006; Cordner and Biebel 2005; Eck 2006). In place of Goldstein’s tightly integrated and in-depth POP model was a form of problem solving that adopted many of POP’s key elements, but not in ways that were necessarily designed to promote enterprising solutions as part of a highly focused and coordinated effort. The three approaches to problem solving occurred in different decision-making arenas, appealed to different elements of the POP model, and were not tied closely together. District commanders used crime analysis to focus their problem-solving efforts, but mainly in reaction to events that had already occurred. Patrol officers were encouraged to address crime proactively, but problem solving occurred informally, tended to be incident-focused, and did not generally involve “going beyond the routines of the job that officers are trained to do and have honed through years of practical experience” (Skogan et al. 1999: 48). Finally, CPOs responded to a wide array of community complaints (not just those that district commanders had defined as important) and directed some attention toward crime prevention (often through formal crime prevention programs), but they were not pressured to use in-depth analysis to identify connections between individual crime incidents or community complaints and to systematically address underlying conditions. These inconsistencies and the fact that community members did not participate as active partners in proposing and implementing solutions led us to conclude that this element under CS and CP was not at all integrated.
External Accountability

Finally, both CP and CS attempt to make police operations more transparent, but their accountability mechanisms work in different ways. The importance of the community as a source of governance of the police is well established in the CP literature (Greene and Mastrofski 1988), and although CS innovators (such as the NYPD) did not list external accountability as an explicit goal, it is clear that CS has an important external dimension. For instance, in describing the anticrime strategies implemented by Chief Bratton in the NYPD as part of its CS approach, George Kelling writes:

These published strategies amount to a contract between the NYPD’s leadership, its officers, and the citizens of New York. They expose citizens to departmental thinking while communicating directly to patrol officers what the department expects of them and what steps the department will take to achieve its goals—steps that can be monitored by those who will be accountable for success or failure. They commit the department to report publicly on the results of its efforts (1995: 5).15

It also appears that as CS has matured, this benefit of keeping outside constituents well-informed about crime problems and the consequences of the department’s efforts has become recognized as an important feature of CS. During our interview, Chief Bratton commented that making CS crime statistics freely available on the web gave a degree of transparency to what the police are doing and was a key feature of CS (along with measuring results and assessing the performance of middle managers).

To illuminate our assessment of this element as not at all integrated under CS and CP, we take an analytical approach that crystallizes the features of external accountability under CS and CP into a “set of dichotomies” (Rein 1976: 23). Reality, of course, is more complex than this and there is likely to be considerable variation in how these reforms actually work, but what this abstraction lacks in subtlety it gains in helping us structure our inquiry into how these reforms worked.

From a CS perspective, police departments decide what information on organizational performance is worth sharing and how it is relayed to external constituents. Given their ready availability, it is unsurprising that departments have tended to disseminate the same crime indicators regularly collected and displayed at CS meetings. These Part I crime data are used to capture how well the department is performing and are organized into crime tables that closely resemble the FBI’s annual Uniform Crime Reports. However, in the case of CS these statistics depict monthly and year-to-date crime numbers for the entire agency, and may even include figures for individual districts. These crime data are often posted on an agency’s web site for public consumption. Because community members are generally passive recipients of these data, the police are externally accountable under CS to the degree that they provide stakeholders with accurate and timely information about how well they are accomplishing their official crime control mission.

External accountability from a CP perspective, at least in theory, goes far beyond merely providing citizens with standard crime measures. Under this model, rather than police leadership pinpointing serious crime as the department’s core mission, citizens are an essential partner in identifying and helping define police policies and practices, particularly in regards to their own neighborhoods. This is more of a democratic process than under CS and requires that the police are intimately connected with local communities. Regular community meetings are a mechanism for soliciting input on the needs and concerns of local neighborhoods, for discussing and setting priorities, and for working with citizens on implementing solutions. Integral to this process is the willingness of the police to provide clear and consistent feedback on any progress.

15. Along with Moore and Braga 2004, we have identified aspects of CS’s external purpose and dimension in our earlier work (Willis et al. 2004).
or setbacks towards mutually agreed upon goals. Police are accountable to the degree that they create a collaborative environment with local residents that is directly responsive to their concerns and that fosters an open dialogue on police policy and practice.

Before we present our fieldwork observations, it is appropriate to note that because of time constraints, we were unable to explore this element of CS as fully as we would have liked. We were only able to attend meetings involving police and community residents at three sites, and we did not have the opportunity to conduct formal interviews with local residents. As a result, our analysis of external accountability depends more on general impressions and on comments made during interviews than on systematic observation of police-community interactions.

Our fieldwork suggested that it was common place for many departments to make the up-to-date crime statistics produced for CS readily available. These data were posted on department web sites so that they could be accessed by members of the public who were interested in increases or decreases in reported crime. Some departments also made it possible for residents to view recent crime maps which, depending on the department, were also interactive. In the LAPD and OPPD, for example, citizens can go online, select a specific area, and see a map plotting where recent serious crimes occurred.

Based on the meetings we were able to attend and our interviews, it appeared that some district commanders also used CS-generated data as a basis for informing citizens of recent crime increases. For example, at a town hall meeting in Marietta, a district commander mentioned that the number of larcenies had risen in the last quarter and that there were no patterns (although he did not present any specific crime statistics or invite discussion). Similarly, at a monthly community meeting in the LAPD, the district commander drew on official crime statistics to report on increases or decreases in the district’s Part I crimes. In principle, CS-generated crime data could be used to generate discussion about what the police were doing in response to a crime problem and to solicit feedback from community members, but based on the meetings we attended and the comments we heard this was not a major purpose. What we did hear or observe suggested that district commanders were selective in what data they chose to show and that the data were used primarily by the police in ways that served their own interests (such as strengthening the basis of a particular decision or for generating support among community members).

More specifically, data tended to be presented for one or more of the following reasons: (a) to reassure residents that district crime problems were being quickly identified; (b) to correct misconceptions in the community about the magnitude of a crime problem; (c) to forewarn residents of certain police actions that were likely to be disruptive to their everyday routine (e.g., increased traffic enforcement); (d) to request assistance in reporting suspicious behavior; (e) to suggest ways to avoid becoming a crime victim; and (f) to explain why a particular crime problem was viewed by the department as a priority. An example of the latter was provided by a district commander in the MCPD who told us how he recently had used CS crime statistics to explain why he was investing more of his resources to tackle a 30 percent increase in robberies than to address open-garage-door burglaries. At the meetings we attended, we did not observe CS data being used as a catalyst to encourage feedback from external constituents on a district commander’s priorities, or strategies and tactics.
As far as we could tell, the principal function of these public forums was to build closer police-community relationships and to improve public safety. To these ends, the district commander or CPOs in charge stressed the importance of the police working with the community to reduce crime and disorder problems and the role that the community could play in this endeavor by providing information to the police. In addition, these venues served as an opportunity for the police to provide those present with helpful information in a variety of forms, including reporting briefly on some recent police activities in response to certain crime problems, sharing crime prevention tips, offering to do safety surveys of residential homes, and describing upcoming events and various police-community programs. These were some of the ways that the police demonstrated that they cared about the local residents, wished to protect them, and sought to be responsive.

In comparison to these features of police-community partnerships, less focus was placed on using these arenas as a mechanism for strengthening external accountability (Mastrofski and Greene 1993: 92). While attendees were encouraged to identify problems in their individual neighborhoods, they did not play an influential role in establishing priorities and selecting responses to problems. For the most part the police set the agenda and information flowed from the police to the community, with little give-and-take discussion on what the police were doing and how they were doing it. This is different to the vision of CP which calls for much greater citizen input on police priorities, policies, and practices in order to make the police directly accountable to the public for their actions. This is accomplished in two ways: (1) the active participation of community members in establishing mutually agreed goals makes them heavily invested in what the police accomplish (rather than distant or passive observers of police performance); and (2) the requirement that police take community preferences into account creates the expectation that the police must “justify to the community any significant divergence of their practices from the community's priorities” (Mastrofski and Greene 1993: 88). Thus, unlike CS, which asks the police to cede little control to the community in setting and meeting performance standards, under a CP model, citizens get to exert real influence in evaluating department success and the opportunity to express their approval or disapproval directly.

In conclusion, our fieldwork suggested that external accountability under CS and CP was not at all integrated. CS-generated statistics and maps were certainly designed to bring outside attention to the department’s performance, but not through a set of mechanisms for enhancing understanding between the police and local residents and to encourage the pursuit of common goals. In its ideal form, CP attempts to bridge the traditional gap between the police and the community by making departments cede some of their decision-making authority in pursuit of mutually satisfying partnerships. According to our fieldwork, CS data were not used in ways that contributed directly to this vision. The CS data that were disseminated may have been important to citizens, but ultimately departments were not being judged on those things that community members had identified as mattering to them most. By and large, CS seemed to do more to try and bring decision-making of community members in line with those of the police, than in the other direction—a core goal of CP.
Benefits and Challenges of Co-Implementation

At the end of each interview, we tried to ask respondents about the benefits or challenges they felt their organization had experienced on account of operating CS and CP at the same time. Did they feel that these reforms were compatible or incompatible? Overwhelmingly, respondents felt that these reforms were complementary because they both focused on crime and they worked side-by-side to overcome their separate individual drawbacks. This characterization of operating in parallel suggested to us that, aside from their common crime control focus, many regard CS and CP as operating largely independently of one another. The benefits that respondents predictably identified accrued from implementing both reforms, but not necessarily from integrating them more closely. Put simply, respondents gave us the impression that they conceived of CS as lacking X and CP as lacking Y: by implementing both reforms, the department gained X + Y. Aside from geographic decentralization, very few respondents identified specific elements where these reforms overlapped (e.g., using data and crime analysis, or engaging in problem solving), or made suggestions for how greater benefits could be derived from integrating the structures and practices of these reforms more closely. This was also true for the challenges that co-implementation presented and the recommendations that respondents made for how their operation could be improved.

Interviewees tended to focus on a general set of challenges that stemmed from operating both programs simultaneously (e.g., lack of resources), or on making recommendations for how a particular reform (CS or CP) might be enhanced. This tendency to think of these reforms as separate yet broadly compatible approaches rather than as reforms whose structures and practices might provide an opportunity for a more integrated policing approach probably speaks to two broader issues in policing and police scholarship: (1) the distinctive values and policing styles embodied by these reforms, at least as they are currently implemented and understood, inhibits departments from envisioning a more integrated model; and (2) the lack of attention that has been paid among researchers to the relationship between these reforms compared to their individual merits and shortcomings.

Benefits

According to some interviewees, CS and CP were distinguished by their separate “guiding forces:” crime statistics and community complaints respectively. One of the key benefits of co-implementation was improving the organization’s focus on quality-of-life problems and serious crime. One district commander told us that if they only did CS then they would lose their focus on quality-of-life issues, while a command staff member in another department said that only doing CP (which s/he equated with community relations) could result in the organization losing its focus on crime. Operating both programs simultaneously resulted, according to one respondent, in a blend of “community policing and crime suppression.”

Similarly, CS was characterized by some as an internal management system (the police “acting alone”) that used crime statistics to promote aggressive law enforcement strategies. In contrast, CP was an approach that tried to involve external constituents in improving neighborhood safety and sought to improve community relations. By operating both, departments were more sensitive to how local residents would react to the implementation of a particular crime response. That is, the police had to consider more carefully what crime strategies would be considered appropriate or inappropriate by the public.

A more direct benefit of operating both programs simultaneously was that crime statistics generated through CS could be used as a mechanism to increase community members’ involvement in crime prevention. Showing local residents data on crime in their neighborhoods could mobilize them as a resource by encouraging them to adopt the target hardening practices suggested by the police. This was also a means of making community members feel more responsible for public safety.
Both CS and CP underscore the importance of geographic operations, and our fieldwork suggested that this element may have helped deliver benefits in two forms: (a) improving officer knowledge of a beat, and (b) increasing accountability. Should a department choose not to deploy geographically, it stands to lose these benefits. The OPPD was not divided into geographic districts, and one of the most common complaints we heard about its strategic deployment plan was that by deploying people out differently each day, there was “no tie-in and development of relationships within the community and ownership, and even accountability.” According to those with whom we spoke, an emphasis on territoriality over temporality, helped some officers get to know community members and business owners in their beats and encouraged them to take ownership of a given area.

Finally, operating CP and CS encouraged the collection of large amounts of information from a wide variety of sources and the communication of this information to inform decision-making. In addition to the collection of crime statistics and intelligence on crime suspects for CS, soliciting complaint forms and making regular contact with citizens and community groups helped departments learn about the kind of quality-of-life concerns that were not captured by CS. Respondents generally felt that the accumulation of all this information from different sources was beneficial. If “information is power,” as one respondent said, dramatic improvements in this regard stood to improve the capacity of the organization to respond more effectively to emerging problems.

Challenges

Just as our survey findings had reported, respondents identified the traditional challenges to the police organization—lack of resources and resistance from police officers—as two of the major challenges that arose from implementing CS and CP. This is not surprising: prior case studies suggest that police generally regard CP as labor intensive and time consuming because of the decentralization of resources geographically, the involvement of the community, and the demanding nature of the problem-solving process. Because CS places additional work demands on the organization, officers are likely to feel time and resource constraints even more acutely.

Pressure on scarce resources stemmed from all seven departments’ strong commitment to the 911 system, which required that they minimized their response time to emergency calls for service when and where they arose, while also trying to engage in strategic deployment needs identified through CS and CP. Across sites, respondents complained about patrol officers not having the time to engage in CP and problem solving. For example, Chief Velez of the CSPD said that his patrol officers were only able to spend about 16 percent of their time on proactive policing due to calls for service, when the department’s goal was closer to a third of their time.

Departments implementing CP and CS also confronted the difficulty of officers at all ranks resisting new methods. This seemed particularly true of CP. Much of the research on departments attempting to implement this approach shows that line officers often understand it as public relations or social work and not real policing and yet their buy-in is critical to achieve. We heard this from some of our respondents, who told us that it was necessary to convince the rank and file that CP did not mean that police were no longer going to make arrests. Another strategy that departments used to attempt to underscore the importance of CP, was to explain the link between quality-of-life offenses and crime (the so-called “Broken Windows” approach). Chief Flynn of the MPD was a major proponent of Broken Windows policing and seemed to consider it a vital bridge between his department’s CS and CP approaches.
In addition to these general challenges to organizational change, some respondents identified a few of the difficulties associated with one or more of CS and CP’s specific elements. For example, Chief Flynn felt that officers were not accomplishing enough in the area of problem solving and that there needed to be more training to incorporate this in patrol officers’ daily activities. Similarly, Chief Bratton of the LAPD expressed his concern that, when it came to patrol officers analyzing data to identify crime patterns and trends, the LAPD—like other police departments—generally had not “drilled down to [their] satisfaction as to what the cop in the field [was] benefiting.”

Others raised the problem of getting community members to show up to CP meetings, despite their best efforts to advertise and encourage attendance. For example, a commander in the MPD had printed and distributed 1,200 fliers for a local town hall meeting, one that the chief was attending, but only 5 local residents managed to show up. Admirably, the district commander in this department as well as those in the other departments we visited did not give up. Instead, they changed the venue and time of the next meeting to encourage greater participation from those who might have been reluctant to attend (e.g., to district headquarters, or to an apartment complex). Buy-in from external constituents was most difficult to accomplish in younger cities, like Cape Coral, that didn’t have the kind of clearly identifiable neighborhoods and corresponding social networks common to older cities.

When it came to CS, sometimes departments struggled with hiring crime analysts with the necessary skill. The LAPD, for example, had approached the City to implement a hiring test for this position, but because it required a change to existing civil service requirements, it would take some time to implement. Chief Bratton also mentioned that another challenge to implementing CS was the “human element,” or the natural tendency of people not wanting to be criticized. The flip-side, he continued, was that CS also provided an opportunity for those people who wanted to step up, “to talk about their successes and failures and get noticed.”
Discussion

Results from our national survey showed that almost two-thirds of large police departments were pursuing both CP and CS simultaneously. However, the contention that these two highly publicized and widely heralded reforms naturally complement one another is fueled more heavily by rhetoric and anecdotes than a body of systematic research. The first purpose of our study was to provide a national profile of CS and CP implementation in the United States, including some of the challenges and benefits that co-implementing departments encountered. Second, we aimed to provide more detailed knowledge on how these two reforms actually operated “on the ground.” Did CS and CP function independently, or in ways that were mutually reinforcing or conflicting? Our survey suggested that co-implementing departments found these reforms to be broadly compatible, but this did not offer us much in the way of insight into why this should be the case, especially given our prior empirical research suggesting that there are some inconsistencies or contradictions between them.

Our observations at seven police agencies of different sizes and organization helped explain the “high compatibility” finding. These suggested that CS and CP worked well together because they were essentially stove-piped—operating side-by-side, one having little effect on the other. This form of co-implementation was viewed favorably by departments because their simultaneous operation helped the agency respond to a broader set of goals and to engage in a wider variety of tasks than if they had implemented just one reform. Thus, they had an additive effect—one compensating for the weaknesses of the other in helping the organization respond more comprehensively to the diverse demands it confronted in its external environment.

In this discussion, we provide a comparison of how each element operated under CS and CP (for a summary, see Table 5 on pages 75 and 76). By revealing some of the major complexities surrounding their simultaneous operation, we hope to deepen understanding about the current relationship between these two reforms and provide police and policymakers with a context for envisioning alternative possibilities for their co-implementation. Rather than merely supplementing one another, it is possible that CS and CP could be combined to increase the potential of their effects exponentially. This analysis is a first step to helping others envision what a marriage of these reforms might look like.
Table 5. A General Cross-Site Comparison of Reform Elements under CS and CP and Assessment of Their Integration

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform Element</th>
<th>Under CS</th>
<th>Under CP</th>
<th>Level of CS/CP Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission Clarification</td>
<td>Highly visible focus on Part I crimes, particularly at department CS meetings</td>
<td>Systematic measures of CP performance not a regular feature of CS meetings; CP values conveyed through occasional queries from top command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of participation of community stakeholders at CS meetings in identifying and discussing neighborhood priorities</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Accountability</td>
<td>Accountability concentrated on district commanders through an internal, visible, and centralized performance system linking districts to headquarters</td>
<td>Accountability experienced primarily by district commanders and CP specialists; less focus on rank and file Accountability decentralized (occurring within districts), externally driven (operating through police-community partnerships), and informal (contingent on individuals rather than structures)</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization of Decision-Making</td>
<td>Territorial focus on districts Primary decision-making by district commanders in accordance mainly with crime control objectives established by top management</td>
<td>Territorial focus not decentralized down to beat or neighborhood level Primary responsibility for CP fell to district commanders and specialist CP officers or units not rank and file. CP performance of rank and file not made transparent to command hierarchy</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Flexibility</td>
<td>District commanders concentrate efforts on reassigning generalist patrol officers and specialist crime units in response to changing crime priorities Attention paid to increasing available resources through partnerships with local stakeholders</td>
<td>Resource flexibility not strongly defined in terms of maintaining beat integrity Attention paid to increasing available resources through partnerships with local stakeholders</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued on next page.
### Table 5. A General Cross-Site Comparison of Reform Elements under CS and CP and Assessment of Their Integration (con’t)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform Element</th>
<th>Under CS</th>
<th>Under CP</th>
<th>Level of CS/CP Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data-driven Problem Identification and Assessment</td>
<td>Crime analysis focused on serious crime. Identification and examination of crime problems* mainly by district commanders and crime analysts. Assessment of success based heavily on official indicators of crime over fairly short timeframe (CS reporting period, year-to-date).</td>
<td>Crime analysis less concerned with additional CP objectives of minor crimes and disorders. Rank-and-file officers not major consumers of crime analysis. Assessment of success rarely based on broader CP indicators measured over long term.</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative Problem-Solving Tactics</td>
<td>District commanders used crime analysis to focus resources on Part I crime problems but with a continued reliance on traditional reactive crime strategies.</td>
<td>Patrol officers proactive but mainly in response to single crime incidents; under little pressure to use data to focus on crime or community problems, or to be innovative. CPOs highly responsive to broad range of community concerns but pay less attention to identifying problems and their underlying causes. Lack of close collaborations with neighborhood residents in all stages of the problem-solving process.</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Accountability</td>
<td>Community members tend to be passive recipients of information on Part I crime statistics selected by departments and generally made available online.</td>
<td>CP performance goals rarely established through consultation with community and discussed in-depth at regular CS meetings.</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As we have throughout this report, the term “problem” in this table is used to refer to “persistent concentrations of related incidents.”
Mission Clarification

CS supporters argue that one of the program’s key features is top leadership’s proclamation of a bold crime-reduction mission that fosters widespread commitment within the organization. The community’s role in deciding the CS mission is scarcely mentioned, in stark contrast to CP which regards community participation as an essential part of an ongoing process of guiding the police in setting major goals. Crime control is also a goal of CP, but given the diverse expectations that different communities place on police, this naturally entails a broadening of the police mission to include other concerns that local residents construe as important, including minor crime and disorder problems.

Across sites there was considerable variation under CS regarding the degree of specificity of each agency’s crime-reduction goal, but generally CS meetings functioned to focus the agency’s attention on its crime-fighting mission through the display of a narrow range of traditional crime indicators and through asking district commanders to report on what they were doing to reduce crime. In contrast, under CP all our departments had embraced similarly broad value-laden mission statements that included references to working with the public, reducing fear, or improving public safety. These were not, however, reinforced at CS meetings with the presentation of systematic measures of CP performance, nor did district commanders routinely discuss their CP efforts. This meant that it was difficult for top management, no matter how invested in CP, to use CS as a specific mechanism for strengthening the agency’s commitment to its CP approach and to assess how well it was accomplishing its CP goals. Rather, top command took the occasional opportunity to bring attention to CP during CS which, given the focus on serious crime, could easily be seen as a distraction from the meeting’s primary purpose rather than an integral feature of the organization’s overarching existence.

Our impression that mission clarification operated independently under CS and CP was further supported by our observation that the participation of community stakeholders at CS was marginal. Regarded by many of its supporters as one of CS’s most crucial elements, CS meetings (as far as we could tell), were attended by only very few local residents or stakeholders, and we did not observe any community members questioning police efforts, or being called upon to express community concerns. In failing to provide a clear or meaningful role for external constituents, CS did little to encourage community involvement in how police identified and responded to problems and distributed resources (Skogan et al. 2004).

Internal Accountability

Accountability for performance under CS and CP also operated independently. CS meetings strengthened accountability between headquarters and the districts and provided a source of motivation that was primarily external and more coercive. Under CS, top leadership district commanders were held responsible for serious crime and an important source of motivation was the fear of looking incompetent in front of one’s peers or top command and, to a much lesser extent, the risk of suffering adverse career consequences. Although almost all the CS meetings we observed did not reproduce the highly charged atmosphere associated with the NYPD, it is probably fair to say that district commanders experienced a fair amount of pressure solely from their superiors’ expectation that they should be well acquainted with crime problems in their areas and be accomplishing results in reducing those problems. In contrast, accountability under CP operated informally within individual districts and emphasized aligning the moral commitment of line officers to its goals.
Comparison to CS’s focus on serious crime, accountability for CP goals and activities was not a major theme at CS meetings. Instead, district commanders and CPOs experienced pressure to do CP because top command had generally assigned major responsibility for this approach to these personnel. Thus, this was a kind of “pressure to do well” they experienced as part of their routine activities rather than due to a specific mechanism, such as being questioned in front of their colleagues.

The most structured accountability process in place for CP that we observed was in those departments that required district commanders and CPOs to participate at community meetings. Similar to the CS format, these gatherings provided a venue for local residents to query those directly responsible for addressing their individual concerns and neighborhood problems. In having to respond to the questions of their constituents, district commanders and CPOs were made to feel accountable for CP. In comparison, CS contributed much less to this goal.

CS did even less to foster accountability for CP among those who, at least according to its supporters, are supposed to feel most responsible for CP—the rank and file. While it could be argued that occasional queries from top command on CP efforts at CS may have exerted some pressure on district commanders and any CPOs in attendance, the fact that rank-and-file officers rarely or very infrequently attended these meetings meant that they were not exposed to this kind of scrutiny. Furthermore, as far as we could tell, rank-and-file officers mainly acted as observers at CP meetings and were not required to participate in a meaningful way (such as fielding questions, making presentations, etc.). The absence of formal venues for fostering accountability that seek to expose personnel to the scrutiny of the upper echelons of the police department, or to the citizens they serve, meant that the rank and file did not experience accountability with similar intensity. This pressure for CP performance was even further diminished to the extent that the creation of CPOs shifted the burden of doing CP onto these specialists, thereby allowing line officers to focus most of their energies on answering calls for service.

How then, were the lowest ranks in the organization, those that CP’s supporters consider central actors, held accountable for CP performance? Our fieldwork suggested the way that rank-and-file officers internalized CP values and engaged in CP activities depended a great deal on the nature of first-line supervision. Unlike CS, accountability under CP for the rank and file was essentially an internal, or “normative compliance system,” whose main source of motivation relied heavily upon an individual officer’s buy-in, and any guidance or support that his or her patrol sergeant cared to offer (Etzioni 1975 as cited in Mastrofski and Greene 1993: 83). In many ways this characterization of accountability for CP as decentralized (occurring within districts) and informal (contingent upon individuals) also applied to district commanders and CPOs.

Decentralization of Decision-Making

Both CS and CP decentralize operational command so that it is focused on the policing of specific territories, and so we would expect that this element would be fairly well integrated under these reforms. Geographic rather than functional specialization is supposed to make the police organization more responsive to local conditions, and indeed, all the departments we visited, bar one (the OPPD), had decentralized into geographic areas or districts and delegated primary decision-making responsibility to district commanders. In this sense, these reforms could be characterized as sharing a common approach.

However, decentralization had not progressed as far down as many CP advocates would wish—that is to much smaller geographic areas than districts (e.g., beats) and with a great deal of decision-making authority delegated to first-line supervisors and their subordinates. Consequently, we assessed the level of integration for this element as low. Because CP places a high value on line officers acquiring detailed knowledge of an area’s residents and their problems and empowering these officers to respond as best they see fit, a more integrated CS and CP model would need to develop structures that support these goals.
Dividing districts into small areas or beats, and assigning 24-hour responsibility for addressing their crime or neighborhood problems to small teams of officers supervised by a sergeant, would be one way that this could be accomplished. However, at the sites we visited, department operations were not organized around beats and while sergeants had considerable decision-making authority, their primary responsibility was to respond to problems identified by their superiors as important rather than to take the lead themselves in identifying what problems were a priority and deciding how they should be handled. The latter approach is highly decentralized, as it specifically empowers sergeants to make important command decisions about how the department should best mobilize its resources. Because operational command was structured around a district concept with central decision-making authority on police operations delegated to district commanders, this element operated in a way that was more consistent with CS than with CP.

In reality, there may be some tension in decentralizing command to different organizational levels, but there is no reason in principle to think of this relationship as strictly zero sum and that a better balance between these two reforms could not be struck. That is, it could be possible to increase the decision-making authority of line officers without degrading the role of middle managers. Under a more integrated CS/CP model, middle could be responsible for focusing on the “big picture”—helping to promote the organization’s goals, monitoring progress and results, coordinating the district’s resources, reviewing performance, and offering guidance. At the same time, beat teams headed by a first-line supervisor could be assigned 24-hour responsibility for a given area. As a team leader, the first-line supervisor could be given considerable leeway to act strategically—that is in setting priorities and in exercising independent judgment about how best to achieve organizational objectives—and to ensure some kind of quality control, could be held directly accountable for results.

**Organizational Flexibility**

Both CS and CP are strategic in that they seek to make the organization more adept at shifting resources in response to variations in the organization’s environment. Under CS, this involves giving district commanders the capacity to move resources to deal with emerging or unforeseeable crime problems, when in CP’s case the focus is on meeting the various demands of diverse constituencies through the permanent assignment of officers to a given beat. Under both reforms, although perhaps more developed under CP, departments are encouraged to use resources outside of the department to increase their capacity to respond effectively.

Our field observations showed that our departments had generally eschewed strongly committing the organization to keeping generalist patrol officers in a small area for a long period of time. A few departments (like the LAPD) had permanently assigned specialist CPOs to a small beat (or reporting area), but most had opted for greater flexibility by assigning CP officers or units to cover a whole district or an entire city and giving district commanders the authority to dispatch these units as they saw fit. In both cases, CP specialists were freed from the burden of having to respond to every call for service so that they could focus on community concerns.
However, assigning primary responsibilities for CP to only a handful of officers makes it unlikely that they will be able to respond adequately to the many community problems that are brought to their attention. Moreover, creating mobile CPOs and units that can be shifted in response to the demands of many different communities in a given district or city, undermines CPOs geographic focus on learning about and responding to the needs of a single community. Having to cover a large territory makes it very likely that these units will find it difficult to develop intimate knowledge of a specific area's problems and the preferences of its residents in order to come up with customized solutions (NRC 2004: 175). The fact that departments had also created specialist crime units to work on their district's emerging crime problems and that there was a clear division of labor between these and CP specialists, strongly suggested that CS and CP were regarded as fulfilling separate purposes within a department.

The creation of specialist units to concentrate on CP meant that generalist patrol officers could continue in their traditional role of responding to calls for service and could be called upon on an ad hoc basis, in particular during their unassigned time, to respond to nonroutine problems within their district when and where these occurred. A common strategy was requesting that officers use their discretionary time to patrol a hot spot. Obviously, generalist patrol could also be called upon to address CP concerns (such as a citizen complaints about minor crimes and disorders), but generally both of these strategies—ad hoc reassignment of patrol and the creation of specialist units—were much more compatible with CS's notion of empowering district commanders to mobilize resources for strategic application, than CP's emphasis on maintaining beat integrity through the assignment of patrol officers to permanent beats and relieving them from the pressure of answering calls for service.

In sum, while CS and CP may have shared a common interest in mobilizing the community as an additional resource, we assessed the level of integration for organizational flexibility as only low. The creation of separate specialist enforcement CP officers and units, and a reluctance toward keeping patrol officers assigned to a small area for the duration of their shift allowed organizational flexibility under CS and CP to act in ways that were more-or-less independent of one another.

Data-Driven Problem Identification and Assessment

Both CS and CP emphasize using reliable and relevant data to identify crime and disorder problems and to assess outcomes. Our fieldwork, however, suggested that the knowledge base for driving this process was not at all integrated under CS and CP. While all our agencies had developed sophisticated data systems to support CS's focus on rapidly identifying when and where serious crime was occurring, these same systematic mechanisms did not incorporate the identification and measurement of CP objectives. Officers' daily reports and calls-for-service information were collected via each department's existing record-keeping system, but these systems often failed to collect information on broader community problems. Command staff and patrol officers could learn about these concerns through their own contacts with local residents and their communities, but this information was not gathered and recorded in a way that helped determine priorities and evaluate results. This lacuna also applied to regular meetings with community members which were seldom used as an opportunity to routinely collect data in order to act strategically under CP.

Not only did the data systems used for CS barely apply to CP, data were also not used in the ways called for by CP. Under CP, patrol officers are supposed to use data as an important part of their decision-making process on what to do and how to do it, but our observations suggested that this was rarely the case. On the whole, patrol officers were passive recipients of crime analysis and experienced problem identification mainly as a directive from their district commander who, under CS, was responsible for using data to make command decisions.
This lack of integration under CS and CP extended to the assessment of outcomes. Without a means of collecting information on the kinds of CP concerns that are often not reported and therefore not recorded in official police records, it is obviously difficult for a department to know how well it is responding to them. Moreover, assessments of success under CS emphasized short-term reductions in crime (in particular from one reporting period to the next). CS helped district commanders focus resources on an area, and when a hot spot turned cold, it was considered resolved (at least for the time being). In contrast, departments had not melded their existing data systems to a CP approach that sought to gather a broad range of evidence on crime and community problems that could then be used to more rigorously monitor and assess a department’s accomplishments over the long term.

**Innovative Problem-Solving Tactics**

CS and CP have been touted as radically changing the way that police have traditionally responded to crime and community problems. Under both reforms, police are expected to look beyond their own experiences and use innovations in theory and research about crime prevention to select and implement those strategies that are most likely to be successful. As such, these reforms embrace several core features of the problem-oriented policing model espoused by Herman Goldstein, and so we used this as a gauge for helping us assess to what degree innovative problem-solving tactics were integrated under CS and CP. In addition, CP assigns a core role to community participation in the problem-solving process, and so we also used this to evaluate how this element worked under both reforms.

Our research suggested that our sites had attempted to implement several of POP’s tenets (such as crime prevention and being proactive), but that these generally operated in various combinations and at different levels within each organization rather than as a coherent or unified strategy. So, for example, district commanders used crime analysis to identify serious crime problems and focus resources, but in a way that tended to promote a traditional reactive response. Meanwhile, patrol officers generally considered problem solving to be synonymous with being proactive in relation to individual crime incidents rather than concentrating on identifying patterns and trying to identify the underlying conditions that gave rise to them. Finally, CP specialists were the most likely members of the department to broaden their strategic focus to include minor crimes and disorders and to engage in crime prevention, but their problem-solving efforts were less systematic and intensive than those called for by this model’s full implementation (in no small measure to the many responsibilities they were tasked with under their department’s CP approach).

This high level of variability of POP implementation within each organization suggested to us that innovative problem solving was not at all integrated under CS and CP. This impression was strengthened by our observation that local citizens were barely involved in the brainstorming, planning, and implementation of problem-solving strategies. When residents were mobilized to help address crime and community problems, it tended to be as a resource at the behest of the police and not in the form of a mutual or co-equal partnership. Nor did we hear about residents receiving special training in problem solving to encourage their fuller participation in this process. By-and-large, the burden of coming up with innovative solutions fell to the police and was not shared with the community, further suggesting a lack of integration between CS and CP.
External Accountability

Finally, CS and CP place a high value on being transparent in order to increase accountability between the police organization and the citizens it serves. Our fieldwork suggested that external accountability was pursued very differently under CS and CP. Under CS, it was accomplished by making traditional Part I crime statistics and, in some cases, the kinds of crime maps prepared for regular CS meetings available to the public through the department’s web site. For the most part, citizens had little influence over the type of crime data that were made available and constituted a largely passive audience with police-defined outcome measures flowing from the police to the community with little opportunity for feedback.

In contrast, external accountability under CP was largely accomplished through police-community meetings where local citizens were afforded the opportunity to meet with the police and discuss any concerns they might have. CS maps and crime statistics played only a small role at this meeting and were generally not used to generate discussion about what the police were doing in response to a crime problem. Nor were these data used to solicit feedback from community members on whether police priorities actually corresponded to those of the local community. Crime statistics are likely to be less tangible and relevant to the community in assessing police “competence” than local neighborhood concerns (Mastrofski 1999: 2). Under CP, departments should be judged on those things that community members have identified as mattering most to them, but CS did little to contribute to the goal of providing consistent feedback to mutually agreed upon goals. As a result, we assessed this element as not at all integrated.
Conclusion

In an important essay on police organization, Albert Reiss writes:

> The dilemma of modern policing seems to lie in determining whether to continue opting for rational, bureaucratic administration centering on crime events and their control or, rather to transform policing into a community and social problem-centered bureaucracy that is accountable to localized groups (1992: 94–95).

Our research suggests that one way police organizations may have sought to try and resolve this dilemma is by implementing CS and CP in ways that allowed these reforms to function simultaneously but independently. By adopting a form of co-implementation that allowed CS and CP to operate side-by-side, departments could respond to a broader set of goals and to engage in a wider variety of tasks than if they had implemented just one reform.

An additional benefit of this co-implementation approach is that it did not require the more radical kinds of change to existing police organization and practice that closer integration of these reforms would seem to demand. So, for example, by continuing to present and discuss official indicators of serious crime at CS, departments retained their familiar crime control focus and did not have to change their existing data systems to include CP objectives. Similarly, creating CP specialist units helped departments respond to citizens’ concerns but in a way that minimized disruptions to the traditional police role of addressing serious crime and answering calls for service (NRC 2004: 84–86). In contrast, a more integrated CS/CP model would require much more radical changes to existing organizational routines.

Our research suggests that police are quite satisfied with CS and CP being stove-piped, so they might rightly ask whether their closer integration is desirable. While a convincing answer to this question would require empirical testing, our evidence suggests that police leaders should seriously consider experimenting with alternative co-implementation approaches. A more integrated CS/CP model could give rise to a new paradigm in policing, which does more to maximize the intended benefits of these reforms than what we observed. We do not provide a such a model in this paper, but it would be one where CP goals are measured and subject to a similarly intense level of scrutiny as serious crime, where high standards of accountability are applied to all department members, especially at the operational level “where the work gets done” (Mastrofski 1996: 211), where departments are organized with an eye toward responding as nimbly to the needs and demands of diverse communities as they are to crime trends, where data covering a broad range of problems relevant to the police and their constituents drives decision-making at all levels of the organization, where the use of cutting-edge knowledge is part of a systematic approach to implementing innovative problem-solving solutions, and where citizens are given sufficient opportunity to influence police priorities and to receive feedback on their central concerns. Whatever challenges such a model is likely to present, this seems like a vision worth striving for.
References


References


### Appendix

**Table A-1. Logistic Regression Predicting Co-Implementation (n=279)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Odds Ratios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implement Community Policing</td>
<td>0.2330</td>
<td>0.1528</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-Solving Vision</td>
<td>0.2603</td>
<td>0.1586</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Driven</td>
<td>0.7189</td>
<td>0.1580</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Collaboration</td>
<td>-0.1361</td>
<td>0.1509</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonlaw enforcement Services</td>
<td>0.0586</td>
<td>0.1405</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive Policing</td>
<td>-0.0336</td>
<td>0.1448</td>
<td>0.817</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Crime Goal</td>
<td>0.1079</td>
<td>0.1468</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate to Command</td>
<td>0.3184</td>
<td>0.1562</td>
<td>0.042*</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build Community Capacity</td>
<td>-0.3388</td>
<td>0.1563</td>
<td>0.030*</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentrate on Single Mission</td>
<td>0.1251</td>
<td>0.1536</td>
<td>0.415</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replace Middle Managers</td>
<td>0.3252</td>
<td>0.1443</td>
<td>0.024*</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Sworn</td>
<td>0.7519</td>
<td>0.2329</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
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<td>PERF Membership</td>
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<td>0.110</td>
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<td>IACP Membership</td>
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<td>0.669</td>
<td>0.65</td>
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<td>State Accreditation</td>
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<td>0.3118</td>
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<tr>
<td>CALEA Accreditation</td>
<td>0.0591</td>
<td>0.3288</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.437</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>0.026*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001"
For the past quarter century, Compstat and community policing have been powerful tools for police reform in the United States. But just how well do they work together: in unison, independently, or at cross-purposes? This report takes a look at how these reforms operate when implemented simultaneously in the same police organization. While some have speculated that Compstat complements and supports community policing and even improves it, there is very little systematic evidence to support these claims. This report uses a national survey and fieldwork data from site visits to seven U.S. police agencies to address this issue. The authors provide a profile of Compstat and community policing in large police agencies to show what local departments are doing with each reform, why they decided to adopt them, and what some of the differences were between co-implementing and community policing-only departments. They also provide an in-depth assessment of how these reforms operated “on the ground.” Their goal is to challenge policymakers, practitioners, and scholars to reconsider the current relationship between Compstat and community policing and conceive of more innovative approaches to their co-implementation.