



# Institutionalizing Problem Analysis: Case Studies of Five Police Agencies



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# Contents

## Introduction 5

### Chapter 1

Port St. Lucie (Florida) Police Department: Problem Analysis of Single-Family Construction-Site Burglary and Theft 6

### Chapter 2

North Carolina State University Campus Police Department: Problem Analysis of Theft from Motor Vehicles 39

### Chapter 3

Raleigh (North Carolina) Police Department: An Analysis of Domestic Violence 57

### Chapter 4

Madison (Wisconsin) Police Department: Problem Analysis of Alcohol-Related Violence in Downtown 127

### Chapter 5

Chula Vista (California) Police Department: Problem Analysis of High-Call Volume Locations 141



## Introduction


Effective problem solving requires an in-depth analysis of the underlying conditions that give rise to community problems. Recognizing the need to increase the capability of law enforcement agencies to engage in such problem analysis activities and develop effective solutions to community problems, the purpose of this study was to institutionalize problem analysis capacity in five law enforcement agencies through some direct funding and technical assistance provided by a team of problem analysis experts. This is one of two reports from the Institutionalizing Problem Analysis Project, which was funded by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice.

The report contains an introduction and five chapters, each a case study describing a public safety problem examined by a police agency. The case studies focus on data used for problem analysis and, as such, they describe primary and secondary data sources used for analysis, the limitations of existing data and the need to collect additional data, analyses undertaken, and key findings arising from analysis. While the analytical process pointed to response options for the problem, the primary objective was to model the analytic process within the agency. Each agency, therefore, selected a public safety problem of concern and undertook in-depth analysis using existing data and collecting additional data, as necessary.

Each analytic process proceeded with the assistance of a consultant who served as a technical advisor to the agency and primary author of the case study. The five police agencies that participated in the study and their consultants/technical advisors are the following:

1. Port St. Lucie (Florida) Police Department: Rachel Boba.
2. North Carolina State University Campus Police Department: James R. Brunet.
3. Raleigh (North Carolina) Police Department: Deborah Lamm Weisel.
4. Madison (Wisconsin) Police Department: Michael S. Scott and Nicole DeMotto.
5. Chula Vista (California) Police Department: Rana Sampson.

While the case studies contain important information about the problems and their analysis, the larger purpose of the analysis process was to provide insight to the agency on the organizational needs necessary to conduct meaningful analyses routinely: data systems, personnel, training, police management practices and policies. A separate report, *Institutionalizing Problem Analysis: Process and Practice*, describes the institutionalization process in the five police agencies, including an assessment of the organizational strengths and limitations supporting routine problem analysis.



## Chapter 1

# Port St. Lucie (Florida) Police Department: Problem Analysis of Single-Family Construction- Site Burglary and Theft

by Rachel Boba

# Port St. Lucie (Florida) Police Department: Problem Analysis of Single-Family Construction- Site Burglary and Theft

This case study is part of a larger project in which the Port St. Lucie Police Department (PSLPD) is seeking to institutionalize analysis for problem solving. This case study was conducted as part of, and simultaneously with, the institutionalization process. Within the institutionalization process, the goal of this case study is to provide members of the agency with experience in problem analysis and to develop a model that can be used to study problems in the future. It is the first comprehensive problem analysis study conducted in PSLPD. The analysis is the result of the work of the members of the problem analysis case study subcommittee.

## Problem Selection

The PSLPD selected construction-site burglary and theft for this problem analysis. Even though it is not the most frequent crime in Port St. Lucie, it is one of the more frequent property crimes. In addition, because of the immense growth in population occurring in the city, it will be a concern for years to come. The population reported in the 2000 census was just under 90,000, in April 2004 it was 115,000, in January 2005, it was 125,000, and estimates anticipate an increase to 150,000 during the next several years. It is the largest city in the Treasure Coast area and according to the 2000 census was the second-fastest growing city in the state of Florida.

Port St. Lucie is approximately 100 square miles in size, the third-largest in area in Florida, and has a significant amount of undeveloped land. Much of the population growth is the result of individuals and families buying vacant lots in Port St. Lucie and building new single-family homes because real estate tends to be less expensive than in areas south. City building department personnel estimate that between 450 and 600 new building permits are issued each month and the building department estimates that more than 6,000 homes are under construction at any given time.

Port St. Lucie's crime rate is relatively low compared both with other cities in the area and with the nation. Table 1.1 shows the Part I crime counts for 2004:

Crime	Count
Homicide	0
Rape	34
Robbery	33
Aggravated assault	174
Burglary	749
Larceny	1,856
Auto theft	123
Arson	23
Total	2,981

**Table 1.1.** Part I Crime Counts

Preliminary analysis of reports titled construction-site burglary and theft showed that 225 incidents occurred between January 2003 and May 24, 2004. During the same time, there were 614 residential burglaries.

An overwhelming majority of construction sites victimized in Port St. Lucie are single-family homes. By reading the reports, and through analysis, we discovered that between one-quarter and one-third of the incidents titled construction-site burglary were actually vandalisms because of the legal components of the crime (i.e., unlawfully entering a structure to commit a crime). These reports described incidents in which property was damaged (e.g., holes in the drywall) but nothing was taken and the damage did not seem to be caused by someone attempting to take property. These vandalism incidents were taken out of the analysis because they represent a problem distinct from the problem selected. In addition, thefts were included because they are crimes in which property is taken from the construction site and not from inside the home under construction. This problem analysis is of single-family construction-site burglary, attempted burglary, and theft, referred to as CSBT throughout this report.

## Problem History and External Factors

The PSLPD had previously identified and addressed the problem through a process in which “strategic plan focus groups” (teams of police officers with interest in, or expertise with, a particular type of activity) were to brainstorm, develop, and implement responses to a list of problems. There is no evidence that substantive problem analysis of CSBT took place before this current project. In addition, crime-prevention personnel and property detectives had implemented several programs in the past, including marking appliances and attempting to apprehend offenders stealing the property as well as implementing a program called “Operation Hard Hat.” The goal of the program was to reduce vandalism, theft, and burglary at the various construction sites by educating builders about preventing crime, providing “No Trespassing” signs and other crime-prevention materials, creating a system whereby builders notified the police department of new construction sites or areas needing extra patrol, selective enforcement, having road patrol officers notify builders through crime-opportunity forms of open or unsecured doors at construction sites, installing surveillance cameras at selected construction sites, security survey assessments of several construction sites at new subdivisions, and making crime prevention recommendations.

During the course of this project, two significant events influenced the problem analysis: Hurricane Frances and Hurricane Jeanne in September 2004. These events may have influenced the analysis in two ways: 1. the storms and devastation destroyed many construction sites and materials and kept people from working during that month, which could have reduced the number of burglaries; 2. the shortage of plywood, both before and after the hurricanes, could have increased the number of thefts from construction sites (Note: October was the month with the most events, just after the hurricanes).

## Analysis Process

Through a review of the limited literature, discussion with other agencies dealing with construction-site burglary problems, and the experience of officers in Port St. Lucie, the following are the hypotheses that the committee developed to guide the analysis:

**Trollers:** Individuals drive around or walk around neighborhoods looking for the opportunity to take property from construction sites for resale or personal use. These can be anyone from people living in the neighborhood to people from out of town.

**Insiders:** Builders and subcontractors steal from one another to use the stolen property in ongoing work and to sell. They either work on the site that is victimized or have some inside knowledge of when property is being delivered, when it is vulnerable, and how well the sites are protected.

**Fraud:** Builders and subcontractors steal from themselves and claim the losses on their insurance.

Probably all three types of activity are part of the problem in Port St. Lucie, but it was the goal of this analysis to collect data and conduct analysis to determine which of the three is most prevalent in order to prioritize the response.

The analysis plan was as follows:

- » Read all reports related to construction-site crime.
- » Determine additional information to collect: 1. from officers at the scene; 2. quantified from the narratives; and 3. obtained through field work, such as interviews and direct observation.
- » Conduct a preliminary analysis and adjust data-collection measures.
- » Conduct final analysis and use it to make recommendations for response.

The analysis process was carried out from May 2004 through January 2005. The following are details of the analysis progression obtained from meeting minutes:

- » **May 2004:** A plan for data collection was developed and a paid student intern was hired to assist.
- » **June 2004:** An initial analysis of construction-site crime was conducted using quantitative data from the records management system. The problem was not specified because the report narratives had not been read. Construction-site crime was compared with residential burglary and presented at the monthly CompStat-like meeting, called Starcom.
- » **July 2004:** In reading the reports, the intern found that many were about vandalism and, therefore, were not included in the analysis. The narratives were used to code variables indicating the level of difficulty of the crimes (see below). The committee developed a check sheet including additional information that officers filled out at the scene, and implemented it on July 1.

- » **August 2004:** Analysis of field interview information revealed that the data were not helpful for this problem. Several recommendations for changes were made and a subcommittee was developed to rethink the Field Interview (FI) cards.
- » **October 2004:** The top 40 builders were invited to a forum to discuss their experiences with crime and their building practices. The committee developed interview questions, including some specifically for problem analysis, to use when questioning construction-site burglary suspects. Observation of construction sites began in order to collect data on the number of vacant lots, homes, and other sites surrounding crime sites to determine levels of guardianship. Preliminary analysis of the data was conducted to present at the department-wide problem analysis training.
- » **December 2004:** A meeting was held with a member of the city's building department to obtain information about the department's practices and experiences with construction-site crime.
- » **January 2005:** Final analysis of the data was conducted and used to develop responses.
- » **February 2005:** A brief presentation of the final analysis and recommended responses was given at the monthly Starcom meeting. The chiefs approved the responses.
- » **March 2005:** The implementation of responses began. Two of the responses included additional analysis (pattern analysis and more detailed analysis of repeat victims [builders]).

Although much of the data collection occurred simultaneously, specific analyses were conducted at selected times throughout the process. The first analysis provided an initial scan of records management system (RMS) data compared with residential burglary. The second analysis was conducted to present to a department-wide problem analysis training as well as to test data-collection methods. The third analysis was the final analysis of the overall problem on which response development was based, and the fourth analysis will be part of the response phase.

## Data

This case study of the single-family construction-site burglaries includes analysis of the following police data:

**Police reports:** Data from the police reports housed in the RMS, such as date, time, location, property taken, and victim information, were analyzed. Narratives were examined to determine inclusion of incidents for the analysis as well as for additional variables not captured in the RMS. Selected information was drawn from the narratives and coded (see primary data collection). The data are available daily and are collected through an electronic report-writing process and an upload into the RMS. Limitations include information not collected specifically for CSBT problem analysis, such as stage

of building, whether the home is in a gated community. Also, the data do not contain modus operandi information that is entered consistently.

**CSBT check sheets:** The problem analysis team determined that responding officers needed to collect additional information at the scene. A check sheet added to the police report had to be filled out for every reported CSBT (see the end of this report for a copy of the check sheet).

**Field interview information:** The committee obtained field interview data from the RMS for this study. The variables included in the RMS did not allow selection of information directly related to construction-site crime; therefore, the narratives were reviewed. After reviewing more than 1,500 cases, the committee determined that only a select few were relevant for the study and not worth analyzing. As a result of this analysis, however, a subcommittee was formed to revamp the FI card and improve the information included in the RMS system.

Major data-cleaning tasks were not necessary in this analysis. The most difficult task was obtaining all crimes related to construction sites so that they could be reviewed for inclusion in the analysis. Personnel in the records section actually read all the reports and put the paper copies aside for the project. The project intern reviewed the reports to determine which to include (e.g., single family, not vandalism), entered selected information from the narrative into a database, and then matched the information to the RMS data which included date, time and location, and other details, by incident number.

Other data that might have been useful, but that we were unable to obtain, were building permit data. It was our hope to be able to map building permits over time and compare the locations of crimes. In addition, we intended to use that information to estimate a timeline of the building process (such as, how far out from when the building permit is pulled is the roof installed, when the house is securable, etc.).

## Primary Data Collection

Several methods of primary data collection were used to obtain additional information about the problem. They included content analysis of existing police reports, direct observation of construction crime sites, as well as focus groups and interviews. The following is a description of each of the primary data collected:

**Difficulty variables:** The difficulty of the crime was thought to be important in determining which hypothesis is supported. For example, if the crimes are difficult, it would support the insider hypothesis because these offenders would have the skills, knowledge, and access to property that is more difficult to obtain. On the contrary, if the crimes show to be less difficult, the troller hypothesis would be supported because these are offenders looking for a quick, easy opportunity to obtain property. Four variables were created to measure the difficulty of the crime:

1. Skill: The level of skill it took to remove the property.
2. Transport: The minimum mode of transport necessary to move the property.
3. Access: Location of the property located on or in the construction site.
4. Time: The minimum amount of time it would take to remove the property.


The values for these variables are shown in Table 1.2. This method was tested along with one with four values by coding a number of the reports and evaluating how well the scores estimated the difficulty of these crimes. The method with three values seemed to better represent the crimes' difficulties.

Value	Skill	Transport	Access	Time
0	No skill	Walk away	Outside/visible/unattached	0 to 5 minutes
1	Heavy, awkward, forcibly removed	Car, small truck	Outside attached, inside visible attached and/or unattached	5 to 10 minutes
2	Skills/tools	Truck and/or trailer	Secured inside	More than 10 minutes

**Table 1.2.** Part I Crime Difficulty Variables

Because the actual skill, mode of transport, and time it took are not known (lack of offender information), the reports were coded to minimum requirements. One person did all the coding to ensure consistency.

**Guardianship:** The committee also thought it would be interesting to determine the level of guardianship of the sites that were victimized because this might provide insight to the troller hypothesis. Data were collected by drawing the eight lots around the victimized site and determining what they contained (see Figure 1.1). In addition to vacant, cleared, and wooded characteristics, others included canal, lake, and another homes under construction.



**Figure 1.1.** Lots Surrounding Victimized Sites

A ratio was computed by counting the number of possible guardian lots (eight in the diagram) and how many did not have people living at them (in the diagram, five vacant lots and homes under construction). Lakes and canals were seen as protection so they were not counted as vacant.

**Home builders' experiences:** A focus group of the top 40 builders in Port St. Lucie discussed their building practices as well as their experiences with CSBT.

**PSL building department experiences:** A meeting with the building department was held to determine building department practices and their experiences and insight into CSBT.

**PSLDP officer experiences:** During the course of the project, themes arose from officers' comments in meetings, training, and discussions about CSBT.

## Data Analysis

Two hundred sixty-six construction-site burglaries, thefts, and criminal damages (related to attempted burglary, not to vandalism) took place from January through December 2004. In this analysis, databases representing three time periods are analyzed. Each contained different characteristics about CSBT incidents. The periods represent when different data-collection methods were initiated:

1. January through December 2004 (12 months, N=266): Date, time, location, disposition, property, builder information, and difficulty characteristics.
2. July through December 2004 (6 months, N=170): Subcontractors, gated community, stage of building, and insurance information (from the check sheets).
3. October through December 2004 (3 months, N=91): Guardianship, and location of lot (from field work).

### By Month: January through December 2004

The number of CSBT incidents per month ranges between 10 and 42, with 22 the monthly average for the year. The numbers seem to have increased in the second half of 2004, with October the highest month with 42, which may be the result of the two hurricanes in September.




Figure 1.2. Single-Family Construction-Site Burglaries: 2004


### Temporal Analysis: January through December 2004

Temporal analysis of CSBT includes analysis of Day Span, Time Span, and Report Span. Day span is the number of days the property was left at risk and is computed by subtracting the first possible date the crime could have occurred from the last possible date it could have occurred. Table 1.3 below shows that the average day span was 3.76; however, 56 percent of the CSBT had a Day Span of 0 or 1.

	Day Span	Time Span*	Report Span
Number of Cases	266	149	266
Mean	3.76	11:51:08	1.74
Median	1.00	14:00:00	0.00
Standard Deviation	9.78	7:42:15	6.78
*Only those crimes with day spans of 0 or 1.			

**Table 1.3.** Day Span, Time Span, and Report Span Analysis

Figure 1.3 shows the frequency of incidents by the number of days showing several outliers.




**Figure 1.3.** Day Span

Time span is the number of hours the property was left at risk for those incidents with a day span of 0 to 1; therefore, the highest value is 24 hours. It is computed by subtracting the first possible time from the last possible time the crime could have occurred. The average number of hours for these selected cases (149) is almost 12 hours. In addition, the time span for 47 percent of the incidents range between 13 and 20 hours, which makes sense because individuals do not live on construction sites and crimes are discovered when workers arrive the next day or so.

Time Span	Number of Reported Incidents	Percent of Total
0-1 hr	26	17.4%
1-2 hrs	5	3.4%
2-3 hrs	6	4.0%
3-4 hrs	1	0.7%
4-5 hrs	2	1.3%
5-6 hrs	3	2.0%
6-7 hrs	1	0.7%
7-8 hrs	4	2.7%
8-9 hrs	4	2.7%
9-10 hrs	0	0.0%
10-11 hrs	2	1.3%
11-12 hrs	1	0.7%
12-13 hrs	5	3.4%
13-14 hrs	14	9.4%
14-15 hrs	9	6.0%
15-16 hrs	9	6.0%
16-17 hrs	3	2.0%
17-18 hrs	11	7.4%
18-19 hrs	13	8.7%
19-20 hrs	11	7.4%
20-21 hrs	5	3.4%
21-22 hrs	3	2.0%
22-23 hrs	6	4.0%
23-24 hrs	5	3.4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>100.0%</b>


**Table 1.4.** Number of Hours Property at Risk

Figure 1.4 shows the breakdown of the number of incidents by time span. The most frequent is 0 to 1 hour, which may be a result of data errors. (In many of these cases, the first and last possible times are the same.)




**Figure 1.4.** Time Span\*

Figure 1.5 depicts a weighted time-span analysis of this subset of incidents and shows that the time spans of these crimes overlap the hours of 1700 and 0700 primarily (72.4 percent).



**Figure 1.5.** Time-Span Analysis: Weighted

Finally, report span is the time between when the crime was discovered by someone to when it was reported to the police and is computed by subtracting the last possible date from the report date. The average number of days is 1.74, but as Figure 1.6 shows, an overwhelming majority (86.8 percent) is reported the same day or the day after they are discovered.



**Figure 1.6.** Report Span

### Spatial Analysis: January through December 2004

Analysis for repeat CSBT by address shows that of the 254 addresses that were victimized, only 12 or 4.7 percent were victimized twice within 1 year.

Spatial analysis of CSBT includes the analysis of 249 of 266 cases (17 could not be mapped). The map below shows the CSBT reported in 2004 with those 12 addresses, with two CSBT symbolized with larger dots. The incidents appear to be occurring in the west side of the city.




Figure 1.7. CSBT Reported in 2004

Figure 1.8 depicts the counts of CSBT by zones using the natural breaks classification. This classification determines the ranges for the colors by the group of the data values.





Figure 1.8. CSBT by Zones

Finally, in Figure 1.9, the zones are shaded by standard deviation. The blue areas are those that are below the average, the pink above the average for the city, and the red zone is three standard deviations above the mean. In this map, the zone average was 23 crimes, with the red zone having 84. Overall, the map shows that the west side of the city has a relatively higher crime rate than the East. Not surprisingly, this is the location of a majority of the vacant land and where construction is occurring. Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain the number of houses under construction in these areas to determine a rate of risk.



**Figure 1.9.** CSBT Zones by Standard Deviation

**Clearances: January through December 2004**

From January to December 2004, five cases (1.9 percent) were cleared by arrest of either an adult (four cases) or a juvenile (one case). Seven cases (2.6 percent) were exceptionally cleared (adult).

### Property Taken: January through December 2004

The property taken and listed in the reports was very specific; therefore, for easier analysis, the committee created the following categories:

- » **AC/heat:** contains equipment related to air conditioning and heating units such as compressors, handlers, heat pumps.
- » **Appliances:** contains domestic appliances for use in the home such as refrigerators, stoves, microwaves, washers, dryers, and dishwashers.
- » **Building supplies:** contains general building supplies that can be used in almost any construction project such as plywood, studs, lumber, copper wiring, steel, and cinder blocks.
- » **Construction equipment:** contains equipment used to carryout construction projects such as generators, cement mixers, saws.
- » **Doors/windows:** contains doors and windows.
- » **Internal cosmetic:** contains materials installed inside the home and may be specific in color and type to a particular home or builder such as ceramic tile, bathtub, sink, faucets, cabinetry, house paint, and carpet.
- » **Pool:** contains equipment and supplies related to building pools such as pool pumps, heaters, and filters.
- » **Rebar, ladder, hurricane shutters, tools, well pump:** these categories represent only these types of property. They have not been categorized either because they are particularly unique (e.g., hurricane shutters) or have arisen as an issue in the analysis (e.g., ladders).
- » **Other:** contains a hodgepodge of property not fitting into any other category.

Table 1.5 lists the number of incidents by the type (category) of property taken. In most cases in which multiple property was taken, the items were of the same category, such as several appliances taken in one incident. The analysis shows that building supplies are the most frequently stolen items (19.5 percent of thefts), with appliances next (16.9 percent). When the categories pertaining to general construction supplies and equipment are combined (building supplies, construction equipment, rebar, and ladders), they represent 33.8 percent of the property taken.

Type of Property	Number of Reported Incidents	Percent of Total
Building supplies	52	19.5%
Appliances	45	16.9%
Internal cosmetic	24	9.0%
Construction equipment	24	9.0%
AC-related	23	8.6%
Doors and windows	20	7.5%
Pool-related	11	4.1%
Rebar	8	3.0%
Ladder	6	2.3%
Hurricane shutters	3	1.1%
Well pump	3	1.1%
Other	13	4.9%
Unknown/Not applicable*	34	12.8%
<b>Total</b>	<b>266</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
*Criminal damage incidents.		

**Table 1.5.** Number of Incidents by Type of Property


#### Difficulty of the Burglaries: January through December 2004

The skill variable represents the minimal level of skill or force the person needed to remove the stolen property. The values were: 0 = No skill; 1 = The property was heavy, awkward, or had to be forcibly removed; 2 = The property was removed with particular skills or tools.

The analysis reveals that almost half of the reported incidents had a skill level of 2, the highest. See Table 1.6 and Figure 1.10.

Skill	Frequency	Percent of Total
0	23	9.7%
1	98	41.5%
2	115	48.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>236</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Table 1.6.** Skill Level and Frequency of Burglary




**Figure 1.10.** Skill Level of Burglary

The *transport* variable represents the minimal mode of transport necessary to move the stolen property. The values were: 0 = The property could be carried away on foot; 1 = The property could be moved in a car or small truck; 2 = The property could be moved in a large truck.

The analysis reveals that a majority (70.1 percent) of the property could have been moved in a car or small truck. See Table 1.7 and Figure 1.11.

Transport	Frequency	Percent of Total
0	27	11.5%
1	164	70.1%
2	43	18.4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Table 1.7.** Transport Variable



**Figure 1.11.** Transport

The *access* variable represents where the property was located and its visibility from the street. The values were: 0 = The property was located outside the home, it was visible from the street and was unattached or uninstalled; 1 = The property was either outside and attached or installed or inside the home, visible from the street (attached or unattached); 2 = The property was secured/locked inside the home.

The analysis reveals that the incidents were fairly evenly spread across categories. See Table 1.8 below.

Access	Frequency	Percent of Total
0	59	25.2%
1	85	36.3%
2	90	38.5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Table 1.8.** Access Variable




Figure 1.12. Access

The *time* variable represents the minimal amount of time needed to remove, load, and move the property. The values were: 0 = 0 to 5 minutes, 1 = 5 to 10 minutes, 2 = more than 10 minutes.

The analysis reveals that the incidents were fairly evenly spread across categories. See Table 1.9 and Figure 1.13.

Time	Frequency	Percent of Total
0	83	36.9%
1	86	38.2%
2	56	24.9%
<b>Total</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Table 1.9. Time Variable




Figure 1.13. Time

### Comparison of Difficulty Variables

The following are the means of all four difficulty variables. Spearman Correlation tests among all four variables revealed two significantly correlated relationships.

	Skill	Transport	Access	Time
Number of Cases	236	234	234	225
Mean	1.39	1.07	1.13	0.88
Median	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Standard Deviation	0.66	0.54	0.79	0.78

**Table 1.10.** Difficulty Variables

Skill and Transport are positively correlated with a coefficient of .21, which is significant at the .01 level. Skill and Access are positively correlated with a coefficient of .35, which is also significant at the .01 level. These correlation coefficients are quite low, but indicate that the more skill used in the crime, the more difficult the transport of the materials. Also, the more skill used in the crime, the more inaccessible the property.

### Difficulty Rating

These variables were created for a difficulty index. The values for each variable were added together for each crime to achieve a difficulty rating. In addition, the time variable seemed somewhat ambiguous during coding so a second difficulty rating was computed with the three other variables—access, transport, and skill. The following table contains the statistics for the two variables.

	Difficulty rating (All)	Difficulty rating (w/o Time)
Number of Cases	200	232
Mean	4.49	3.59
Median	4	4
Standard Deviation	1.50	1.34

**Table 1.11.** Difficulty Ratings

The values for the first rating were 0 to 8 and for the second rating, 0 to 6, with 4 and 3 as center values, respectively. Each means is slightly higher than the middle, which indicates a medium level of difficulty overall.

Figures 1.14 and 1.15 depict the frequency by difficulty rating value. The frequency by value shows that a majority of the crimes have a difficulty rating of higher than 4 and 3, respectively which indicates that they are more difficult.




Figure 1.14. Difficulty Rating (All)




Figure 1.15. Difficulty Rating (W/O Time)

**Builders/Subcontractor: January through December 2004**

The committee conducted an analysis of the builders' victimizations because not many construction sites are victimized repeatedly. Table 1.12 shows that 20 percent of the builders account for 69.2 percent of the crime, with Renar Homes having a significantly higher number of incidents than the others.

Builder	Number of Reported Incidents	Percent of Total	Cumulative Percent	Percent of Total Builders (N=70)	Cumulative Percent
Renar Homes	40	16.9%	16.9%	1.4%	1.4%
Adams Homes	15	6.3%	23.2%	1.4%	2.9%
Levitt and Sons	15	6.3%	29.5%	1.4%	4.3%
Ameritrend Homes	14	5.9%	35.4%	1.4%	5.7%
Hanover Homes	14	5.9%	41.4%	1.4%	7.1%
Mercedes Homes	11	4.6%	46.0%	1.4%	8.6%
Royal Professional Builders	10	4.2%	50.2%	1.4%	10.0%
Willard Brothers Construction	10	4.2%	54.4%	1.4%	11.4%
Maronda Home Builders	7	3.0%	57.4%	1.4%	12.9%
Princeton Homes	7	3.0%	60.3%	1.4%	14.3%
RJM Homes	6	2.5%	62.9%	1.4%	15.7%
Associated Homes Inc.	5	2.1%	65.0%	1.4%	17.1%
Groza Builders	5	2.1%	67.1%	1.4%	18.6%
Paramount Homes	5	2.1%	69.2%	1.4%	20.0%
All Others	73	30.8%	100.0%	80.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>237</b>	<b>100.0%</b>		<b>100.0%</b>	

**Table 1.12.** Builder Incidents

To examine the insider hypotheses, we collected information about the last subcontractor who was on site before the crime occurred and who delivered the property that was taken. Unfortunately, the information was not helpful and may be more relevant for tactical crime analysis and investigations of individual crimes.

#### **Property Location and Installation: July through December 2004**

Information about where the property was located on the site (different from the difficulty measurement, access) and whether it had been installed (and had to be uninstalled to be taken) is shown in the following tables. About a third of the property was located outside and almost half had not been installed.

Location of the Property	Number of Reported Incidents	Percent of Total
Outside	40	30.8%
Inside home	26	20.0%
Near road	7	5.4%
In construction trailer	6	4.6%
Both inside and outside	3	2.3%
Other	3	2.3%
Unknown	45	34.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Table 1.13.** Property Location/Number of Incidents

Property Installed?	Number of Reported Incidents	Percent of Total
Yes	54	36.7%
No	64	43.5%
Unknown	29	19.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Table 1.14.** Installed Property/Number of Incidents

#### **Insurance: July through December 2004**


Of the reports that were completed from July to December (N =135), 86.7 percent reported that builders were covered by insurance, but only 45.9 percent (N =122) of builders anticipated filing a claim. When asked for the name of the insurance company, only about one-third of the people reporting the crime knew, reporting 26 different companies. Finally, of those who were asked about who carried the insurance that would cover the crime (N=104), 75 percent said the builder, 13.5 percent said the subcontractor, and 11.5 percent said the homeowner.

#### **Stage of Building: July through December 2004**

The committee thought that it was important to get a sense of when the homes were most vulnerable, so officers were asked to indicate on the check sheet the stage of building at which the crime occurred. Just over half occurred when the house was securable. (This does not mean the house was actually secured.)

Stage of Building	Number of Reported Incidents	Percent of Total
Cleared lot	9	6.3%
Concrete slab poured	6	4.2%
Exterior walls in place	15	10.6%
House securable	72	50.7%
Interior walls in place	14	9.9%
Roof installed	26	18.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Table 1.15.** Building Stage/Number of Incidents



**Figure 1.16.** Stage of Building

**Gated Community: July through December 2004**

Data collected from July through December showed that 17.2 percent (25 of 145) of the incidents took place in gated communities. Most homes under construction in Port St. Lucie are not in gated communities, so this makes sense. Unfortunately, we were not able to get the number of homes under construction in gated or nongated areas for comparison purposes. The following Tables 1.16 and 1.17 compare the crimes occurring in gated areas with crimes in nongated areas. T-tests comparing the means of the two groups revealed only one significant difference: In crimes occurring in gated communities, the property is less accessible than crimes not occurring in gated communities. Interpretation should be done cautiously because the number of crimes in gated communities was only 25, a small number for conducting statistics.

		<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
Day Span	Gated	25	4.76	7.61
	Not Gated	120	3.12	5.62
Time Span	Gated	13	11:23:04	7:25:40
	Not Gated	68	11:46:46	7:54:28
Report Span	Gated	25	2.84	11.77
	Not Gated	120	2.27	7.86

**Table 1.16.** Crime in Gated/Nongated Communities

		<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
Skill	Gated	24	1.58	0.58
	Not Gated	100	1.36	0.66
Transport	Gated	24	1.17	0.56
	Not Gated	100	1.15	0.59
Access*	Gated	24	1.46	0.66
	Not Gated	99	0.95	0.84
Time	Gated	19	1.00	0.88
	Not Gated	93	0.82	0.75
<i>*Significantly different at the .05 level</i>				

**Table 1.17.** Crime in Gated/Nongated Communities




Figure 1.17. Stage of Building

### Guardianship Risk: October through December 2004

Eighty cases were analyzed from data collected from October to December 2004. The guardianship risk was computed by adding the vacant lots to those under construction and dividing by the total number of neighboring lots. The average for these cases was .64; therefore, less than half the lots around an average home that is victimized in Port St. Lucie are occupied. Figure 1.18 shows the risk values in ranges for all the crimes in this analysis, with 56 percent having a risk of higher than .50, or 50 percent.




Figure 1.18. Guardianship Risk

Analysis also showed that only 21.3 percent of the sites were along canals, 5 percent were on lakes, and 25 percent were on a corner. These crimes, therefore, seem to be happening in the middle of a street in a fairly isolated area with few neighbors.

#### **Builders' Forum: October 2004**

In October 2004, builders were invited to a meeting to share their experiences and provide additional insight for this analysis. The 13 people who attended the meeting were either construction managers or site supervisors representing nine builders. Three builders had been in Port St. Lucie for more than 15 years; the others between 1 and 7 years. They have between 25 and 275 houses under construction each month. Most reported that it took them either up to 6 months or 6 to 9 months to construct a house, with one company reporting 12 to 15 months. They estimated that the number of subcontractors they employed ranged between 12 and 75 with five of the builders estimating 20 to 50. All builders construct homes on an individual basis, with two reporting that they work in developments. Ten of the 13 individuals believe that houses are most vulnerable when the interior walls are in or the house is securable.

The themes from the focus group discussion include the following:

- » Builders hire some subcontractors who provide their own materials.
- » Builders typically do not report crimes of less than \$300 (They suggested developing a fax form to make reporting easy).
- » Vandalism is a big issue for the builders.
- » There is tension between the builders and the Port St. Lucie building department.  
Some issues mentioned include:
  - ◁ Providing ladders at the sites
  - ◁ Leaving the homes unsecured for an entire day for inspection
  - ◁ Not allowing builders to mark materials
- » Builders believe that subcontractors are the majority of the offenders.

#### **Meeting with City Building Department: December 2004**

A meeting with the city building department provided additional insights into the problem:

- » 6,300 homes currently under construction.
- » Appliance installation is not required for CO, but may be required for bank inspection.
- » No stopping of building because of the hurricanes or growth.
- » On average, it takes about 10.5 months to build a house. The utility department is 22 months behind but has hired subcontractors to help make up time. Engineering is behind 14 months. In both cases, a house has to be at a certain stage of construction before that department is called, which is the cause for the lag.

- » The Florida Building Code has been a state statute for the 8 years since Hurricane Andrew. It requires builders to provide a ladder and raises the qualifications for inspectors.
- » Meter inspection occurs when the house is securable and safe. Port St. Lucie is one of the few cities in Florida to inspect meters. It happens about 3 weeks from closing and the addresses that have requested or passed the inspection are faxed to Florida Power & Light every day at 5 p.m.
- » Builders think that the offenders are predominantly insiders.
- » The building culture has changed in recent years—subcontractors are not from the area, as evidenced by the addresses of those pulling permits and do not care about Port St. Lucie. Hispanics with good work ethic, work all the time, so it is not unusual to see workers on weekends, nights, and holidays.
- » Fraud doesn't seem to be a major issue and is policed by the insurance companies.
- » What is done with stolen property? 1. generic materials are used in other sites (rebar, concrete blocks, wood, sheet rock), and 2. specialized property is sold to builders' warehouses, at yard sales and flea markets, and used for personal construction (shingles, ceramic tile, doors, windows, for example).

## Analysis Findings

The following are the key findings from this analysis:

- » The crime rate was low, considering the large number of targets (average of 22 per month with more than 6,000 targets per day).
- » Crimes increased in the second half of the year, particularly in October which could be because of the two hurricanes.
- » Just over half of CSBTs occur within a day.
- » Of the incidents occurring within a day, most are at risk between 13 and 20 hours.
- » The crimes happen all throughout the day, but mostly overnight.
- » Builders report the crimes fairly quickly (preliminary analysis showed there was not a significant difference between builders and homeowners, for burglary reporting time).
- » No significant repeat victimization of addresses, only 12 repeat addresses out of 254.
- » CSBTs occur primarily on the west side of the city, predominantly in the southwest. This is where most of the building is taking place.
- » The clearance rate is very low compared to other types of burglary.
- » General construction supplies and equipment constitute about one-third of the property taken; appliances constitute only 16 percent.
- » More than half of the crimes require the highest level of skill.
- » Most of the property taken can be transported with a car or small truck.

- » In only one-fourth of the cases is the property easily accessible.
- » The amount of time it takes for the crime varies.
- » Overall difficulty is slightly higher than medium difficulty.
- » Twenty percent of builders victimized account for just under 70 percent of the crimes.
- » Most (86 percent) builders are covered by insurance but less than half of them expect to report an incident.
- » In half of the incidents, the property was taken when the house was securable.
- » Only a small percent of the homes victimized were in gated communities.
- » Crimes seem to be happening in the middle of a street in a fairly isolated area with few neighbors.
- » Builders and the building department think the insider hypothesis for incidents is most prevalent.
- » Builders hire subcontractors who provide their own materials.
- » Meter inspections are an indicator of when the house is securable and, therefore, the most vulnerable according to the analysis and builders' opinions.

It appears from this analysis and from the experience of builders, the building department, and officers, that the insider hypothesis of CSBT has the most support. These crimes tend to take an elevated level of skill, the property is not easily accessible, and they occur when the house is securable. The types of property taken are such that insiders can easily use the items in their work, or have specific knowledge about the product and its installation. In addition, there is a profit motivation for stealing construction materials on the part of subcontractors who provide their own material for a particular job. This is not to say that crimes are not being committed by trollers or are reported fraudulent, but the insider hypothesis rises to the highest priority in terms of response. One concern about this conclusion is that builders do not report crimes of \$300 or less, which could be crime most likely perpetrated by trollers.

This being said, the single-family construction-site burglary and theft problem in Port St. Lucie is fairly small, with an average of 22 per month with more than 6,000 targets per day, and does not warrant a full-scale response, such as changing the building codes or city building requirements. The analysis provides some smaller yet potentially fruitful areas for response. For example, Renar Homes experienced 40 CSBTs in 2004, more than twice that of the next builder. Just reducing the number of crimes suffered by the builder by half would reduce the overall amount of burglaries by 7 percent. Using the analysis, and the Problem Analysis Module from the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing web site, the committee recommended the following three responses:

### 1. Focus on Repeat Victims

- » Twenty percent of the builders victimized account for 70 percent of the reported crime.
- » Conduct further analysis of the top five builders.
- » Contrast the top five builders with selected builders with fewer burglaries and larger numbers of sites.
- » Work with the builders to tailor responses based on this analysis and experience.

### 2. Identify Patterns

- » Implement pattern analysis to link crimes in the short term in hopes of informing builders of current patterns and apprehending more offenders.
- » Use the offender interview questionnaire developed by the committee to collect information about the offenders.
- » Advertise arrestees for this crime at the building department where subcontractors obtain permits.
- » Use the information to identify problem subcontractors.

### 3. Educate Potential Guardians

- » Community watch for crime: city employees, Florida Power & Light, postal workers, waste management, newspaper, community groups, and members.
- » Utility bill announcement and crime stoppers.
- » Use meter inspection data in selected areas.

The analysis will also provide information for the responses. Now that we conclude that the insider hypothesis is supported, analysis of the builders, pattern identification, and education of potential guardians would focus on the characteristics supporting this hypothesis such as accessibility of property, skill level, and types of property taken.

## Organizational Impact of Analysis

The problem analysis of CSBT suggests parallels with other problems, specifically vandalism of construction sites. More important, the method we used—developing hypotheses, beginning with official data, supplementing it with primary data, and prioritizing the response—has already been discussed as a model for analyzing traffic accidents in the city. Official data can assist in identifying the top locations and the types of violations that occur, and primary data collection of the environment, traffic patterns, and volume can supplement these data.

The findings of the problem analysis contributed to improving the general functions of the police agency concerning data issues, such as:

- » Modify incident report forms: Modifications were suggested to enter modus operandi information for the CSBT as well as to change the FI card.
- » Modify computer aided dispatch (CAD) entries: CAD data were not used in this project.
- » Improve the quality of report writing: Officers actually improved the quality of their reports after the check sheets were implemented. They documented additional information important for problem analysis that they did not document before.
- » Provide additional training to personnel: The entire process was essentially training for the committee members on how to conduct problem analysis. Through the institutionalization process, all members of the police department were trained on this case study and its analysis process and results.

The committee has already begun to implement the responses to this problem. In the near future, another committee will be formed to begin another problem analysis, most likely of traffic crashes. The CSBT problem currently is being evaluated. The organizational changes that may occur are only partly due to this case study because most have arisen through the overall institutionalization plan of this project.

## Appendix 1A: Questionnaires or Data-Collection Forms

### Suspect Debriefing Questions

1. Why did you select the target location?
2. Did you have any previous knowledge concerning this location?
3. Did you survey the location prior to committing the offense?
4. Was the offense planned or spontaneous? Explain.
5. Did you have an outlet to fence the materials prior to committing the offense?
6. Did you notice anything about the neighborhood that you felt would make the offense easier to commit?
7. Do you remember the physical layout (environment) of the target location?
8. Did you act alone? Did anyone else plan to benefit from your crime(s)?
9. Do you have any construction/building experience? If so, how much and what type?
10. How confident were you that you would not get arrested? Why?

### Construction Site Builder Survey

Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability. This information will be used as a part of a larger study the Port St. Lucie Police Department is conducting on Construction Site Burglary and Theft. All information will be kept confidential.

Thank you for your participation.

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Position \_\_\_\_\_

Builder \_\_\_\_\_

Phone Number \_\_\_\_\_

Number of years with builder \_\_\_\_\_

Number of years your company has been in PSL \_\_\_\_\_

On average, how many houses does your company have under construction in a month?

- 0 - 25 houses
- 26 - 50 houses
- 51 - 75 houses
- If more than 75, please estimate number of houses: \_\_\_\_\_

On average, how long does it take for your company to build a house (from ground breaking to certificate of occupancy)? Note: this question is to get an idea of the length of time your sites are vulnerable to crime.

- 0 - 6 months
- 6 - 9 months
- 9 - 12 months
- 12 - 15 months
- 15 - 18 months
- If more than 18 months, please estimate number of months: \_\_\_\_\_

On average, how many subcontractors (individual companies) do you employ? \_\_\_\_\_

How does your company typically construct houses (individually, in developments, other)? \_\_\_\_\_

When do you think a house under construction is most vulnerable for crime?

- Cleared Lot
- Concrete Slab Poured
- Exterior Walls in Place
- Roof Installed
- Interior Walls in Place
- House is Securable

Any other comments or suggestions concerning Construction Site Burglary and Theft experienced by your company?

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
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## Chapter 2

# North Carolina State University Campus Police Department: Problem Analysis of Theft from Motor Vehicles

by James R. Brunet

The North Carolina State University (NCSU) campus shares many of the same public safety concerns of similarly situated metropolitan areas. The university is home to approximately 30,000 students, 1,700 faculty members, and many thousands more staff, visitors, and construction workers. The Raleigh campus includes a diverse array of land uses (educational, office park, residential, commercial, open space, parking, and sports venues) spread out over 2,110 acres. The campus is bounded and bisected by several major thoroughfares. The combination of a young and transient population along with an expansive and open geographic setting provides a suitable environment for certain types of criminal activity.

It is within this context that the NCSU Campus Police selected theft from motor vehicles as its problem for analysis. For some time, the Campus Police struggled to find ways to prevent such larcenies. The department's 55 sworn officers had the Herculean task of monitoring the 16,000 parking spaces on campus. Traditional techniques, including random patrols and lot checks, seemed to produce little benefit. This project provided the Campus Police with the opportunity to engage in a new form of strategic thinking about a persistent problem.

At this juncture, it is important to provide greater definition to the problem under study. The National Incident-Based Reporting System describes such theft as the taking of articles from a locked or unlocked motor vehicle (offense code 23F). This definition does not include the removal of parts or accessories from the exterior of a vehicle. State law provides a more technical definition of the crime. The breaking or entering of a motor vehicle is a punishable offense under North Carolina law (N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-56). The statute specifies five elements that must be present to prosecute individuals for the crime: 1) there was a breaking or entering by the defendant; 2) without consent; 3) into a motor vehicle; 4) containing goods, wares, freight, or anything of value; and 5) with the intent to commit any felony or larceny therein. Attempts, including entry into a vehicle without the taking of items, are included under the statutory definition. North Carolina law classifies breaking and entering of a vehicle as a Class I felony. To sum up, the NCSU Campus Police is trying to learn ways to prevent thefts from automobiles, an ongoing public safety concern on the NCSU campus and in many communities throughout the United States.

## Problem Selection

The entire police department had a hand in selecting the problem for analysis. To begin, a small group of sworn personnel representing different levels of the organization (command staff, first-line supervisors, and rank and file) developed a questionnaire to determine *officer* perceptions of common problems on campus (see Appendix 2A). Survey developers came up with an exhaustive list of 24 problems from which to choose. The list included a range of issues from the most severe (aggravated assaults and drug dealing) to the mundane (key requests and skateboarding). The survey received an enthusiastic reception as evidenced by an impressive response rate of

90 percent. Theft from motor vehicles ranked as the problem of greatest concern for officers. Respondents also noted that it was a crime that could be prevented with the proper problem-solving methods. Based on the results of the officer survey and a preliminary review of incident and computer aided dispatch data, the project team adopted theft from automobiles as the subject for its initial problem-solving activities.

The university has an extremely low crime rate, especially involving violent offenses. It averaged 15 assaultive crimes per year from 1999 to 2004. Larceny is the most prevalent crime on campus (85 percent of all crime). On average, 512 larcenies are reported each year to Campus Police. The Campus Police distinguishes between different types of larceny. Theft of personal belongings is the most common form of larceny. These crimes occur typically in the library, residence halls, educational buildings, and common areas. Theft from motor vehicles is the second most reported form of larceny. Approximately 20 to 25 percent of all larcenies involve property taken from automobiles.<sup>1</sup> Bicycle thefts make up the third most popular form of larceny on campus.

With little violent crime to prevent, the Campus Police decided to select theft from motor vehicles, a problem that affected the greatest number of victims and one that had been resistant to previous interventions. The number of incidents has remained fairly stable during the last 8 years, with a slight decline in actual numbers in recent years (180 in 2000 down to 107 in 2004). This drop mirrors an overall decline in reported crime on campus. The rate of theft from motor vehicles has seen a steeper decline because of the substantial growth in campus population during the last 7 years.<sup>2</sup>

Breaking and entering of automobiles does not appear to strongly correlate with other types of car crime on campus. This is partly explained by the relative absence of crimes involving vehicles. For the 5 years prior to 2004, approximately 10 cars were reported stolen on average per year. In 2004, six cars were stolen. The Campus Police does not track larceny of motor vehicle parts and accessories separately; but officers commented that they rarely receive calls for this crime. There is no reason to expect thefts from motor vehicles to track closely to other sorts of larcenies.

In the police district surrounding campus, the number of breaking and entering of cars may be substantially higher than the number reported on campus (perhaps two or three a day). In reality, the Campus Police has not been able to gather reliable data about car crime activity on the streets bordering campus. There are anecdotal indications that the number of breaking and entering of vehicles in the largely residential section of the city north of campus is higher than that experienced on campus. The Campus Police continues to work with the city police department to improve the exchange crime data.

<sup>1</sup>There is good evidence which shows that up to half of thefts from motor vehicles go unreported (see Kinshott, Graham. *Vehicle Related Thefts: Practice Messages from the British Crime Survey*, Home Office Research. London, England: July 2001).

<sup>2</sup>Since academic year 1997-98, student enrollment at NCSU has expanded by 2,500. A state university construction bond has brought a tremendous number of contractor traffic to campus the last several years.

## Problem History and External Factors

The Campus Police has tried several different strategies to combat the problem. Officers are required to drive through parking lots during their nondirected patrol activities.<sup>3</sup> This approach, on rare occasion, has led to an officer witnessing a theft in progress. Random patrols are more likely to detect a car that has already been entered. More targeted approaches have also used been with mixed success. After a rash of break-ins at the Sullivan gravel lot, officers organized a formal stakeout to catch the perpetrators. With officers positioned on a dormitory rooftop and other adjoining locations, several juveniles were apprehended the first night of the operation. This tactic has not been used subsequently. The Campus Police also used a bait car at the State Fairgrounds in hopes of entrapping would-be thieves. This activity failed to result in a single arrest. A systematic evaluation of these tactics has not been done, so the deterrent value is unknown.

The NCST Department of Transportation commissioned a parking lot and deck security study in 2003. Using Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design techniques, the consultants suggested a number of lighting, vegetation control, signage, and other security measures for the largest parking facilities on campus. The implementation and impact of these recommendations have not been assessed to date.

An attempt was made several years ago to gather historical information about thefts from automobiles on campus. A lieutenant, on his own initiative, conducted an exhaustive review of incident reports during 4 years (1997 to 2000). The analysis was done with the express purpose of finding patterns to predict future car break-ins. The lieutenant used descriptive statistical techniques to identify patterns involving location, time, and car types. The results of the analysis were never disseminated or used for operational purposes.

An interesting phenomenon did occur during the course of the project. As the team began to focus on the issue, the number of reported car break-ins diminished. A similar situation occurred during a study of car crime in Charlotte, North Carolina.<sup>4</sup> There are many possible explanations. The group postulated that the recent incarceration of perpetrators in Raleigh may have had the effect. There may have been an experimental effect at work, too. Police officers may have changed their approach to the problem of breaking and entering of vehicles as more was learned about it. As always, the drop in crime may be tied to random chance or some other unknown factor.

<sup>3</sup>During an 11-month period ending July 2001, the Campus Police conducted 48,101 lot checks.

<sup>4</sup>Clarke, Ronald V. and Herman Goldstein. *Theft From Cars in Center City Parking Facilities—A Case Study*, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.: 2003.

## Analysis Process

The Campus Police possessed very specific ideas about the causes of motor vehicle break-ins, as well as the effectiveness of responses to these crimes. Early on in the process, a series of propositions was developed to guide the problem analysis. Hypotheses were developed for each element in the criminal event: victims, targets, locations, temporal aspects, and offenders. Twenty-two hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of police actions were formulated:

### Victims

- V1: Victims do not report thefts from vehicles in a timely fashion.
- V2: Students are the most common victims of these types of larcenies.
- V3: Victims leave property in plain view, which increases likelihood of theft.
- V4: Most victims secure their vehicles.
- V5: Victims tend to contaminate the crime scene.
- V6: Victimization is expensive because it may involve replacing property and repairing the vehicle.
- V7: Prior victimization increases the likelihood of future victimization.

### Targets

- T1: Certain vehicles are more likely targets.
- T2: Electronic security is of little deterrent because false alarms are common.
- T3: Stereo equipment is the most frequently stolen item (perhaps 90 percent of cases).
- T4: Offenses often occur as a series with multiple break-ins at same location or time period.
- T5: The most common mode of entry is by breaking a window.

### Locations

- L1: Large flat lots have more breaking and entering of vehicles.
- L2: Lots that serve as long-term parking have more thefts.
- L3: Lots and decks with guardians (attendant, electronic arm) are less likely to experience thefts.

### Temporal Aspects

- TA1: Offenses peak in period after Christmas when students return to campus with new merchandise.
- TA2: Offenses are more likely to occur during special events.
- TA3: Offenses are more likely to occur during the day.

### Offenders

- O1: Perpetrators are primarily nonstudents.

## Police Responses

PR1: Campus police officers rarely process vehicles for fingerprints.

PR2: Past police responses (added patrols, bait cars, stakeout) have had limited effectiveness.

PR3: Few cases are ever cleared by an arrest.

The analysis was undertaken according to normal social scientific procedures, starting with the identification of the problem. As noted earlier, the idea for studying theft from automobiles was generated by rank-and-file officers. The problem identification stage was followed by a review of the extant literature. The textbook knowledge emerging from the literature review was married with the actual experiences of campus police officers to form testable hypotheses. Data were then gathered from existing manual records and entered into a spreadsheet. The researcher conducted most of the tasks associated with data collection and analysis. The Campus Police Department facilitated data processes by making records available and assisting in the interpretation of preliminary findings. The researcher provided status reports and preliminary findings to the entire team during regular monthly meetings.

There were two goals for the problem analysis. The primary motivation for engaging in problem analysis was to identify better ways to prevent thefts from vehicles. It was hoped that the findings would lead to new investigatory insights, more targeted prevention efforts, and better clearance and property restoration outcomes. A secondary goal of the analysis was to suggest better data-collection practices to improve the quality of information for decision-making.

## Existing Data

The project team relied almost exclusively on data in existing police information systems to conduct its problem analysis. The data largely came from the Incident/Investigation Report (incident report) filed by officers who respond to calls for service. The Campus Police Department retains both a paper and electronic copy of the report. We favored the manual case file which contained a paper copy of the Incident Report rather than the electronic version. The case file included additional materials (e.g., information about captured offenders, ongoing correspondence between responding officer and victim) that were not available through electronic means.

The project team analyzed all larcenies from motor vehicles that were reported to Campus Police between August 2003 and December 2004. During this 17-month period, 159 cars were investigated as motor vehicle breaking and entering cases (it is important to note that the car, not the individual, serves as the unit of analysis in this study). The incident report contains a bounty of information about these events. Relevant data are found in forced choice questions (e.g., race, sex) and in the officer's written description of the crime scene and subsequent investigation. The incident report provided the following data elements for each case:

- » **Victims:** name of driver; demographics (age, race, and gender); tag number; day/time crime reported to campus police; day/time crime discovered by victim; day/time vehicle last secured; employment status (student, employee, visitor, contractor); and victim's behaviors (e.g., did he/she contaminate the crime scene, was he/she able to produce a serial number for stolen merchandise)
- » **Targets:** year, make, and model of car; type and value of property stolen; mode of entry into the vehicle
- » **Locations:** location of car during crime
- » **Temporal Aspects:** time of day crime occurred (day or night); day of week
- » **Offenders:** name of suspect
- » **Police Responses:** case disposition (cleared by arrest); usable fingerprints recovered.

The incident report is easily available and accessible to both internal and external constituencies. Supervisors have the ability to print out current and older reports from their desktop computers. Victims may also request a copy of the incident report through the Campus Police web site. Several years of case files, including incident reports, are stored in the Campus Police file room located in the headquarters building. If the case is still under investigation, the detective's bureau may be in possession of the manual case file. Addendums to the report are frequently filed in cases when a victim discovers additional property missing or submits a serial number for lost property.

Reliability is a key concern with this data source. Researchers routinely discovered data entry errors during the course of the project. Certain data fields seemed especially prone to these types of mistakes, including dates and times as well as vehicle year and type. Another problem has to do with inconsistencies in how different officers record items on the report; for example, officers can use several property codes, including the ubiquitous "other" category, to classify stereo equipment (radio, speakers, amplifier, equalizer, and faceplate). Additionally, there are no standard procedures for estimating the cost of stolen property or vehicle damage. Officers determine these costs using their personal judgment. As such, there is a vast disparity in dollar cost estimates from case to case. A final issue relates to the omission of critical data. If a string of cars is hit at the same time and location, the officer is required to collect complete information about only one of the cars; that is, the officer typically files only one incident report. As such, vehicle information (year, make, and model), property damage, and time estimates are not consistently reported for the second, third, and fourth victims.

The incident reports are produced in a very timely manner. Researchers were able to receive the latest reports within days of the criminal event.

Officers are required to submit an incident report each time they respond to a criminal call. After the data has been entered into the system, one or more patrol supervisors check the report for accuracy and completeness. The civilian system administrator conducts a similar review. Senior managers have the ability to view all incident reports in electronic format. Line officers do not share these same privileges.

Investigators, on occasion, review case files looking for crime patterns (e.g., types of cars hit, brand of stereo taken). The analysis is perhaps more art than science. An investigator will recall how the fact pattern of a current case mirrors the elements of an earlier one. This leads to a comparison of cases looking for similarities. Line officers do not engage in a routine analysis of incident reports.

The data management system used in most police departments predates the advent of problem/crime analysis; thus, typically there is a gap between the information demands of modern police administrators and what the system can produce. Such is the case with the NCSU Campus Police Department. The existing system is tooled to meet the crime-reporting/workload needs of the department and property insurance needs of victims. Not surprisingly, there has been something less than a missionary zeal to correct data deficiencies in the current system, including minimizing the number of missing values, ensuring consistency in responses, and adding new data elements. These changes require a significant investment in both officer training and systems upgrades. The project team was instructed that it was cost prohibitive to make any major changes in the format of the incident report (i.e., to add new fields).

Instead of adding data elements to the incident report, serious consideration was given to creating a new data-collection form for thefts from larcenies. A mock checklist was developed which included 13 items for the responding officer to fill out. The checklist included information that was not currently gathered including types of after-market accessories on the vehicle (exterior cues), vehicle-protection devices, and more standardized ways of recording the method of entry. The idea, while promising, died on the vine. It was determined that the additional paperwork and data entry requirements outweighed the benefits of the new information.

A great deal of time was spent cleaning and reconfiguring the data so that the data could be used for problem analysis. Several specific initiatives were undertaken. First, the researcher read through every case file/incident report to correct inconsistencies in dates and other data entry errors. Second, all property codes were reentered to eliminate the variability in coding systems between officers. Third, new property codes were established to more fully capture the types of property that are taken from vehicles on campus. For example, books, laptops, cellphones, bookbags, and stereo equipment (amplifier, speakers) were given distinctive codes. Fourth, valuable information included in the officer's written narrative was coded and entered into the database. In the updated dataset, the mode of entry and fingerprint results are now included as separate fields for analysis.

Two other sources of data were considered, but ultimately not used. At NCSU, the Transportation Department is responsible for permitting drivers and maintaining parking facilities. It would have been useful to have detailed information about the characteristics of cars (targets) on campus. With this information it becomes possible to learn if certain cars are victimized at a rate higher than their prevalence on campus. The city of Raleigh Police Department possesses information about the number of breaking and entering (B&E) incidents occurring on the immediate periphery of campus. It would be interesting to compare the two jurisdictions to establish a benchmark for prevention activities. There is a distinct possibility that car crime on campus is related to problems in Raleigh's jurisdiction. To illustrate this point, Campus Police officials attributed a short-term drop in thefts on campus to the capture of a prolific offender by the Raleigh police.

These data sources were not used because of reliability concerns. It appears that the Transportation Department does not purge old permit information from its files. As such, it was not possible to get a highly accurate picture of the types of cars that have current permits. The Raleigh Police Department crime data seemed to vary greatly from year to year, calling into question its reliability. For these reasons, the project team did not incorporate these data into its problem analysis process. The incident report, after extensive data cleaning, provided the best source of information for this problem. Unfortunately, the primary source of crime data in the United States, the Uniform Crime Report, does not distinguish vehicle break-ins from other forms of larceny; therefore, it was of little utility in the current analysis.

## Primary Data Collection

No new data were collected during this project. The project team considered conducting a general survey of the campus population (faculty, staff, and students) to gauge their experiences and concerns about car crime. Team members decided that this was not an efficient method for collecting data because far less than 1 percent of employees and students have been victimized.

## Data Analysis

This analysis relied primarily on descriptive forms of data analysis. We used univariate (frequencies, percentages) and bivariate statistics to test our inferences, and did not use inferential statistics. The data in the instant study were gathered from the entire population of breaking and entering cases during an extended period rather than from a sample. Inferential statistics are appropriate when making inferences about a population by looking at the characteristics of a sample of that population. That is not the case here.

At the start of the process, Campus Police staff developed several GIS-generated maps to show the location of larcenies from motor vehicles on campus. While each parking lot and deck has an address, it was not possible to pinpoint the exact location of the pilfered vehicle within the lot or deck. When the crime took place at a construction site or in an unmarked parking area, there was no way to accurately locate the vehicle on the map. The Campus Police Department has addressed this problem by investing in new crime analysis tools including mapping software and handheld GPS devices. Soon, all officers will be able to pinpoint the exact location of car crimes and conduct higher order spatial analysis.

## Analysis Findings

This project confirmed for all participants that theft from motor vehicles is a significant problem on campus. Its effects are far-reaching. It requires a tremendous expenditure of police effort, from responding to calls to investigating possible leads. The services of city and county crime scene investigators are also expended when the evidence gathering is particularly difficult. This crime also affects hundreds of victims annually, most especially students and their parents who often hold the insurance on the car. Costs are high for the victims. They spend countless hours waiting for officers to respond to crime scenes and lose time off from work and school to have windows repaired and stereos replaced. The estimated property loss and vehicle damage during the study period was more than \$100,000. The most important cost, perhaps, is one that is hard to quantify: victimization likely adds to a general sense of insecurity on campus. Students and faculty, visitors and contractors, may feel the need to be on guard when coming to campus, or worse, they may avoid participating in campus life altogether.

Another takeaway from the project was learning that larceny from motor vehicles is not a single problem. It is more accurately viewed as several distinct problems that suggest different solutions. Each represents a unique combination of crime elements. As an example, more than a dozen thefts occurred at construction sites around campus. These crimes transpired during the day and contractors with Spanish surnames were overwhelmingly represented among the victims. A mixture of stereos, personal items, and tools were stolen, perhaps indicating that the perpetrator was familiar with construction worker routines. The B&E problem experienced by Centennial Campus Park and Ride Lot customers is somewhat different. About a dozen cases were reported, but the victims were an equal mix of NCSU students and contractors. These crimes also occurred during daylight hours and, in most cases, involved the theft of a car stereo. A third type of event took place in the two large parking decks on the main campus (Coliseum and Dan Allen) where 17 thefts were reported. There is no clear pattern for the time of the crime because these decks are used by students for long-term parking. Students, typically, were victims, but staff cars were hit in the Dan Allen deck.

At least three other distinct problems were evident in other types of locations. Visitors to a university-owned forest preserve located off campus were victimized six times during the course of the study. An offender likely knew that victims left wallets and purses in their vehicles before heading out on a hike. The mode of entry was crude—often a rock thrown through a window—again suggested a different type of offender. Flat lots on north and central campus (West, North Hall, Wood), especially those with easy access to city streets, were often targeted by thieves during the day and at night. Students again were the likely victims. The last area with a distinct set of crime elements includes the fraternity row lots and Varsity Drive Park and Ride Lot. These lots, accounting for 15 percent of all B&Es on campus, are populated by student vehicles for both short- and long-term spans of time. There is quite a bit of traffic (disorder) through these areas at all times of the day. Thefts occur in equal numbers during the day and at night. Most thieves enter the cars by breaking a window.

Finally, the project team discovered that problem analysis is not an easy undertaking. Even though the crime is a relatively routine matter for police officers, a constantly changing campus landscape confounds the analysis. The campus environment is in a perpetual state of change. Lots and roads are closed for renovation and expansion, new decks are built, individuals eligible to park in certain lots are shuffled to other parking options, hundreds of construction workers make the campus their temporary home, and thousands of additional students have come to campus within the last several years. One of the most troublesome lots a few years ago no longer exists. The project team members came to realize that their current data sources are inadequate to match our constantly evolving information needs.

The following are analysis findings related to the hypotheses or analysis questions:

### **Victims**

V<sub>1</sub>: Victims do not report thefts from vehicles in a timely fashion.

*Finding:* The vast majority of thefts from autos were reported quickly. In only 16 cases did the time between the filing of the crime report and the time the victim last saw his or her car extend past 24 hours. The most common scenario is where an individual arrives on campus in the morning and returns to his or her car later in the day and discovers the crime.

V<sub>2</sub>: Students are the most usual victims of these types of larcenies.

*Finding:* This is correct. Students comprise 59 percent of all victims. Surprisingly, contractors are the next highest group (16 percent) followed by university employees (14 percent), and visitors (11 percent). Not all students have an equal likelihood of being victimized. White male students make up 40 percent of all victims followed by white females, Hispanic males, and black males.

V3: Victims leave property in plain view, which increases likelihood of theft.

*Finding:* Unclear, but there are some indications that this is the case. Half the offenses involved the successful taking of stereo equipment and related accessories (speakers, amplifiers). These items would be visible from outside the car. Some other forms of property were commonly taken, including CDs, money, purses, and book bags that likely were left in plain view.

V4: Most victims secure their vehicles.

*Finding:* This seems to be the case, but there is no specific question on the incident report that asks about this behavior. Officers noted in their crime scene notes that 22 victims admitted that they either left a door unlocked or left the windows open. The Campus Police should collect better data on this victim behavior. Responding officers should specifically ask about crime-deterrent devices and individual behavior (open windows or door locks).

V5: Victims tend to contaminate the crime scene.

*Finding:* Line officers attribute some of their difficulties in solving this crime to contamination of the crime scene by victims. That is, victims enter the car after the larceny to search for missing items or they drive the car to the police station. In 25 cases, officers claimed that the crime scene was compromised by the victim. Nine victims refused to have their cars dusted for fingerprints. The Campus Police Department does not routinely collect information on this issue, so it is difficult to reach firm conclusions. Officers were able to retrieve usable prints in 40 cases.

V6: Victimization is expensive because it may involve replacing property and repairing the vehicle.

*Finding:* There is some support for this hypothesis. Property losses totaled more than \$75,000. One individual lost nearly \$5,000 in electronic equipment including a laptop computer, iPod, and radar detector. Aftermarket stereos were generally estimated at \$200 to \$300 each. Close to 60 percent of the vehicles were damaged. Damage estimates ranged from \$50 to \$1,500. Many came in around \$300, the cost of a driver's or passenger's side window. In 12 percent of the larcenies, no property was taken and no vehicle damage was incurred.

V7: Prior victimization increases the likelihood of future victimization.

*Finding:* There is very little indication of repeat victimization on campus for this crime. Two individuals' cars were broken into twice while on university grounds during the study period (less than 1 percent of the total), but we do not have information about victimizations that may have occurred in other jurisdictions or prior to August 2003 on campus.

## **Targets**

T1: Certain vehicles are more likely targets.

*Finding:* It is very difficult to reach firm conclusions on this question. It does appear that older vehicles (1990s) predominate in the dataset. Unfortunately, officers have not been diligent in properly recording the year of the car. This data deficiency should be rectified immediately. The most popular makes in descending order are Hondas (32), Jeeps (24), Ford (18), Nissan (11), and Chevy (10). Older model, low-priced cars are less likely to come equipped with alarms and other security devices.

T2: Electronic security is of little deterrent because false alarms are common.

*Finding:* There is not enough information to answer this question. In only a handful of cases did the incident report mention that a car alarm was sounded or that the car was armed prior to the theft. Campus Police should query victims about the specific defensive tactics that have been used.

T3: Stereo equipment is the most likely stolen item (perhaps 90 percent of cases).

*Finding:* Aftermarket car stereos and related equipment are taken from half of all B&Es.

T4: Offenses often occur as a series with multiple break-ins at same location or time period.

*Finding:* Yes. There were at least 19 situations that could be classified as multiple break-ins (more than two thefts at the same location or time). In one case, seven cars were broken into during the day at a construction site. The fraternity court/Varsity Drive area (eight multiple break-ins) seems especially prone to this tactic.

T5: The most common mode of entry is by breaking a window.

*Finding:* Suspects gained entry to motor vehicles half the time by breaking a window (passenger side window was most frequently cited). Suspects also bypassed the car locks (12 percent) or simply entered through an unlocked door (12 percent).

## **Locations**

L1: Large flat lots have more breaking and entering of vehicles.

*Findings:* Inconclusive. Large lots (park and rides, Vet School, and West) do record some of the highest number of B&Es. These lots also have the most cars at any given time (more targets), so the frequency of thefts may be higher in these locales, but the rate may be lower than smaller flat lots such as North Hall.

L2: Lots that serve as long-term parking have more thefts.

*Findings:* Inconclusive. Students may park in a number of lots for extended periods. During the study period, no single lot was identified as the long-term facility; therefore, it was not possible to reach a determination on this question.

L3: Lots/decks with guardians (attendant, electronic arm) are less likely to experience thefts.

*Findings:* There is some support for this idea. The parking decks that use these place management techniques did not report any break-ins.

### **Temporal Aspects**

TA1: Offenses peak in period after Christmas when students return to campus with new merchandise.

*Finding:* There is no support for this hypothesis.

TA2: Offenses are more likely to occur during special events.

*Finding:* There is no support for this hypothesis.

TA3: Offenses are more likely to occur during the day.

*Findings:* Almost 50 percent of thefts from autos occurred during the day. One-fourth took place under cover of darkness. The time that the crime transpired could not be determined in the remaining cases.

### **Offenders**

O1: Perpetrators are primarily not students.

*Finding:* There is weak support for this hypothesis. The few suspects who have been caught during the years have not been university students. They were professional thieves or teenagers.

### **Police Responses**

PR1: Campus police officers rarely process vehicles for fingerprints.

*Finding:* We do not have complete information about this issue. Sometimes, officers will discuss this matter in their case notes. In 40 cases, usable prints were recovered. In another eight cases, prints were attempted but were not retrieved. Victims either contaminated the crime scene or refused to permit dusting in 34 cases.

PR2: Past police responses (added patrols, bait cars, stakeouts) have had limited effectiveness.

*Finding:* This appears to be true. See PR3. below.

PR3: Few cases are ever cleared by an arrest.

*Finding:* The data seem to support this hypothesis. Fewer than 10 cases (5 to 6 percent) resulted in the arrest of a suspect. It is unclear whether any property was recovered and restored to victims. The extremely low clearance rate indicates two possible paths: either focus efforts on front-end prevention/target hardening strategies or back-end approaches (e.g., more sophisticated investigations) with a primary goal of apprehending perpetrators.

## Police Responses

It would seem that certain police responses do not produce desired results. Random patrols, bait cars, and stakeouts don't seem justified based on what was learned about the problem. There are simply too few cases and a small likelihood that a parking lot would be hit twice within a specified period (recall that no lot even averaged one break in per month). The problem analysis does point to another set of responses that could prevent future crimes. Larcenies were virtually nonexistent in certain parking facilities. Parts of two parking decks that maintain different forms of place management (parking lot attendant, electronic arm) were virtually crime free. Parking spaces in north campus that can be accessed only after using a key card were also quite safe. The Transportation Department may wish to consider extending these relatively passive forms of place management to all parts of the large parking decks. Along these lines, the Transportation Department recently set aside one lot to serve as long-term parking for students. The key is to provide some level of surveillance over the lot to deter would-be thieves. Closed-circuit television, a tactic currently not used in campus parking lots, is another option for preventing car crime. East Carolina University and the University of Maryland monitor security cameras in selected parking facilities on campus. Outlying campus facilities (e.g., forest preserve, farms) with few available place managers would potentially benefit from the use of signage to warn people about securing valuables in their vehicles; that is, to not place them in plain view. Lastly, crime-prevention education seems to be indicated, especially for students who park in the fraternity row area and contractors who primarily communicate in Spanish. A bilingual awareness campaign may provide some limited benefits in the latter case.

Benchmarks are most useful when an organization can compare its performance to similarly situated organizations. As a first step, the NCSU Campus Police Department could take the lead in working with other university police departments to develop standard ways of determining police effectiveness on this issue. The typical measures of police performance, clearance rates, and dollar value of property restored do not seem to be the best indicators of success for this crime. If one is taking a more proactive, preventive approach, a measure that provides an estimate of the likelihood of theft is best. This is difficult to accomplish because it is hard to find an appropriate denominator in the equation (the number of B&Es would serve as the numerator). Is it the number of parking spaces on campus? Number of permitted vehicles? The percentage of spaces that are occupied during different times of the day or week?

## Organizational Impact of Analysis

There are many similarities between thefts from cars and bicycle thefts.<sup>5</sup> The property in cars is valuable and portable and often in plain view. The same can be said about bicycles. Bicycles and cars typically are secured outside the owner's range of personal surveillance. Cars are parked in distant parking lots while bicycles are secured in bike stands all over campus. Cars and bicycles are mobile and can be located throughout

<sup>5</sup>There are differences, too. For one, fewer bicycles are stolen. Between August 2004 and May 2005, 34 bikes were stolen on campus. Also, unlike automobiles on campus, bicyclists are not required to register their vehicles.

campus. Both vehicles can be secured with protection devices. U-bolt locks are particularly good at preventing bike theft. The same problem analysis process can be used to learn more about bicycle theft. Certain locations may be hot spots for bicycle theft. Victim behaviors (properly securing the bike, removing expensive saddles) may also influence the likelihood of theft.

The Campus Police can improve and expand the data it collects without modifying the incident report. Throughout this case study, we have made recommendations on how to capture additional data elements in the officers' narrative. Officers should be instructed in what elements need to be included in this section of the incident report including, but not limited to, a discussion of victim behaviors, target characteristics, and police responses.

The Campus Police Department should work with the Transportation Department to regularly exchange information that relates to car crime. The police would benefit from having up-to-date information about the cars that are permitted. Transportation workers (bus drivers, maintenance) could help the police by providing information on suspicious activities and broken glass found in parking lots.

The Campus Police Department recently acquired new computer software and handheld mapping devices to expand its crime analysis capacity. Line officers will be encouraged to use the new resources to initiate their own problem-solving projects.

## Appendix 2A: Police Department: Problem Selection Survey

1. In your opinion, which five of the following problems are of most concern **within your assignment**? Rank your choices on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the problem of most concern. Your concern may reflect the frequency or severity of the problem.

<input type="checkbox"/> Assaults in and around campus	<input type="checkbox"/> Elevator calls
<input type="checkbox"/> Bicycle thefts	<input type="checkbox"/> Larceny—State property
<input type="checkbox"/> Speeding	<input type="checkbox"/> Larceny—all others
<input type="checkbox"/> False alarms	<input type="checkbox"/> Trespassing
<input type="checkbox"/> Drug-dealing	<input type="checkbox"/> Burglary—dorms
<input type="checkbox"/> Thefts from cars	<input type="checkbox"/> Key requests
<input type="checkbox"/> Acquaintance rape	<input type="checkbox"/> Skateboarding
<input type="checkbox"/> Hit and run accidents	<input type="checkbox"/> Verbal disputes
<input type="checkbox"/> B or E of buildings	<input type="checkbox"/> Robbery
<input type="checkbox"/> 911 hang-ups	<input type="checkbox"/> Noise complaints
<input type="checkbox"/> Traffic congestion	<input type="checkbox"/> Traffic accidents
<input type="checkbox"/> Alcohol use	<input type="checkbox"/> Special events
<input type="checkbox"/> Other problem(s) _____	


2. Which five of the following problems **in your assignment** do you believe could be reduced or improved through a problem-solving approach? Rank your choices on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the problem that could be most improved. (Your selection may be the same **or** different from the problems you picked in question 1.)

<input type="checkbox"/> Assaults in and around campus	<input type="checkbox"/> Elevator calls
<input type="checkbox"/> Bicycle thefts	<input type="checkbox"/> Larceny—State property
<input type="checkbox"/> Speeding	<input type="checkbox"/> Larceny—all others
<input type="checkbox"/> False alarms	<input type="checkbox"/> Trespassing
<input type="checkbox"/> Drug-dealing	<input type="checkbox"/> Burglary—dorms
<input type="checkbox"/> Thefts from cars	<input type="checkbox"/> Key requests
<input type="checkbox"/> Acquaintance rape	<input type="checkbox"/> Skateboarding
<input type="checkbox"/> Hit and run accidents	<input type="checkbox"/> Verbal disputes
<input type="checkbox"/> B or E of buildings	<input type="checkbox"/> Robbery
<input type="checkbox"/> 911 hang-ups	<input type="checkbox"/> Noise complaints
<input type="checkbox"/> Traffic congestion	<input type="checkbox"/> Traffic accidents
<input type="checkbox"/> Alcohol use	<input type="checkbox"/> Special events
<input type="checkbox"/> Other problem(s) _____	

3. What is your division?  
\_\_\_\_\_ Field Operations      \_\_\_\_\_ Special Operations  
\_\_\_\_\_ Investigations      \_\_\_\_\_ Administrative
4. What is your rank?  
\_\_\_\_\_ Captain, major, or chief  
\_\_\_\_\_ Lieutenant  
\_\_\_\_\_ Police officer, corporal, or sergeant
5. If applicable, to what squad and beat are you assigned?  
A \_\_\_\_\_ B \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_  
D \_\_\_\_\_ Admin. \_\_\_\_\_ Staff \_\_\_\_\_

**Thank You For Completing This Questionnaire**

If you have comments about this survey, contact Lt. Rick Potts 919.515.8822;  
Fax: 919.513.2057 Richard\_potts@ncsu.edu

The background of the page is a faded, grayscale image of a classical column with vertical fluting. The column is positioned on the left side, and its base is visible at the bottom. The overall tone is light and professional.

## Chapter 3

# Raleigh (North Carolina) Police Department: An Analysis of Domestic Violence

by Deborah Lamm Weisel

The Raleigh Police Department recognizes that domestic violence is a major, increasing problem and is particularly concerned about how it is manifested among the city's rapidly growing Hispanic population.

Organizationally, the department's response to domestic violence is evolving rapidly. As the agency has gone through major organizational transformation in recent years, so too, it has tried different approaches to handling the problem of domestic violence. These changes have included the following:

- » Requiring incident reports for all domestic calls.
- » Providing services and assistance to victims of domestic violence, such as transporting them to secure a warrant or protective order, assistance with securing housing, and access to specialized services.
- » Requiring mandatory arrest when there is probable cause, resulting in more on-scene arrests.
- » Placing emphasis on determining the primary aggressor, thereby avoiding dual arrest.

The Raleigh Police Department's changing approach to domestic violence is paralleled by an increasing knowledge of domestic violence arising from important research studies.

An important element of understanding domestic violence in Raleigh is that the distinctions between disturbances—especially domestic disturbances—and domestic violence are not clear. Domestic violence and domestic disturbances are fundamentally different types of calls for service. The blurred boundaries between these two types of incidents extend to other calls for service and incidents to which police respond, and highlight the inconsistent and unreliable classifications used by dispatchers, officers, and others within and outside the police agency.

Nearly 2 decades ago, Sherman and others found that domestic disturbances are the single most predictable problem to which police officers are dispatched. The problem can be predicted by victim, by offender, and by address. In contrast, the worst domestic violence crimes, such as homicides, are rare events and cannot be accurately predicted (Sherman et al., 1991). This finding still appears to be true today. Police concerns about the escalation of domestic violence appear to dominate the agency's handling and recording of both calls and incidents.

This case study is the result of much effort within the Raleigh Police Department. Without exception, we have found that department personnel are like-minded in their focus on protecting victims from abuse and preventing violent crimes. While the mechanisms for preventing violence and for measuring police success in meeting this objective are not well-established, the focus on prevention is ubiquitous and includes personnel in the domestic violence unit, crime analysts, police managers, supervisors, and officers across the agency. Consistent with the emphasis on prevention, this case

study describes an analysis of domestic violence and is not intended to be critical of any unit or personnel. Instead, the purpose is to compile diverse types of data, link data and findings across different sources, and develop a mechanism so that the Raleigh Police Department can routinely monitor and evaluate the prevalence of domestic violence and the effectiveness of the agency's response. In that spirit, analysis may suggest making organizational changes; revising police policies or practices; accessing additional resources; creating, modifying, or linking disparate data systems; and developing systematic approaches to monitoring this common problem.

## Raleigh, Police, and Crime

Raleigh is the capital of North Carolina and the largest municipality in a region known for technology, research, and its major universities. The city has enjoyed modest unemployment and has experienced rapid growth in recent years. From 1989 to 2004, the city's population rose from 189,000 to an estimated 325,000.

Despite growth, Raleigh has also enjoyed a low crime rate. The city's crime rate in 2004 was about 4.8:1,000—much lower than rates in other cities in the state. The crime rate in Raleigh has actually declined. In 1989, there were 14,248 Part I crimes among the 189,000 population, a rate of 7.5:1000. The number of Part I crimes recorded by the Raleigh Police Department in 2004 was only slightly higher (14,500) although the population had nearly doubled during the same period.

The low crime rate, the strong economy, and steady population growth have routinely eclipsed public concern about crime, and political agendas have focused more on issues related to road congestion and overcrowded schools than on crime. Although the volume of crime in the city has not increased in recent years, the number of police officers has. In 1989, the Raleigh Police Department had 425 sworn officers. The number rose to 587 by 1999 and to 716 in 2005. The increased numbers reflected a 68 percent increase in the number of sworn personnel, consistent with the 72 percent increase in population during the same period. Much of the need for more police relates to police workload generated by traffic safety. In 2004, the city experienced more collisions (22,706) than Part I crimes. Further, four types of road safety calls—collisions, assist motorists, hit-and-run accidents, and road hazards—accounted for 17 percent of all emergency calls for service dispatched to patrol officers.

Despite the low crime in Raleigh, many in the police department recognized that the city is in transition. Increases in population have been accompanied by more ethnic and racial diversity, and the responsibilities of police have also changed. Nowhere is the department's transition from small-town cops to big-city police more evident than in the agency's evolving approach to domestic violence.

According to long-time police employees, Raleigh officers handled domestic violence calls informally, and had a well-established mindset and approach to calls for service involving domestic violence. When responding to such calls, officers would ask the disputants to stop or ask one disputant to leave the premises.<sup>6</sup> Although the police created a domestic violence unit in the early 1990s, and by the mid-1990s required officers to write reports for all domestic violence calls, the mind-set of handling domestic violence informally was still prevalent in 2000.

At the management level, the Raleigh Police Department has steadily increased its attention to domestic violence. Among other efforts, department members participate in monthly meetings of a countywide Domestic Violence Task Force, sponsored a domestic violence conference, initiated and secured funding for dedicated domestic violence personnel in the county prosecutor's office, expanded the domestic violence unit by integrating civilian crisis counselors with sworn domestic violence officers, expanded domestic violence in-service training for officers, and created a domestic violence supplement form for incident reports. Despite these and other substantial police efforts and attention to domestic violence during the last decade, the problem has remained one of concern.

In September 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Jane Perlov took the helm of the Raleigh Police Department. Chief Perlov undertook an ambitious reform agenda, focused on improving the technology, management, and operations of the 600-officer agency. Some of the changes related to creating a strong crime analysis unit to provide timely and accurate data about crime to police managers. The previous crime analysis unit had functioned primarily as a records unit. Other organizational changes early in Chief Perlov's tenure included reorganizing the agency to establish patrol districts headed by decentralized patrol commanders. As early as 2002 when Chief Perlov joined the department, she raised the issue of domestic violence, noting that police cared about the problem but simply didn't talk about it.

The departmental reorganization and IT retooling had preoccupied the agency during the early part of Perlov's tenure. Domestic violence, however, was not a forgotten problem and was the subject of a crime strategy meeting in February 2005. At that time, the chief verbalized concerns about domestic violence, including the department's organizational response:

- » Calls dispatched as domestic were not generating domestic violence reports, suggesting that officers might have been reclassifying incidents to avoid writing a report.
- » Were domestic violence cases getting enough police attention? Several domestic violence cases had resulted in negative outcomes for the victims.
- » Many domestic violence cases were open, suggesting that cases were not being resolved by the department.

<sup>6</sup>Of course, this view, not unique to Raleigh, is shared by many in policing across the county, reflecting a perception that domestic violence is a personal and private matter rather than a police matter.

In highlighting domestic violence at a crime strategy meeting, Chief Perlov drew attention to the problem, reflecting a view that counting and monitoring the number of incidents shows that the problem is one of importance. The chief, however, recognized that simple counts of domestic violence would not provide a meaningful measure of police effectiveness. This would remain a challenge.

## Organizational Response to Domestic Violence

The Raleigh Police Department decentralized its field operations in 2003, assigning patrol officers to six district stations. As part of the decentralization process, many detectives and other specialists were also assigned to districts, including six domestic violence officers.<sup>7</sup> A civilian supervisor and two crisis counselors remained centralized in a downtown office in the department's Special Services Division.

Under this arrangement, the domestic violence officers were part of the department's Field Operations Division, with their assignment and evaluation at the discretion of a captain. Locating the domestic violence officers in the districts put them in regular contact with patrol officers, and their caseload was determined primarily by a detective supervisor in each district. The supervisors routinely read all incident reports completed by patrol officers in their districts and assigned cases to domestic violence officers, as appropriate, usually based on information contained in the report narrative about the relationship among the disputants. Serious domestic violence cases, such as assaults with injuries requiring hospitalization, were assigned to district detectives, while nonhospitalized cases were assigned to domestic violence officers. All crimes involving homicide or sexual assaults were assigned to the department's Major Crimes or Special Victims Units.

The crisis counselors assisted domestic violence victims who needed special services, such as assistance with securing housing, counseling, securing protective orders, getting to court, and other services. At the time, the caseload for these counselors was around 40.

In contrast, the domestic violence officers in the district stations had much larger caseloads. One police district (24) had 35 percent of the city's domestic calls, not the 20 percent that would represent a more even distribution. Although decentralized, the domestic violence officers appeared to follow some uniform practices:

- » Officers maintained databases of cases referred to them. The databases were not standardized but generally included variables such as address, date and time of incident, victim and suspect name, case number, and case status.
- » Officers routinely conducted Follow-Up Fridays, recontacting victims in person or by telephone to check on their welfare and encourage them to seek assistance.

<sup>7</sup>Homicide, sex crimes, gangs, and electronic crimes remained centralized.

- » Crime analysts were assigned to each district in 2004. Each would provide the domestic violence officer with a repeat call list, showing addresses that had generated further calls for service during the 28-day period following an initial domestic call.

It is not clear how the effectiveness of domestic violence officers was measured. Although officers anticipated that most domestic violence cases could be cleared with the victim’s ability to identify an offender, this was not always the case. Some officers described domestic violence cases as cases that are never cleared; that is, the potential for violence is considered high and cases remain on the officer’s maintenance list for some kind of follow-up.

The decentralization of domestic violence officers put them close to patrol officers and district detectives. This proximity facilitated informal communication among detectives and domestic violence officers, such as when domestic violence suspects were suspects in other crimes. But the decentralization resulted in an uneven distribution of cases among domestic violence officers. Although workload among the districts is relatively even, some districts in Raleigh consistently have more domestic violence (see Table 3.1). District 24 had the largest share of calls for service in 2004, recording 24 percent of all calls, but had an even larger proportion (34.6 percent) of the city’s domestic calls. In contrast, Districts 21 and 22 had only 11 percent of the city’s domestic calls.

District	# calls	% domestic calls	Domestic as % district calls	# district calls	% district calls of citywide
24	1,472	34.6%	3%	47,793	24%
26	941	22%	2.2%	42,950	21.6%
23	697	16.4%	2%	35,289	17.7%
22	479	11.3%	1.7%	28,412	14.3%
21	477	11%	1.5%	31,555	15.9%
Downtown	189	4.4%	1.5%	12,992	6.5%
Citywide	4,255		2.1%	199,068	

**Table 3.1.** Domestic and Total Calls by Raleigh Police Department District

With domestic violence officers decentralized, their supervision was also an issue. To some extent, the officers were accountable to district captains and lieutenants in Field Operations, but also to the Special Services and detective sergeants. The domestic violence unit, however, did not supervise the domestic violence officers.

An audit conducted in January 2005 showed that many domestic violence cases were open; that is, pending or inactive. In some cases, follow-up was either not done or not documented, and there were concerns that the victims were not receiving assistance. The domestic violence unit was recentralized in January 2005 and positioned, with the civilian supervisor and crisis counselors, in the department’s Special Services Division.

## Defining Domestic Violence

Domestic violence is commonly understood as violent criminal acts against a domestic partner, such as a spouse. To describe a domestic violence suspect, the term “batterer” or “abuser” is often used, and the term “battered wife” was in common use for many years. But the relationships considered as domestic vary among states; some definitions limit domestic violence to spouses or persons with children in common, while other definitions are broader, and include persons in current or former dating relationships, roommates or cohabitants, and family members. Most of the current domestic violence literature does not include family members but refers to victimization between “intimate partners.”

In North Carolina, the domestic violence statute does not restrict violence to offenses between intimate partners, but instead protects two groups:

1. Persons involved in a “personal relationship,” including current or former spouses, persons of the opposite sex who are or have been dating or living together, or who have a child in common.
2. Persons in familial relationships, such as parents and child, grandparents and children, and current or former household members.

Although the intimate partner definition is commonly used in other states, North Carolina’s statute is much broader and might generally be considered as family violence.

Definitions of domestic violence not only define protected relationships, but also define the type of offenses that comprise domestic violence. Many studies limit domestic violence to violent criminal offenses. The National Crime Victim Survey includes homicide, aggravated and simple assault, robbery, and sexual assault. Many domestic violence reports and studies refer to domestic violence suspects as batterers, suggesting that domestic violence comprises assaults or events that followed an assault (homicide), or may have preceded an assault (threats).

In North Carolina, domestic violence is not distinguished in statute as a crime; that is, domestic violence is not a criminal charge that would be made against a suspect, and it is not a criminal offense recorded by law enforcement agencies. Instead, it is defined under a state statute that provides emergency relief through court-issued protective orders available to victims or their children who are in danger of being seriously injured.

The North Carolina state statute specifies offenses that comprise domestic violence: providing protection to victims from attempts to cause or causing bodily injury, or threats of such, continued harassment, and rape or another sexual offense, or being placed in fear of imminent serious bodily injury or emotional distress. Examples of such acts were included in the state’s 2005 domestic violence in-service training and

included: throwing a bottle at a victim and missing or hitting the victim, saying “I am gonna break your legs” or saying “I am gonna break your mother’s/uncle’s/friend’s legs,” or a sexual assault. The statute specifically excludes acts of self-defense.

While family members are included and same-sex partners excluded from the statutory definition of domestic violence, service providers in the state operate under a different definition. The North Carolina Coalition for Domestic Violence (NCCDV) and Interact, the primary domestic violence service provider for Raleigh, define domestic violence as abuse arising from intimate-partner relationships, and comprising emotional, sexual, economic, and physical abuse.<sup>8</sup> The NCCDV further provides services to “battered women and their children,” reinforcing the common view of domestic violence as limited to assault incidents arising from intimate-partner relationships.

In the Raleigh Police Department, incidents may be identified as domestic at varied entry points:

- » Calls for police service are initially classified by a dispatcher in the Wake County 911 system.
- » Responding officers clear calls and may reclassify calls when completing their response.

The police department has a policy that defines domestic violence, including the use of warrantless arrests for assaults with probable cause that occur between “people who are married or who live together as married.” The departmental policy further describes domestic violence offenses as including domestic criminal trespass G.S. 14-134.3, and conditions of release if intimate partners are charged with communicating threats, assault, criminal trespass, or a 50B violation. In 1998, the Raleigh Police Department’s DOI for domestic violence required that officers write case reports for all domestic disputes<sup>9</sup> where a criminal offense was known or alleged to have occurred. In contrast, Wake County’s domestic violence unit handles cases only when violent offenses have occurred between people currently or previously in an intimate relationship, such as married, dating, living together, or having a child in common.<sup>10</sup>

## Preliminary Analysis

Most crime or problem analyses focus on using data to shed light on effective responses that might be implemented to reduce prevalence. For many crime and public safety problems—collisions, motor vehicle theft, burglaries, and so forth—data can be easily accessed or obtained. As a problem, however, domestic violence is more akin to drug use and truancy than collisions. There was no available or reliable source of information about its prevalence; consequently, it was not known whether the volume of domestic violence was rising or falling, or whether resource-intensive initiatives adopted in recent years by the police and others were effective. Because of the absence of data, it was not clear that analysis would lead to responses that could

<sup>8</sup>Definition of domestic violence retrieved from [www.interactofwake.org](http://www.interactofwake.org).

<sup>9</sup>Note that the term domestic violence is not used.

<sup>10</sup>From an interview with Wake County District Attorney domestic violence unit.

reduce the prevalence of domestic violence. Instead, the focus was on using the analytic process as a technique to measure the amount of domestic violence, and to develop an organizational capacity to monitor it in the future. In this sense, the selection of domestic violence for analysis would provide a mechanism for monitoring police effectiveness and changes in the problem over time.

There were initial concerns that domestic violence was a huge problem for the agency to adopt for analysis. Consideration was given to narrowing the focus of the analyses, such as by focusing on domestic violence on one of the city's six patrol districts or examining the problem among the city's growing Hispanic population. Early discussions, however, suggested that the magnitude of the problem—and department-wide implications of any analysis—were important at several levels.

**Diffused Organizational Responsibility.** The Raleigh Police Department's organizational changes in recent years have focused on increasing its accountability to public safety problems, yet every division of the department has some responsibility for domestic violence:

- » Patrol officers handle initial calls.
- » Specialized domestic violence officers—initially in districts but later centralized—handle some follow-up investigations.
- » Decentralized detectives in the districts investigate serious crimes, such as assaults.
- » Centralized detectives investigate some domestic violence crimes, such as sexual assault and homicide.
- » Centralized victim services personnel provide additional services to victims, such as assisting them with security protective orders.
- » The department's Administrative Division provides domestic violence training to recruits, in-service training for all sworn personnel, and coordinates data management issues, such as the records management system.

Since domestic violence crosses functional divisions within the police department, thereby necessitating coordination, analysis has important implications for assessing the effectiveness of the organization's response to the problem, and suggesting avenues for improvement.

**Specialized Units.** The problem of domestic violence also raises issues about how best to measure the effectiveness of specialized units. The Raleigh Police Department has made an effort to reduce the number of special units; therefore, a review of effectiveness provides an important barometer for evaluating organizational configurations and staffing needs. Raleigh, like many other police departments across the nation, has struggled to decentralize and despecialize. Specialized units create a special incentive to evaluate the effectiveness of their efforts, and to ensure that activities are closely coordinated and complement generalist responses.

Deciding where to locate a special unit is difficult because there is a desire to put resources into decentralized police districts, yet domestic violence personnel need to work closely with each other. Creating a specialized unit within a department also appears to create expectations by others that all problems related to domestic violence will be handled by the specialists. Communicating the role of the special unit is a challenge.

**Multiagency Coordination.** It is widely recognized that domestic violence is not solely a police issue, but involves courts, who issue 50B protective orders or warrants, and magistrates, jail, prosecutors, shelters, social service or mental health providers, and others. With no reliable benchmark of domestic violence, and no measures of effectiveness in handling it, the police had little leverage in getting other organizations to play an increasing role in reducing the problem.

**Police Mission.** Domestic violence is a complex issue for police, and one reason is because it raises expectations about what police are expected to do in the community they serve. The Raleigh Police Department has historically responded to all calls for service, including nonemergency calls. Because the agency is service-oriented, domestic violence—even low-level disturbances—continue to receive a high priority. Although some citizens might abuse police services by repeatedly calling and coming to rely on an officer to mediate family disputes, many in the department see this is an important mission of the organization.

### **Counting, Reporting, and Measuring Impact**

Raleigh police have standardized the counting and measuring of many crimes, primarily through rigorously monitoring rises and falls in offenses, arrests, and case clearances primarily for Part I and Part II incidents. The department uses the standardized CompStat reporting form to monitor increases by periods of 1 week, 28 days, and year-to-date to compare prior years and periods. While much of the police workload can be monitored through this system, emerging problems such as electronic crime, gang-related violence, and domestic violence create organizational challenges for counting and recording these incidents. While the Raleigh Police Department routinely evaluates public safety by reviewing rises and falls in crime types specified by The FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), many public safety problems do not fit into this framework. The difficulties in counting incidents of domestic violence make it difficult to compare domestic violence in Raleigh with domestic violence in other jurisdictions, and make it impossible to identify rises and falls, even within Raleigh.

### **Analysis Objectives**

There was no evidence that any systematic analyses of domestic violence had ever been undertaken by the Raleigh Police Department, but the department's written policies documented the change of the agency over time. Many in the department had strong perceptions about domestic violence and several working hypotheses shaped the analyses that were undertaken. These working hypotheses included the following:

1. The amount of domestic violence in Raleigh is not known because there are no reliable sources of data about the problem. Nonetheless, it is widely perceived that domestic violence is increasing. The police view it as a serious problem, and one that is likely to increase as the city continues to grow.
2. The city's large increase in Hispanic population raises special concerns about domestic violence because of cultural views of machismo, language barriers between police and victims, and unclear victim expectations of the police.
3. Although many perceive incidences of domestic violence as those in which women are repeatedly battered, incidents involving family members, for example, mother and son, or brothers, are also counted as domestic violence. Further, many domestic violence victims are not female.
4. Perceptions of the definition of domestic violence are inconsistent.
  - a. Many calls classified as domestic actually are disturbance calls involving verbal disputes rather than violence, threats, or any type of crime. Many are nuisance calls where disputants want the police to mediate their problem, such as getting a juvenile out of bed to go to school. The nature of relationships defined as domestic is not clear. Do these include only intimate partners, family members, roommates, same-sex partners, or juveniles? Dispatchers and officers define domestic violence differently.
5. Police managers have put increased emphasis on officer response to domestic violence, and more domestic violence reports are being written and more on-scene arrests are being made.
6. Domestic calls comprise a large share of police workload. The Raleigh Police Department dispatches officers to all citizen-initiated calls, and domestic calls are one of the most common calls to which patrol officers respond. Domestic calls are time-consuming because policy requires two officers to respond to these calls and that a report must be written on all domestic calls, even when no crime has occurred.
7. Domestic violence calls are complex for officers. Victims, suspects, and third parties are often present and, therefore, the calls are volatile and unpredictable. When an officer responds to a domestic call, no one is happy at the end because often there is no clear resolution. In particular, victims often do not want the suspect arrested. When an officer makes an arrest, it creates conflict between the officers and victim, making officer safety a major concern. Officers often get conflicting reports from victims and suspects. While officers are discouraged from making dual arrests, it is often difficult to determine the primary aggressor.

8. Domestic violence calls can be frustrating for officers. Victims are often unwilling or fail to take protective steps. Calls are very time-consuming because the police must sort out conflicting stories. Training does not adequately prepare officers to handle domestic calls; experience is a key to handling calls well. The Raleigh Police Department has a specialized domestic violence unit and some officers perceive that such calls should be handled by officers in that unit.
9. Domestic violence is an important public safety concern because police officers perceive that incidents can escalate over time and result in a harmful outcome for victims. Although it seemed rare that domestic violence results in a homicide or severe aggravated assault, concerns about this outcome seemed to dominate police concerns about how to best handle the problem. Many were concerned that “all that could have been done to protect a victim” had indeed been done.

To test these hypotheses, the Raleigh Police Department conducted an extensive analysis of domestic violence to improve the agency’s understanding of the issue and examine its effectiveness in handling domestic violence problems. At the outset of this effort, many department personnel, including analysts and supervisors, indicated that the department does not have a reliable and consistent way to identify the amount of domestic violence in the city; therefore, the analysis initially sought to do the following:

1. Establish a benchmark of domestic violence in Raleigh.
2. Examine the consistency, or identify the types of inconsistencies, in domestic violence data by determining how domestic violence is documented. Assess the accuracy of such measures, and identify opportunities for improvement and for developing a routine data system to monitor rises and falls.
3. Distinguish and determine the prevalence of domestic violence by intimate partners and family.
4. Examine whether domestic violence escalates and, if so, how? Examine the contribution of repeat victims to domestic violence.
5. Examine officers’ attitudes and perceptions about domestic violence and consider how these may affect the problem.
6. Examine the outcomes of domestic violence cases, including the impact of police responses.
7. Examine the reliability of data including calls-for-service, domestic violence reports, arrests, and prosecution.

These hypotheses and objectives formed the initial framework for the problem analysis of domestic violence.

## Existing Domestic Violence Data

Analysts looked at calls for service and incident reports to measure the volume or magnitude of domestic violence in Raleigh.<sup>11</sup>

- » The volume of calls for service classified as domestic in the computer aided dispatch (CAD) system operated by Wake County (ST2)
- » The number and type of incident reports referred to the domestic violence unit and recorded in the domestic violence database (ST4).

Further, domestic violence was measured by the following:

- » Ratio of incident reports to domestic calls (BR2)
- » Case status of domestic violence reports (open, pending, and cleared) in District 24 (ST1).

## Calls for Service


Calls for service have been used to assess the domestic violence workload among police districts. The call classifications used in Wake County for domestic calls comprise three classes: P16, P16W, and P16-DV. P16 refers to a regular domestic call, P16W is a domestic call with weapons involved, and P16-DV is a new call class. Only P16-DV includes “violence” in its label. In 2004, the Raleigh Police Department averaged about 350 domestic calls a month, comprising calls from all three classes.

The variables in calls for service are limited: date, time, the caller’s name, location (address), report number (if completed), final call classification, and call disposition. There also is a variable for remarks by the officer.


In February 2005, the Raleigh Police Department examined the effectiveness of the domestic violence unit. The department examined the distribution of 1,819 domestic violence cases assigned to each of the six districts (see Figure 3.1). Three districts—23, 24, and 26—had a similar number of cases: about 24 percent of the total domestic violence cases assigned.

Further analysis by the department showed that domestic calls and the reports required for domestic calls were not distributed the same way across the city. Among 428 calls classified as domestic from January 1, 2005 to February 13, 2005, 29 percent (125) and 27 percent (115) of calls occurred in Districts 24 and 26, respectively (see Figure 3.2). This sample of domestic calls and reports showed that reports arising from domestic calls were fairly evenly distributed among Districts 22, 23, and 26, with 20 percent in each district. The analysis showed that District 24 had 42 percent more reports than these three districts.

<sup>11</sup>Because many of the data sources in this report will seem similar to readers, references to data are followed by a code, such as MI, that relates to a listing of all data sources included as Appendix A.



**Figure 3.1.** Domestic Violence Reports by District, 2004 (n = 1,819).



**Figure 3.2.** Domestic Violence Calls and DV Reports by District 1/1/05 – 2/13/05 (n = 428 calls/158 reports) (n = 1,819).

Of more concern to the department was the ratio of reports generated by domestic calls. In Districts 22 and 23, 54 percent of all domestic calls resulted in reports being written. The rate of reports to calls in Districts 26 and 21 was about half the rate of Districts 22 and 23, as 27 and 28 percent of the calls generated incident reports. In District 24, which had the highest volume of domestic calls, 35 percent of calls resulted in incident reports. Since departmental policy requires that officers write incident reports on all domestic calls, the differences between calls and reporting rates reflected an important loss of data.

## District 24 Domestic Violence Database

Data on domestic violence cases were maintained by domestic violence officers in each district.<sup>12</sup> The data entry process was later centralized and all such cases referred to the domestic violence unit were entered into a centralized database by the unit supervisor. The variables included in the initial District 24 dataset included date, time, offense location (address), and report type for each offense, as well as the name of the victim, suspect, responding officer, officer assigned to the case, and the case status.

Because the analysis commenced while the domestic violence officers were decentralized, initial analysis focused on District 24. According to the domestic violence officer, the case load was so large in District 24 that only domestic violence cases between intimate partners were included in the database. A summary analysis by the district's crime analyst identified 850 domestic violence cases<sup>13</sup> classified by type of offense and a count of each for 2004 (see Table 3.2: 2004 District 24 Domestic Violence Reports).

These data included the case status of domestic violence cases. As of January 12, 2005, 28 percent (238) were cleared by arrest, 15 percent (128) pending, and 57 percent (484) were inactive. These summary data did not include any other variables. Most of the incidents in the data were simple assaults (55 percent), but there were numerous other incident reports.

<sup>12</sup>Since each domestic violence officer maintained a separate database, the number and selection of variables varied from one district to another.

<sup>13</sup>The 850 domestic violence cases contrast dramatically with the 435 cases reported in Figure I. The nature of the discrepancy could not be determined.

Simple assaults	55% (471)
Miscellaneous/no offense	15.2% (129)
All other/include threats, fraud, trespass	8% (69)
Aggravated assault	10.8% (92)
Vandalism/damage property/vehicle	7.2% (61)
Larceny	1% (6)
Burglary	1.2% (10)
Disorderly conduct	- (2)
Robbery	1% (6)
Weapons violations	- (4)
Total	850

**Table 3.2.** 2004 District 24 Domestic Violence Reports.

## Repeat Address Analysis

In District 24, the crime analyst assisted the domestic violence officer by routinely running a follow-up, repeat-call analysis on all addresses at which at least one domestic report had been completed. The analysis, conducted weekly, identified repeat calls for the preceding week and the preceding 28 days.

During a 2-month period, there were 15 addresses with 2 or more domestic calls in District 24 (see Table 3.3). These addresses generated 31 domestic calls, while another 43 calls of other classifications also occurred at these addresses. Some addresses had only 2 or 3 calls during the 2-month period, but 3 addresses (21 percent) generated 45 percent of all calls.

# Addresses	% Addresses	# calls per address	Total calls	% calls
2	13%	2	4	5%
4	26%	3	12	16%
6	49%	4-5	24	34%
3	21%	9-14	33	45%
15	100%		74	100%

**Table 3.3.** District 24 Repeat Calls by Address During 2 Months

Table 3 provides information about the workload generated by 15 addresses, and the analysis provides information about the nature of calls generated by the addresses. The 15 addresses generated 74 calls for service within 2 months; 31 (43 percent of calls were classified as domestic, while 43 (57 percent) were not. The nondomestic calls covered a range of call classifications, from disturbances assaults, suspicious persons, 911 hang-ups, and others. These call classifications clearly suggest that domestic problems at addresses cannot be identified by a single call classification; instead, domestic violence occurs within a broader constellations of offenses—some appearing relatively minor—against victims over time. In this sense, victims of domestic violence may be considered as multiple victimization rather than repeat victimization because the types of victimization cannot be narrowly defined. A limitation of the standard repeat victimization domestic violence analysis is that there is no information about the total number of addresses reporting domestic calls, or the volume of calls that do not repeat.

Another data source—calls for service from April 2003—showed that 182 domestic calls were recorded at 159 addresses in District 24 in 1 month (see Table 3.4). In addition to the domestic calls, the 159 addresses generated an additional 252 calls to police during the month. The nature of the calls varied, but included 911 hang-ups, assaults, refuse to leave, talk with officer, damage to property, disturbance, noise, larceny, harassing phone calls, and robbery. The distribution of call classifications among these addresses reveals that 42 percent of their calls were domestic, and 58 percent were not.

# calls	# addresses	% addresses	# calls	% calls
1	73	46%	73	17%
2	36	23%	72	17%
3	20	13%	60	14%
4-10	24	15%	146	34%
11-18	6	4%	84	19%
Total	159		434	

**Table 3.4.** Police Workload at Addresses with Domestic Calls.<sup>14</sup>

Many of the addresses (73 or 46 percent) called police only once during the month and another 23 percent (36) twice. But 6 addresses called police 84 times, generating 19 percent of calls and the 30 addresses that called police 4 or more times generated 230 calls to police. These 30 addresses were 19 percent of addresses but generated 53 percent of all calls.

Even the most frequent callers in this sample did not demonstrate the pattern of escalation that concerned many police. For example, there were 18 calls during the month from one address, displayed in Table 3.5. The calls, however, did not appear to escalate in severity during the period.

<sup>14</sup>One month workload generated by 159 addresses with 182 domestic calls.

4/05/2003	21:18:48	Drug Law Violation
4/05/2003	22:23:24	911 Hang-Up Call
4/05/2003	22:23:45	Drug Law Violation
4/08/2003	8:21:10	Warrant Service
4/09/2003	13:18:05	Request For Service
4/13/2003	0:08:11	Fight
4/13/2003	1:31:06	Domestic
4/13/2003	1:35:48	Domestic
4/17/2003	0:44:03	911 Hang-Up Call
4/19/2003	23:57:31	Loud Music
4/20/2003	12:06:37	Talk With Officer
4/20/2003	21:01:14	Disturbance
4/24/2003	17:20:30	Investigate Person
4/25/2003	23:57:37	Loud Music
4/28/2003	22:44:18	Loud Music
4/28/2003	22:47:01	Disturbance-Weapons Involved
4/28/2003	23:06:30	Disturbance
4/28/2003	23:07:20	Fight

**Table 3.5.** One Month Call Sequence at a Domestic Violence Address.

## Repeat Time Window

The preceding analyses have used a single month or 2 months of data for analysis. While 46 percent of addresses with domestic calls do not appear to repeat, at least in the short term, and addresses with numerous calls do not appear to escalate in offense severity during the period, some addresses demonstrate a pattern of escalation. A longer period of data shed further light on the nature of escalation. During 2004, Raleigh police responded to one address (see Table 3.6) 14 times during the 8-month period of April to December. From April to July the offenses were less serious and included no felonies; from September to December, four felonies occurred at the address.

Date	Nature	Time between
4/16/2004	Simple assault	--
4/17/2004	Simple assault	1 day
4/30/2004	Talk with Officer (TWO)	13 days
7/02/2004	Simple assault	62 days
7/3/2004	Misc/all other	1 day
9/9/2004	Aggravated assault	66 days
11/3/2004	Threats	54 days
11/3/2004	Suspicious person	0 days
11/3/2004	Burglary	0 days
12/3/2004	Motor Vehicle Theft	30 days
12/3/2004	Fight	0 days
12/6/2004	Aggravated assault	3 days
12/6/2004	Trespass	0 days

**Table 3.6.** A Domestic Violence Address with Escalation.

At another address, one intimate partner dyad called the police 31 times in 15 months (see Table 3.7). The couple, who had a child in common, was not living together but was well known to the domestic violence officer who had repeatedly encouraged the female victim to secure warrants or a protective order. The call history suggests that most of the calls were relatively minor offenses and no felony crimes had occurred. But the frequency of the calls to police appeared to accelerate, and police were called seven times in January 2004. The escalation culminated in a stabbing in March. In this sense, the escalation reflected the frequency more so than the increasing severity of calls.

On average, there was 1 call every 15 days during the 15 months. From January until October 2003, there were an average of 26 days between calls; the average time between calls from October 2003 to March 2004 decreased to 9 days.

Date	Nature class/type report		Days between
	1208 Walnut	2120-202 Larson	
1/8/2003		Investigate vehicle	—
3/28/2003	Domestic/Misc. report		80
5/18/2003		Call	50
6/22/2003	Domestic/Misc. report		34
7/1/2003		Call	8
7/20/2003	Domestic/Trespass		19
8/17/2003	Refuse to leave		27
8/17/2003	Trespassing		0
8/17/2003	Investigate person		0
9/12/2003	Domestic		25
10/2/2003	Check in other agency		20
10/2/2003	Trespassing		0
10/3/2003	Assault on Female		1
10/9/2003	Request for Service		6
11/2/2003	Vandalism		21
12/13/2003	Talk with officer		41
1/10/2004	Vandalism		27
1/10/2004	Domestic		0
1/10/2004	Talk with officer		0
1/18/2004	Trespassing		8
1/19/2004	Trespassing		1
1/19/2004	Talk with Officer		0
1/25/2004	Disturbance		6
2/4/2004	Missing		10
2/12/2004	Trespassing		8
2/12/2004	Domestic		0
2/20/2004	Disturbance		8
2/21/2004	Communicating Threats		1
3/13/2004		Stabbing	21

**Table 3.7.** Two Domestic Violence Addresses with Escalation.

The repeat victimization domestic violence analyses in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 also demonstrate that limiting the time window search to 28-day cycles will miss many repeat incidents.

Table 3.6 shows 13 calls, and the time between calls can be computed for 12 calls because the first call, the initial call, has no prior call. Of the 12 calls, there were more than 28 days between four calls. For each call occurring after 28 days, the next call is

considered the initial call and treated as if no prior calls had occurred; therefore, this address would have appeared to have a repeat series in April, July, November, and December. Each series would be presumed to be independent of the previous series and the pattern of escalation overlooked.

The same issue arises in Table 3.7, which shows 145 days between calls on average. From January 2003 to 2004, the average was 22 days between calls. The average number of days between calls from January to March 2004 was 6 days.

Both examples suggest that the time window for identifying repeat victimization domestic violence should be increased, and periods such as 60, 90, and 180 days added to the analysis. An address that does not have another call to police within 180 days is probably at very low risk of additional calls to the police.

A more critical issue in repeat victimization domestic violence analysis is using the address as the unit of analysis. As seen in Table 3.7, offenses between the same persons occurred at two different addresses during the course of 15 months. Using address as the unit of analysis routinely overlooks offenses between the same persons at different locations. This is particularly likely when the victim moves from the original domestic violence location. Repeat victimization analysis should use address as the primary unit of analysis but also search for repeat incidents by victim and suspect name, including searching for victims who have become suspects and vice versa. In several of the domestic violence cases, the actual victim may be a third party to the dyad, but the current repeat victimization domestic violence analysis does not provide insight into these types of recurrences.

## Data Limitations

The existing data had substantial limitations. The primary limitation is that the data were not reliable for documenting or estimating the volume of domestic violence in Raleigh, or indicating its nature, rises or falls, concentration, recurrence, or outcomes.

Both calls for service and domestic violence reports have characteristics that make them unreliable for documenting the prevalence of domestic violence.

A serious problem in using domestic calls to benchmark domestic violence is that many serious crimes between persons in domestic relationships are not recorded as domestic calls. Calls such as severe stabbings, shootings, homicides, and rapes are recorded by these crime classifications, even if domestic violence is involved. Many serious crimes between persons in domestic relationships will not be counted in calls for service data.

Further, even minor crimes that are classified domestic generate a different type of report. Trespassing, for example, will be an “All Other/Trespassing” report. While it can be determined from the call data whether a report was written by the officer, the call record does not indicate the type of report that was written and includes only the report number that can be used for further analysis.

The call classes used by the Raleigh Police Department include “domestic” and two domestic violence classes, but it is the “domestic” class that is most often used. This class often reflects simple assaults and arguments that are domestic in nature and these calls need not include violent acts. In fact, if the domestic call includes violence, the responding officer will generate a report of the offense detailing what has occurred based on the FBI’s UCR definition of crimes. The incident reports are classified according to what the complainant alleges happened. A victim may report a simple assault when there is no evidence that an assault occurred. The UCR classification is based on the crime that is reported, not the crime that is eventually determined.

As a data source, calls for service are also weak because they use the final call classification assigned by the responding officer. Although officers can reclassify calls, there is no way to determine how many nor what type of calls are reclassified without a manual search of CAD records to compare final and initial call classification.

A further limitation is that calls for service data (used in repeat call analysis) do not distinguish apartment numbers in addresses. Further, while the data are reconciled with the city’s street center line files assuring accuracy of addresses, these calls are not a reliable source of information about persons involved in incidents. The names of callers are not verified and may include misspellings, alternative spellings, and other sources of error. When police are interested in the victim and/or the suspect, calls for service are not a reliable source of information.

While calls for service and incident reports have limitations, a particularly important limitation is that calls and reports cannot be linked unless specific efforts are undertaken to do so. Routine use of CAD remarks could help overcome this problem.

## Improving Data Quality

Because of the limitations in existing data, it was necessary to supplement existing data for analysis and to undertake further data collection. Since there was no single reliable source of data about domestic violence, several datasets were compiled for analysis. Multiple datasets offered an opportunity to triangulate findings; that is, to determine consistency of findings across differing sources, and to identify the limitations of any particular data source. The following describes the source and amount of data collected and analyzed. Later, we describe the findings from these sources.

## Citywide Domestic Violence Unit Database

An analyst reviewed data maintained by the domestic violence unit for 2004 (ST4), examining 1,621 cases.<sup>15</sup> The database included all cases (incident reports) referred to the domestic violence unit from district stations across the city. Variables in the dataset included date, time, offense location (address), and report type for each offense, as well as the name of the victim and suspect, the officer assigned to the case, and the case status. Analysis was undertaken to determine the volume of cases and the contribution

<sup>15</sup>In contrast, there were 1,819 domestic violence cases reported as assigned to Districts (BT1). This number was reported at the February 2005 CompStat meeting.

of repeat victims to the types of incidents recorded. The domestic violence database is a comprehensive and relatively new database, and has not been used for analysis. The data are organized by incident report as the unit of analysis and uses a departmental report number as a unique identifier for each case.

## Manual Review of Crime Reports

Crime reports in Raleigh do not distinguish the nature of the relationship between the victim and suspect. To determine the prevalence of domestic relationships in reported crime, a manual review of selected Part I and Part II incident reports for 2004 was undertaken (ABL). This involved reading the full report narrative and report supplements to determine suspects in the crimes. In many cases, suspects were identified by victims, and this information was contained only within the report narrative.

Reports were reviewed by pre-service officers and included all homicides, rape, aggravated assaults, and disorderly conduct in 2004. Four other offense and report types were examined: residential burglary, vandalism, simple assault, and miscellaneous/no offense. For these four report types, a sample of 2 months was selected for examination. February and September were examined for residential burglary, March and September 2004 for simple assault, May and August 2004 for vandalism, and July and November 2004 for miscellaneous/no offense reports.

During the manual analyses, the report narrative was reviewed to identify the nature of the relationship between victim and suspect, and to classify the relationships into two types: intimate partners and family.

## Domestic Calls for Service and Domestic Violence Reports

To further examine domestic violence and the relationship between domestic calls, domestic violence reports, and arrests, a sample of domestic calls was selected for analysis (M1). All calls with a final disposition of “domestic” in June 2005 were examined, reports printed out, and variables examined. During the month, 333 domestic calls took place, with 209 of the calls (62.8 percent) resulting in an incident report. These reports contained information about the type of crime, address and type of location, and information about both the victim and suspect including sex, race, and relationship between the disputants.

## Officer Survey

Despite the presence of a specialized domestic violence function in the Raleigh Police Department, patrol officers who respond to calls have the most exposure to domestic violence calls. To gain a better understanding of domestic violence in Raleigh, a survey of the city’s patrol officers was conducted to learn more about their attitudes and

concerns about domestic violence. This included their perceptions about repeat victims, attitude toward victims' "failure to cope," victims' dependency on the police for resolving family issues, as well as to evaluate the validity of dispatcher classification of domestic violence calls, and examine other dimensions of the problem.

In June 2005, Raleigh patrol personnel were surveyed about the most recent call to which they had responded that was a "domestic" call of any nature, that is, a call involving any incident (criminal or otherwise) between persons in a domestic relationship. The survey asked only about the most recent domestic call to learn about the most typical domestic call and because there were concerns that officers' views might otherwise focus on the most memorable calls, such as those involving serious violence or that compromised officer safety.

This method creates a sample of calls and increases the accuracy of an officer's recollection about a single call. While we cannot determine whether the sample is representative, this method appears to create a more valid dataset than other strategies that would have asked officers to generalize about domestic violence calls, and might over represent egregious cases of domestic violence.

The survey was developed in collaboration with an advisory group, field tested at a police district station, and administered on May 24–25 at roll calls at police district stations and at the police firing range. The survey was conducted just prior to a mandatory Raleigh Police Department in-service training on domestic violence. The training was developed by the North Carolina Attorney General's Office.

The purpose of the survey was to determine how officers perceive and handle domestic-related calls. The survey was administered by staff of the Raleigh Police Department Training Academy who distributed the surveys at roll calls across the city, remained on site while officers completed surveys, and then collected the completed surveys. Data entry tasks were completed by recruits who were in the department's Basic Law Enforcement Training Academy.

The sampling frame was a convenience sample. A total of 192 Raleigh Police Department personnel responded to the survey. While the department has about 700 sworn personnel in the department, about 350 are assigned to Field Operations and are responsible for responding to calls. The convenience sample amounted to about 50 percent of the eligible population and the survey respondents appear representative of all officers in the department. Sixty-two percent (119) of the survey respondents were 26 to 35 years old, while 16 percent were 25 or younger and 22 percent were older than 35. Nearly half of respondents (93 or 49 percent) have a college degree, 14.6 percent had high school diploma, only while 34.9 percent had some college. A large majority, 92.6 percent (175) of respondents were male, 76.6 percent (144) were White, 13.3 percent (25) African American, and 3.7 percent (7)

were Hispanic. About one-third of respondents had 3 years or less of experience; 11 percent had less than one year; 24 percent had 1 to 3 years; 17.7 percent, 3 to 5 years; 31 percent, 5 to 10 years; and 17 percent had more than 10 years of experience.

## Calls for Service

In June 2005 (ST4), the department received 22,805 calls for service. A sample of 11,402 calls was selected to examine the nature of initial and final call classifications, and determine the frequency and type of calls that get changed.

## Arrest Outcomes

Another analyst extracted data from the domestic violence database for January 2005, creating a dataset of all domestic violence cases assigned to the unit in that month (MI and LM1). One hundred forty-nine cases were in the dataset, using the incident (or report number) as the unit of analysis. This included 55 arrests for assault. The analyst used arrests to examine case progression. First, to determine the amount of time the suspect remained in custody in Wake County Jail, the analyst used the county's CHIEFs system. Second, to examine the time sequence and outcome of prosecution, the analyst accessed North Carolina court records (maintained by the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Court, or AOC) to determine the date of adjudication and disposition of the case. CHIEFs was also accessed to determine additional offenses committed by defendants pre- or post-disposition.

Another analyst undertook a similar task, extracting from the records management system all arrests for Simple Assault/Assault on Female from January 2005. There were 97 arrests during the period and 27 were suspects who were listed in the domestic violence database for the same month; therefore, 27.8 percent of Assault on Female arrests during the month concerned domestic violence. The analyst attempted to examine the outcome of the arrests to determine prosecution and conviction rates.

## Usefulness of Data

A variety of data sources were used for analyzing domestic violence. Each data source had limitations, but using techniques of comparison permitted development of a composite picture of domestic violence in Raleigh, and offered important insight into inconsistencies between varied sources. In this sense, no single data source could be considered the most useful.

Some additional data sources might have been useful for analysis. Although calls for service data were analyzed for this project, not all victim-initiated calls are recorded in CAD. Domestic violence officers routinely provide their cell numbers to victims and ask victims to call them directly. Unfortunately, there were no records of these contacts between officers and victims. These contacts provide more information about the domestic violence workload. In many ways, it is likely that these contacts are quite similar to the talk-with-officer and request-an-officer calls that are recorded through CAD.

Despite efforts to gather reliable data on domestic violence, there were errors in the data. Two analysts examined arrests for January 2005. One analyst commenced with arrests recorded in the domestic violence database; the other analyst downloaded all simple assaults/assault on female arrests from the police department's records management system. A comparison of these two datasets showed that the domestic violence data were not current; for example, arrests of four suspects in January 2005 were not included in the domestic violence data, an error rate of 15 percent.

## Key Findings about Domestic Violence

Much that was learned about domestic violence in Raleigh was based on analysis. These findings are discussed.

### Officer Workload

Domestic calls comprise a large and increasing portion of the officer workload in Raleigh. In 2004, only 2 percent of all calls-for-service initiated through E-911 were classified as domestic in the final call classification (4,257); however, three of the other common calls for service—talk with officer, disturbance, and request for service—are often used for domestic-related calls. These four classifications, added together, comprised 17.82 percent (30,572) of all calls (171,402), excluding calls related to collisions/assist motorist (see Table 3.8).

Even added together, these call codes will undercount calls associated with domestic violence. Many serious domestic-related calls, particularly sexual assault and shooting, are not classified as domestic; that is, the domestic-related homicide results in a homicide report and the call is cleared this way. It does not result in a domestic violence report.

Call Classification	# calls	% calls
Alarm	24,014	14.01%
Talk with officer	13,220	7.71%
Humane	11,798	6.88%
911 hang-up	11,386	6.64%
Larceny	10,567	6.17%
Suspicious person/vehicle	10,518	6.14%
Disturbance	8,966	5.23%
Loud music	4,664	2.72%
Domestic	4,257	2.48%
Request for service	4,129	2.41%
Check-in	3,793	2.21%
Assault	3,517	2.05%
Vandalism	3,320	1.94%
Other	57,247	28.76%
Total	171,396	86.10%

**Table 3.8.** 2004 Raleigh Police Department Calls for Service.<sup>16</sup>

Further, based on police experience and analysis of the Family Violence Intervention Unit caseload, many calls that are classified as assaults, vandalism, 911 hang-ups, suspicious persons, or vehicle appear to reflect ongoing problems between domestic partners. It should be noted that initial call classifications are often changed by officers; this is particularly true of domestic calls.

- » A survey of Raleigh Police Department personnel showed that officers routinely change calls initially classified as domestic. Of 165 calls initially classified as domestic, officers said 56 percent (92) were wrong and reclassified them as disturbance, talk with officer, and request for service.
- » An analysis of 11,402 of the 22,805 calls received from June 2005 showed that at least 904 calls, or 8 percent of the sample, had a different final classification than what they had been classified initially.<sup>17</sup> The initial call class most frequently changed was “domestic”; 165 calls initially classified this way were reclassified, most often changed to talk with officer as a final call classification. Only 9 calls not initially classified as domestic were reclassified as domestic.
- » Responding to domestic calls can be time-consuming, particularly because two officers respond to these calls. Based on the officer survey, in 6 percent of domestic calls (12), officers spent more than 2 hours on the scene. In about two-thirds of calls, officers spent from 15 to 45 minutes handling the call. In 12 percent of calls (23)

<sup>16</sup>Excludes officer-initiated activities such as warrant service, and two large categories of motor vehicle-related calls: collisions and assist motorist.

<sup>17</sup>Only 8 percent of calls had information in the remarks than indicated a change in classification. The actual number of reclassified calls may have been much larger but cannot be determined.

officers spent less than 15 minutes on the scene. While most officers (62.5 percent) felt they spent about the right amount of time on the call, a large percentage 37 percent (71) felt they spent too much time handling the call.

## Contribution of Domestic Violence to Part I and II Crimes

Although there is no routine, reliable source of data about the amount of domestic violence in Raleigh, the volume of homicides, aggravated, and simple assaults are an important indicator, and data are available for multiple years. Homicides and both types of assaults are clearly defined by UCR and routinely result in a crime report.

### Homicide

National victimization surveys show that 11 percent of homicides are between intimate partners, and that this proportion has remained consistent over time (Rennison and Welchans, 2000).

- » In Raleigh, there were 13 homicides in 2005; three, or 23 percent, of the city’s homicides were between current or former intimate partners (M2).
- » Of the 15 homicides in 2004, 6, or 40 percent, could be considered domestic violence: three involved intimate partners (20 percent) and three involved family members (20 percent) (ABL).

While these data appear to suggest that Raleigh has a somewhat higher proportion of domestic violence homicide than national rates, it seems this way primarily because Raleigh has such a low number of homicides each year.

### Assaults

Aggravated and simple assaults are perhaps the most reliable barometer of domestic violence in Raleigh (see Table 3.9). In 2004, aggravated assaults comprised 7.8 percent of Part I crimes in the city, compared to 6.5 percent in 2002. Simple assaults are even more numerous than aggravated assaults. In 2003, there were 2,905 simple assaults and this increased to 3,457, or by 19 percent, by 2004.

	Aggravated assaults	Part I	Aggravated as % Part I	Simple assaults	Assaults as % Parts I & II	Parts I and II
2004	1,135	14,498	7.8%	3,457	11.4%	40,319
2003	1,181	17,288	6.8%	3,163	10.8%	40,028
2002	1,175	17,965	6.5%	2,905	-	-

**Table 3.9.** Assaults in Raleigh.

Manual analysis of assaults recorded by the Raleigh Police Department (ABL) for 2004 shows that a large share of all assaults involved victims and suspects who could be considered domestic or family members.

- » One-third or 33 percent of aggravated assaults were domestic.
- » In a sample, more than half (57 percent) of all simple assaults were domestic.


January 2005	Arrests	
Arrest/Aggravated or simple assault	202	
Physical arrest/assault	151	74.8%
Arrest/Assault on female	119	58.9%
Physical arrests/Assault on female	97	82% of arrests
On domestic violence list	23	

**Table 3.10.** Assault Arrests.

Further analysis confirmed this pattern of domestic involvement in assaults (see Figure 3.3):

- » The most common type of crime report (June 2005) resulting from a domestic call was simple assault (41 percent); another 8 percent were aggravated assaults. (M1)
- » Simple assaults are the most common type of case in the domestic violence unit's database. Of 1,621 incident reports in the citywide domestic violence database, 58 percent were assaults (50 percent were simple assaults and 8 percent were aggravated assaults). (ST4)
- » Simple assaults (471) were the most common type of case in District 24's domestic violence-related cases, comprising 55 percent of all domestic violence cases (850); another 10.8 percent were aggravated assaults. (ST1)

Further, the simple assault cases classified as domestic violence (471) represented 40 percent of all simple assaults that were recorded in the district (1,178).



**Figure 3.3.** Types of Domestic Violence Cases.

## Other Crimes

Despite the prevalence of assaults, many incidents classified as domestic violence are not assaults but represent another type of offense. From 9 to 21 percent of all domestic violence cases were classified as offenses, reflecting a wide range of crimes including damage to property, stalking, larceny, robbery, burglary, and false imprisonment (see Table 3.11). Unfortunately, many of these domestic violence cases (6 to 8 percent) were classified very generally as “all other,” an offense category that includes communicating threats, violations of 50B orders, trespassing, and other offenses. (It would be useful to disaggregate and monitor the number and specific type of these offenses because they are so common among domestic violence cases.) Manual analysis of 2004 incident reports (ABL) showed that 31 percent of rapes reported to the Raleigh Police Department were domestic; further, 8 percent of residential burglaries involved persons in domestic relationships, 15 percent of vandalism, and 12 percent of disorderly conduct (see Figure 3.4).

## No Crime

Many cases of domestic violence involve no crime, although it is unclear what proportion lacks this element; five Raleigh Police Department data sources all showed a differing contribution of domestic violence. Analysis showed that as much as 45 percent or as little as 15 percent of domestic violence reports were classified as “miscellaneous.” The following were classified as miscellaneous/no offense:

- » 46 percent of domestic violence reports in June 2005 (M1)
- » 24.5 percent of 2004 incident reports (ABL)


- » 21.5 percent of 2004 reports in the domestic violence database (ST4)
- » 15 percent of reports in 2004 in the domestic violence database District 24 (ST1)
- » 16 percent of reports (domestic violence database for January 2005) (MI).

Miscellaneous reports are one of the largest report categories for the Raleigh Police Department. Its reports comprised 23.6 percent of Part II incident reports in 2003, increasing to about 33 percent in 2005.

While the percentages are not consistent across different sources, it is clear that many domestic violence reports do not involve a crime. In about half (46 percent) the reports arising from domestic calls (June 2005), no crime had been committed. Similarly, nearly one-fourth (22 percent) of the citywide domestic violence cases involved no crime.

	<b>2004 citywide Domestic Violence cases (ST4)</b>	<b>2004 District 24 Domestic Violence cases (ST1)</b>	<b>June 2005 reports from domestic calls (M1)</b>	<b>Jan 05 Domestic Violence cases (MI)</b>
Simple assaults	50% (817)	55% (471)	41.1% (86)	60% (90)
Miscellaneous/no offense	21.5% (349)	15.2% (129)	45.9% (96)	16% (24)
All other/include threats, fraud, trespass	8% (137)	8% (69)	6.2% (13)	7.4% (11)
Aggravated assault	8% (135)	10.8% (92)	3.8% (8)	5.4% (8)
Vandalism/damage prop/ vehicle	5.8% (94)	7.2% (61)	- (2)	7.4% (11)
Larceny	2.2% (36)	1% (6)	- (1)	- (1)
Burglary	1.7% (28)	1.2% (10)		- (3)
Disorderly conduct	- (9)	- (2)	- (2)	
Robbery	6 -	1% (6)		- 1
Weapons violations	4 -	- (4)		
Motor vehicle theft	2 -			
Rape	2 -			
50B violation			1.9% (4)	
False imprisonment			- (1)	
Stalking			- (1)	
Total	1,621	850	209	149

**Table 3.11.** Incident Type in Domestic Violence Cases.



**Figure 3.4.** Domestic Violence Relationship as Percent of Raleigh Police Department Incident Reports.

## Domestic Violence Calls, Reports, and Arrests

Raleigh Police Department policy requires officers to complete incident reports on all calls classified as domestic. For several reasons, this doesn't always happen. The officer survey showed that more than half of all calls (56 percent) initially classified as domestic were not classified correctly. In fact, 29 percent of domestic calls should have been classified as "disturbances" rather than "domestic," according to officers.<sup>18</sup>

Of 333 calls classified as domestic in June 2005, 209 resulted in a report. Even when domestic violence reports reflect that a crime has been committed, an arrest is not a certain outcome. Of the 209 reports in June 2005, 54 percent (113) alleged that at least one crime had been committed; however, only 37 percent (77) of the reports resulted in an arrest. This is likely because of the absence of witnesses or evidence of the crime. In domestic violence, bruises on the victim or damage to a kicked-in door are common types of evidence. The officer survey showed that 192 calls involving domestic violence, resulted in 99 reports (52 percent of calls) and 68 arrests (69 percent of reports).

The survey showed that suspects were on the scene when police arrived in 59 percent of cases. When suspects are on the scene, events may be described in a he-said-she-said manner, making it difficult for officers to distinguish the primary aggressor.

<sup>18</sup>The survey asked officers to comment only on their most recent call for service involving domestic partners or family members. This method creates a sample of calls and increases the accuracy of an officer's recollection. While we cannot determine the representativeness of the resultant sample, this method appears to create a more valid dataset than other samples that might overrepresent egregious cases of domestic violence.

When unable to do so, dual arrest may be necessary. Dual arrests occurred in 14 of 68 incidents, or about one in five incidents. Similarly, in the June 2005 domestic violence reports, both parties were arrested in 13 percent of the cases.

## Gender of Offenders

While men comprise the majority of domestic violence suspects, women are well-represented in domestic violence arrests. Of 77 cases that resulted in arrest in June 2005, 30 were females and 57 were males. Ten cases resulted in dual arrests. Nonetheless, females comprised 35 percent of all arrests arising from domestic calls (see Table 3.12). This finding contrasts dramatically with popular perceptions of domestic violence.

	Arrests	%	People	%
Females	20	26%	30	34.5%
Males	47	61%	57	65.5%
Both	10	13%	-	-
	77		87	

**Table 3.12.** Gender of Domestic Violence Arrests.<sup>19</sup>

## Relationship between Disputants

Domestic violence is commonly perceived to be among intimate partners and most reported cases in Raleigh (about 68 to 85 percent) is among disputants such as spouses and persons in dating relationships (see Table 3.13, Table 3.14, and Figure 3.4). But a substantial amount of domestic violence occurs between family members.

	Survey (DLW)	Crime reports (ABL) <sup>20</sup>	June 05 Domestic Violence reports (M1)
Intimate partners	68% (128)	81.4%	84% (175)
Family members	24% (46)	18.5%	14% (30)
Other domestic	8% (5)	-	2% (4)

**Table 3.13.** Relationship of Domestic Violence Disputants.

<sup>19</sup>Based on the June 2005 domestic violence reports.

<sup>20</sup>This row is extrapolated from analysis showing that 46.5 percent of simple assaults were among intimate partners, and 10.6 percent among family members.

For the most part, the intimate partner disputants who call the police are current partners, rather than estranged partners. The June 2005 reports arising from domestic calls showed that 80 percent (140) of intimate partner disputants were current partners; while 20 percent (35) were divorced, separated, or former relationships. Among reports arising from domestic calls involving family members (46), most (63 percent or 29) were between parent and child. Most domestic violence cases involved a male and female disputant. Intimate partners were 84 percent (175) of June domestic violence reports (209), in contrast to 73.5 percent reported in the officer survey (128)

		June '05 Domestic Violence Reports	Survey
Current intimate partner	Girl/boyfriend	35% (74)	62% (108)
	Spouses	29% (61)	
	Same sex partners	2.4% (5)	
Former/divorced intimate partner	Former girl/boyfriend	10.5% (22)	11.5% (20)
	Former spouse	6% (13)	
Family members	Parent child	11.5% (24)	16.7% (29)
	Siblings	2.8% (6)	9.8% (17)
	Other/family	1.9% (4)	
		209	174

**Table 3.14.** Type of Relationships in Domestic Cases.

Most of the domestic violence reports of intimate partners involved people in current relationships: girlfriend/boyfriend relationships comprised 35 percent, 29 percent of the reports involved spouses, and 2.4 percent were same-sex partners. In the survey, 62 percent were current partners, and 11.5 percent were estranged. Of all domestic violence reports, 16.5 percent involved estranged or former spouses or boyfriend/girlfriends.

In contrast, family members comprised 16.3 percent of June 2005 cases, and these were mostly parent-child relationships.

The officer survey showed that when the relationship of disputants was known by responding officers (179), the majority (73.7 percent) of disputants were living together. About two-thirds, or 67.7 percent of disputants (128) were intimate partners. A large majority (84 percent) of these intimate partners were current partners who were dating or married, while 16 percent (20) were divorced, previously dating, or former partners. About one-fourth of disputants (24.3 percent) were family members (46) and most of these (63 percent or 29) were parent-child. A total of 8 percent were other types of relationships.

In the June 2005 domestic violence reports, 43 percent of opposite-sex intimate partners had at least one child in common. About 31 percent had no children but 22 percent of the reports did not have enough information to determine whether there were children. In 4 percent of the reports, however, the victim was pregnant with the suspect's child.

## Domestic Violence Callers and Offense Locations

The June 2005 call data showed that the victim called the police in 73 percent of the domestic-related calls; 11 percent (22) of the calls were initiated by neighbors and 8 percent (15) by children or other persons in the household. Most of the victims were still at the scene when the police arrived (180 of 192). In many cases the suspect (114) was also at the scene. Children were present in 37 of the calls.

Most domestic reports arise from residential locations. In 64 percent (134) of the June 2005 cases, both subjects involved in the domestic call lived in the residence in which it occurred; 21 percent (44) occurred in a residence where only the victim lived.<sup>21</sup> Other domestic calls occurred at third-party locations (7 percent), at the suspect's residence (5 percent), and in the street (3 percent).

More than half (59 percent) of the domestic reports for June 2005 originated from multifamily residences (apartments, condominiums, and town houses), while 31 percent were from single-family residences. Mobile homes, hotels, and rooming houses accounted for 4 percent of reports. About 3 percent of reports arose from commercial locations, such as restaurants and retail stores, and a similar proportion arose from a street or parking lot location. The prevalence of multifamily properties in domestic violence reports relates to the prevalence of renters among domestic violence victims; 88 percent of victims rent residences, while 12 percent owned their home.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup>This compares with national victimization surveys that show two-thirds of intimate partner violence occurs in the victim's home. The national data only include intimate partner domestic violence and the Raleigh Police Department data include family domestic violence, the proportions are likely very similar.

<sup>22</sup>These findings, too, are consistent with national victimization surveys that show that domestic violence is three times more common among renters. The prevalence of renters is also noteworthy because some disturbances or serious assaults can be grounds for the landlord to evict the tenant involved. Tenancy of domestic violence victims, however, is protected under North Carolina statute.

Findings about the prevalence of renters among domestic violence victims are consistent with national victimization surveys that consistently show that domestic violence is more common among persons of lower income. The victimization surveys also show that domestic violence is more common among minorities; however, the June domestic violence reports show no distinct racial pattern in Raleigh. It is important to note, however, that most disputants in domestic violence cases are of the same race. Only 3 percent of cases involved disputes between persons of a different race or ethnicity. Black disputants comprised 60 percent of cases; White disputants comprised 24 percent; Hispanic disputants, 9 percent; Indian, 1 percent; and Asian disputants, 1 percent. The mixed-race disputes were between a Black subject and a White subject.

## Alcohol and Drug Use

Alcohol and drug use are often involved in domestic violence cases, and affect the volatility of the incident. In June 2005, 21 percent of the domestic violence reports involved alcohol use by one of the disputants. In 2 percent, at least one disputant was using drugs, and in 2 percent of reports, at least one of the disputants was using drugs and alcohol.

In the officer survey, respondents reported that drug or alcohol use was often involved in calls. In 30 percent of calls (58), the suspect was using drugs or alcohol; in 23 percent of the calls, the victim was using drugs or alcohol (44).

Although drugs and alcohol may fuel many domestic disputes, common problems are often the primary nexus of the dispute. In the survey of officers, respondents described 12 percent of disputes as arising from problems with money (23), and 22 percent related to the behavior of children (23) or child custody issues (19). For many of the calls (45 percent), officers classified the nature of the dispute as “other” (87). This general category offers little insight into the nature of domestic calls.

## Escalation and Recurrence of Domestic Violence

Although it is widely perceived that domestic violence escalates or increases in severity over time, and there is some evidence of this as was seen in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, the pattern of escalating domestic violence does not seem widespread. An examination of 15 homicides in 2005 showed that three were domestic in nature. The examination also suggested that those arising between domestic partners could not have been predicted based on contacts with police.

One homicide resulted when the victim was strangled after a car chase. The victim had no prior incidents listed in KOPS (the Raleigh Police Department’s records management system), and the CAD address check showed only a call about a loud party in 2003. The suspect previously had attempted suicide while living in Raleigh, but was living in Wake Forest at the time of the incident.

Another homicide arose from a conflict between former dating partners. A records check showed that the suspect had no prior arrests and CAD history of the suspect’s address showed no prior calls. The victim had several prior contacts with police and had reported larceny from motor vehicle and flimflam. There were no domestic calls or reports. CAD history showed that the victim had experienced harassing telephone calls, a burglary, and a domestic at the victim’s address but none of these calls involved the suspect.

In a third 2005 homicide, two dating partners were involved. Neither had any call or records history with the Raleigh Police Department.

Examining patterns of escalation might shed light on the escalation of some types of domestic violence. As the example in Table 3.7 illustrated, the nature of the call classification is not as important as the frequency of calls for police service. When calls become more numerous and closer in time, regardless of the nature of the call, this may be an indicator of escalation.

Analysis of 1,621 cases in the 2004 domestic violence database showed that most victims (85 percent) are one-time victims. A total of 1,478 victims were involved in 1,621 incidents. While 92 percent of victims were involved in only one incident,

8 percent were victims in multiple incidents and were victims in 16 percent (260) of the total domestic violence cases. Repeat victimization was most common for vandalism, with 21 percent of victims being victimized again during the year. Because of the problems with the time window discussed earlier, these estimates of repeat victimization probably underestimate the total amount substantially.

Examining repeat victimization also overlooks recurrent incidents in which the victim and suspect change roles. Among 149 domestic violence arrests in January 2005, 80 percent (120) were unique suspects who did not reoffend during the month. In eight cases, there were dual arrests, resulting in two incident reports and two arrests.

During the month, there were repeat offenses at three addresses between the same disputants, but the disputants were separated in time. At one address, the same offender assaulted two victims, resulting in two arrests. In three separate arrests (at two different addresses), the same three disputants were involved. A female was the suspect in the first incident, but a victim in another incident at another address 5 days later. She was again a victim of a simple assault by a different suspect 2 days later at the same address as the second incident. It seems clear that for some disputants, domestic violence continues over time and the role of the disputants as victim and offender change over time. In many cases, third parties are victimized, but may also offend.

The officer survey showed that many domestic disputants had prior police contact and were well-known by officers. Although police didn't know about prior contact in about one-third of calls (33.3 percent), the disputants had extensive prior police contact in 12 percent of calls and some prior contact in 30.7 percent of calls.<sup>23</sup> When known by the responding officer (128 calls), 17 percent had extensive police contact, 46 percent had some prior police contact, and 37 percent had no prior police contact. In 10 of 182 calls, officers knew there were protective orders in place, outstanding warrants, or both.

## Domestic Violence Prosecution

As arrest has become a more common outcome of domestic violence incidents, it is critical to examine prosecution and conviction rates. Analysis of 55 persons arrested for domestic violence assaults in January 2005 (MI) showed that there was much variation in prosecution and conviction. The Wake County District Attorney has a specialized domestic violence unit that prosecutes misdemeanor cases. Of 55 arrests, there were dispositions in 38 cases (66 percent of 55 arrests) within 11 months. Only 25 defendants (66 percent) of the 38 arrested were prosecuted (see Table 3.15).<sup>24</sup> Among the 25 defendants prosecuted, 21 (84 percent) were found guilty, and four were not guilty.

There were distinct differences between the defendants according to their time in custody. Most of the suspects (48 or 87 percent) were taken into custody at Wake County Jail. Six defendants were issued a citation and there was one outstanding warrant. On average, these cases took 114 days from arrest to disposition, but the disposition time ranged from 22 days to 298 days.

<sup>23</sup>This question permitted officers to subjectively define prior police contact as extensive, some prior, no prior, or don't know.

<sup>24</sup>Nine defendants were pending, most awaiting trial in Superior Court, while eight cases were deferred.

For about half of defendants (21 or 55 percent), disposition time was more than 90 days and up to 298 days. For 45 percent of the defendants, the disposition time was relatively short, occurring within 22 to 64 days. Some of these defendants remained in custody until their court date, but on average, these defendants spent 29 days in jail. Most (15 or 88 percent) were prosecuted. In contrast, defendants with a long disposition time spent an average of 2.2 days in jail, but only 48 percent (10) of these defendants were prosecuted. Without any explanatory data, these findings suggest that defendants who do not remain in custody, and delay their adjudication, are less likely to be prosecuted.

Among all defendants, many (22 of 55 or 40 percent) reoffended and many did so prior to their court disposition; the likelihood of reoffending prior to disposition reflected the length of time between arrest and disposition. No defendants with a short disposition time reoffended prior to disposition, primarily because most were in custody. After disposition, 41 percent of the “short dispo” defendants (7 of 17) committed another domestic violence offense. Among the “long disposition” defendants, 4 of 21 (19 percent) were arrested for another domestic violence offense prior to their disposition, possible because they were not in custody. A similar number of long disposition cases reoffended domestic violence after the court disposition. Among the nine pending cases, four (44 percent) reoffended prior to disposition. Overall, five of the domestic violence suspects reoffended but the offenses were not related to domestic violence.

Although the District Attorney has a “no-drop” policy, it is not clear how many cases are prosecuted, and what prosecutorial success is related to cases. Although Raleigh Police Department personnel are often aware of the progress of a case, such as when crisis counselors accompany a victim to court or officers are subpoenaed to testify, there is no evidence that the department evaluates the outcome of domestic violence arrests. Prosecution and conviction rates, however, provide an important measure of the effectiveness of police efforts.

In many jurisdictions, assaults among acquaintances are among the least prosecuted cases; however, specialized prosecution and police units sometimes improve prosecution and conviction rates.

In the officer survey, Raleigh police widely perceived that many domestic violence cases are not prosecuted. Their perceptions are largely supported by the prosecution data showing that 40 percent are not. The problem may be with the victim or with the prosecutor. Even when arrests occurred (50), many officers (36 percent) felt that prosecution was unlikely. Among the 130 calls reported by officers, police felt that 76 percent of the disputants were likely to remain together. And police anticipated further involvement with the disputants: they felt that with 69 percent of respondents (132), police would be called to return to the address and resolve another incident; and 33

percent felt that it was very likely that police would return. Only 12.5 percent (24) felt that it was very unlikely that the police would return. Domestic violence cases may lack evidence, such as photographs of injuries or property damage, or third-party witness.

	#People	Days to disposition	Total jail days	Average jail days	Prosecuted	Guilty	Reoffend			
							Domestic Violence pre-trial	Domestic Violence post-trial	Not DV	Overall
Cases dispo'd	38	4,315 (114 average)	530	14	25 (66%)	21 (84%)	9 (24%)	8 (15%)	5 (9%)	22/55 (40%)
Long disposition	21	92-298	46	2.2	10 (48%)	9 <sup>26</sup> (90%)	4 (19%)	1 (5%)	3 (14%)	8/21 (38%)
Short disposition	17	22-65	484	29	15 (88%)	12 (80%)	0	7 (41%)	0	7/17 (41%)
Pending	9	N/a	27	3	N/a	N/a	4 (44%)	N/a	1 (11%)	5/9 (56%)
Deferred	8	N/a	41	5	8	N/a	1 13%		1 (11%)	2/8 (25%)

**Table 3.15.** Disposition of January 2005 Domestic Violence Arrests for Assault.<sup>25</sup>

The analysis of prosecution suggests that while slightly more than half of domestic violence defendants (55 percent) are prosecuted; nearly as many are not. Regardless of prosecution, 62 percent of defendants (34 of 55 defendants) commit and are arrested for another domestic violence offense, and more than half of these offenses occur before the initial domestic violence arrest is adjudicated.

## Alternative Police Strategies

Arrest was not the only strategy used by police officers. They used a variety of other strategies including mediation, separation, warning, transporting, and making referrals (see Table 3.16).

<sup>25</sup>Based on January arrests recorded in the domestic violence database.

<sup>26</sup>Five of these offenders were found guilty and two were not. Only four defendants were found not guilty and half of them reoffended in domestic violence.

Strategy <sup>27</sup>	Used	Most effective	Least effective
Completed report	51.6%	11.5%	24.5%
Mediated	35.4%	18.8%	9.9%
Separated disputants	32.3%	22.4%	5.2%
Provided other advice, such as eviction or child custody	27.6%	13.5%	
Arrest suspect	28.1% (54)	16.1%	2.6%
Arrest both	7.3% (14)	6.8%	1%
Advised/counseled victim	22%	2.6%	6.8%
Verbal warning	14.6%	4.4%	10.9%
Advised protective order	14.6%	1.5%	5.7%
Made a referral	13.5%	2.1%	8.3%
Advised warrant	8%	.5%	.5%
Transported someone	5.7%		1%
Other/missing			23.6%

**Table 3.16.** Strategies Used by Police.

Despite their use of these strategies, police did not feel that all were effective. In particular, most officers did not feel that completing a report was an effective strategy. Some other resources that police officers felt would have been helpful included social services, mental health, drug and alcohol treatment, or a domestic violence specialist (see Table 3.17).

Other Helpful Resources	
Domestic violence specialist	17.2%
Social or family services	19.8%
Drug/alcohol treatment	16.7%
Mental health services	12%
Money	2.1%
Education	13.5%
Friends/family	10.4%
Church	7.8%
Other	6.8%
Nothing	34.4%

**Table 3.17.** Resources Used in Domestic Violence Responses.

Responses for strategies used and most effective strategy do not sum to 100 percent because respondents entered multiple responses.

## Accuracy of Dispatch

In the officer survey, 90 of 194 respondents (46 percent) said dispatch had assigned the correct call class to their domestic-related call, while 104 said the wrong call class had been assigned. Of calls that were initially classified as domestic, 73 were correct while 92 were not correct. Of 92 calls initially but erroneously classified as domestic, the correct call class was one of the following:

- » Disturbance (50)
- » TWO (18)
- » Request for service (6)
- » Noise, refuse to leave, trespass, check in EMS, and threats.

Of note, two 911 calls were initially classified as hang-ups; one of these was a domestic and the other was a disturbance.

Officer responses suggest that dispatchers are conservative in call classifications and avoided the general classifications:

- » Dispatchers classified only eight calls with the disturbance or TWO class. Officers added 51 disturbances, 19 TWO, and 5 request for service.
- » Only four calls that were not initially classified as domestic should have been: this included one of the 911 hang-ups, a fight, and 2 TWO calls.

Only five calls appeared to escalate; that is, the dispatcher underclassified or the situation escalated and the calls were cleared as serious crimes (assault, assault on female, stabbing). One call came in as domestic, cleared as stabbing; two calls, cleared as assault, one came in as break-in, the other as fight; two calls came in as domestic, cleared as assault on female.

Dispatchers appeared to provide important information to officers on many calls, including information about the relationship of the parties (63.5 percent), complainant (52 percent), weapons (50 percent), nature of the dispute (41 percent), other people on the scene (39 percent), and injuries. Information was seldom provided for drug or alcohol involvement (10.4 percent) or prior police contact (4.7 percent).

## Officer Perceptions of Domestic Violence and Victims

Based on the survey, many police officers are frustrated by the unwillingness or inability of the victim to take steps to resolve the situation: 95 percent of officers believe that many domestic-related problems could be solved if the victim would leave the offender. Based on their recent calls, 8 percent of officers advised victims to secure warrants (16) but 62 percent felt that the victim would not follow through. Similarly, in 15 percent of cases, officers advised victims to secure protective orders (28) but 64 percent felt victims were unlikely to follow through.

Although it seems that domestic calls would be frustrating for officers, many officers have a neutral view of the outcome of the domestic-related calls:

- » 40 percent of officers viewed the call neutrally; 22 percent expressed that they just settled things and left, and 17.7 percent of officers said the situation was resolved.
- » While 3.6 percent of officers were annoyed or frustrated with the call, nearly one-fourth of officers (24 percent) felt that police involvement was not necessary and 13 percent felt that the victim was unlikely to follow advice.
- » 5.7 percent of officers were concerned about the victim's safety.

Most officers (84.3 percent) believe that most domestic calls do not involve a crime; 75 percent of officers believe most domestic calls are between family members, not intimate partners. Nearly all respondents (95 percent or 182) agreed that: "Many disturbance and domestic calls come from family members or domestic partners who repeatedly call the police and even rely on police to settle their disagreements." The survey findings suggest that there are important distinctions between family disturbances that are often noncriminal and crimes involving intimate partners.

## Organizational Impact of Analysis

Public safety problems increasingly do not fit easily into the neat boxes of UCR codes. Because call classifications, crime types, and criminal charges use unique classifications that are not consistent, emerging problems such as cyber crime and gang-related crimes are not easily and consistently counted across data sources.

The domestic violence analysis determined that calls are an unreliable measure of domestic violence; the analysis also revealed that cases identified as domestic violence are also unreliable. Some "cases" are double-counted, that is, an offender in one incident is charged twice, so two crimes are counted although the two incidents occurred at the same location and were committed by the same offender. None of the domestic violence databases contained consistent numbers of cases and there was no way to detect the source of data error.

For example, repeat analysis of the 2004 domestic violence database (ST4) reported 94 incidents of vandalism. The repeat analysis reported that 74 incidents (79 percent of the total) were reported by one-time victims. If so, there would be 20 additional vandalism reports by no more than 10 victims, assuming that each experienced exactly two incidents. Instead, the analysis reports that 20 victims suffered repeat incidents. Obviously, 20 incidents spread among 20 victims do not indicate repeat victimization.

Another major limitation of the domestic violence database is that victims and offenders are presumed to remain consistent in their roles. Limited analysis of January 2005 arrests show that victims and offenders often switch roles and also victimize persons other than their partner. The data suggest that a perception of domestic violence as male suspects battering intimate partners is a myth. Much domestic

violence is not among partners, women are frequently domestic violence offenders, only half of domestic violence incidents are assaults, and there is a range of other criminal and noncriminal behaviors among persons in domestic relationships. Perhaps the most important finding is that domestic calls do not routinely, and in fact rarely, appear to escalate in severity. Thus, police preoccupation with attending to all “victims” of domestic calls suggests that many “victims” are receiving too much police attention and become increasingly dependent on police. It is resource-intensive for officers to complete reports on all domestic calls, and it is even more resource-intensive to recontact and offer assistance for all domestic calls. There is much evidence that the Raleigh Police Department could be more effective by prioritizing some calls, and in some jurisdictions this prioritization occurs after multiple calls have occurred. By spreading police resources too thin, there is a greater risk of escalation among some callers than others. To prioritize callers, the police department must establish a routine and reliable process for examining and identifying repeat calls. This analysis should not rely exclusively on address, but also include victim and suspect name.

There is also an opportunity to increase the reach of domestic violence analysis by involving other jurisdictions in Wake County in the analysis. Because of the increasing mobility within Wake County and commuting patterns, victims and offenders may move between jurisdictions, masking chronic patterns of victimization. In recent years, several domestic violence homicides committed in Raleigh involved victims and suspects who lived outside Raleigh but in Wake County. Since Raleigh is the largest municipality in the county, the Raleigh Police Department may need to take a lead role in creating a domestic violence victim-suspect database to ensure that recurrent or escalating incidents are not overlooked by police.

The analysis of domestic violence in this study was not conclusive, but one important finding is the progression and attrition of domestic calls, incident reports, arrests, prosecution, and conviction (see Table 3.18).

911 called 100 calls classified domestic
78 calls classified domestic (final class) (78% of initial calls)
49 incident reports written (63% of calls)
27 crime reports written (54% of reports)
16 arrests made (68% of crimes)
10 defendants prosecuted (64% of arrests)
9 defendants found guilty (86% of prosecuted cases)
6 defendants reoffend (63% of prosecuted cases)

**Table 3.18.** Outcome of 100 Domestic Calls.

Its primary contribution is to highlight important limitations of existing data and analytic practices. The analysis process, however, has suggested important changes in policy and police management practices that could improve analysis of crime and public safety problems in the city. These include the following:

RPD has no routine method for monitoring the handling of problems by other agencies; for example, the Raleigh Police Department cannot examine the validity of calls dispatched by Wake County Emergency Communications System, examine the disposition of cases by the Wake County District Attorney, or identify incidents involving Raleigh Police Department suspects in neighboring jurisdictions. To measure police effectiveness, these data must be reliable and accessible across cooperating organizations.

The Raleigh Police Department monitors increases and decreases in the number of incidents, and arrest and clearance rates to determine its effectiveness. There is no other routine method to measure the effectiveness of police efforts or the quality of its efforts. At a minimum, the Raleigh Police Department should routinely monitor prosecution and conviction rates for domestic violence and other incidents. This issue is critical for proactive police investigations. Although it requires additional effort, the department can develop ways to evaluate the effectiveness of specialized units, and monitor changes in public safety problems that do not fit in conventional crime categories. The domestic violence unit currently reports on the number of warrants, use of force, cases assigned, reports and supplements filed, contacts attempted and made, and other counts that reflect police activity more so than effectiveness.

The Raleigh Police Department is reliant on standard data sources—calls, incident reports, arrests, collisions—and has not developed data-collection systems that might be informative. If existing data and measures are not meaningful, the police department needs to develop unique measures and routinize their use.

The Raleigh Police Department's crime analysts have focused primarily on pattern detection, such as identifying series offenses and providing information that can guide tactical responses and lead to apprehension. But many emerging problems do not relate to single offenders, and the police department's crime analysis can play an important role in analyzing problems for which enforcement will have limited impact. The Raleigh Police Department has used some of these strategic analyses, such as for analysis of false alarms, problems at bars and nightclubs, problems at rental housing, and for shootings. The practice of such analysis, however, is not routine or widespread in the agency. Since domestic calls are such a large portion of police workload, efforts should be made to develop meaningful measures and the unit may need a dedicated crime analyst to develop these procedures.

## Add Key Data Elements

The Raleigh Police Department has already taken some steps to improve data and measurement for domestic violence. The department does not have its own dispatching system; it is operated by Wake County. As such, the department does not control the communications system and emergency call classifications and must use the UCR classifications established by the FBI's UCR system. The department, however, can add additional data variables to KOPS, its records management system. The RMS is accessed from patrol vehicles as officers complete reports on their mobile data terminals. To improve the quality and reliability of data for domestic violence, the Raleigh Police Department added a report tab for officers to complete for all incident reports recorded in the agency's KOPS. For any incident between domestic partners or family members, the responding officer can note the relationship between the victim and suspect.

To improve their ability to identify and analyze the nature of the relationship between victims and suspects, the police department added a tab to its reports specifying a range of relationships that can be recorded for any type of offense or incident report. The relationships listed are consistent with those listed in the FBI's homicide supplement, including intimate partner relationships, such as boyfriend, husband, spouse, and family relationships, including, for example, parent, child, aunts, grandparents. The tab further permits officers to distinguish whether victim and offender are in a current relationship or estranged, note the involvement of drugs and alcohol, and describe the origin of the dispute, such as money or children. These data variables permit the department to analyze a wide range of criminal and noncriminal incidents, but this analysis can take place only when incident reports are submitted by officers. Call data will not permit this level of relationship analysis.

While the victim-suspect relationship is recorded in reports by many law enforcement agencies, anecdotal evidence suggests that officers do not routinely record suspect information in report blocks. While this information is routinely included in the officer's narrative report, officers are conservative in labeling suspects, particularly when the suspect information is provided by the victim or a third-party witness.

## Assist Patrol Officers

For patrol officers, domestic violence is a high-volume problem and it is probably the most common call for service in the city. Since policy requires two officers to respond to these calls, a vast amount of the Raleigh Police Department's resources are dedicated to domestic violence. Although the department's domestic violence unit has an important role in assisting victims, it is responding officers who have the primary interaction with victims. Responding officers need much support to enable them to respond most

effectively to domestic calls. Officers need information about warrants, protective orders, and prior call history. It would be useful to have these addresses flagged by dispatcher. Further, officers need feedback about the calls they are handling.

While it has been suggested that, to reduce report writing, incident reports should not be written for domestic calls when there is no crime, this practice should be evaluated. Officers state that many calls classified as domestic are actually disturbance calls between family members who repeatedly call and come to rely on police to settle minor verbal disputes. Callers who abuse police services in this way do not need victim assistance, but should be discouraged from calling the police repeatedly.

Based on analysis of the June 2005 domestic calls, one-third generated no report, and half of the reports generated noted that no crime had been committed. It may be reasonable to record these calls by having officers record remarks in the CAD system. Eliminating these reports would relieve the reporting burden on officers and provide them with additional time to produce quality reports carefully documenting domestic violence crimes.

Further, officers may need specialized assistance in dealing with chronic nuisance callers, who call police when under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or when they want their significant other to leave the premises. In some cases, these chronic callers could best be served by alcohol counselors or social services.

## Reduce Reliance on CAD

The analysis of domestic violence suggests that “domestic” calls are not a reliable measure of the amount of domestic violence reported to the Raleigh Police Department. Tracking the volume of domestic offenses using calls recorded in CAD is invariably flawed; the most serious domestic situations are not coded as domestic in CAD. This creates a reliance on the KOPS record management system to obtain a domestic violence history using the name of the subject involved. CAD also does not indicate what type of report was written, which makes it difficult to determine how many crimes have actually occurred between two parties. A better integrated CAD and KOPS system would eliminate the need to generate a report for each domestic situation and provide a better working system of tracking repeat domestic violence before serious incidents escalate.

## Compare Initial and Final Call Classes

Analyzing domestic violence in the Raleigh Police Department raised concerns that officers might reclassify domestic calls to avoid writing an incident report. While analysis showed that officers often reclassify domestic calls as a disturbance, request for service, or talk with officer, there is no indication that this is done systematically to avoid a greater workload. Instead, reclassification of calls sheds important light on the loss of information and the reliability of dispatchers for correctly classifying calls

for Raleigh officers. For example, numerous calls are initially classified as 911 hang-ups, and the domestic violence analysis showed that many of these calls occurred at addresses with domestic problems or disturbances. When these calls are reclassified, important information is lost about the relationship between initial and final call classification. Similarly, dispatch records calls as alarm calls, and these are often reclassified by officers as false alarms. By reviewing only the final call classifications, police are unable to determine how many calls initiated as alarms are actually “true activations,” that is, that a crime has actually occurred.

The Raleigh Police Department should seek to obtain and compare both the initial and the final call disposition. These data may reveal that dispatchers are erroneously classifying calls to officers. They also provide an important source of information about the progress of a call from dispatch to clearance by the officer for domestic violence and for other calls.

Further, the department should evaluate the prevalence of very general call categories, such as TWO and request for service. These classifications are extremely vague and reduce the usefulness of call data for both workload and crime analysis. These general classifications should be examined to ensure that important public safety trends are not masked by the classification scheme. Similarly, every effort should be made to ensure that call classifications are “mutually exclusive;” that is, a call should be classified reliably as one nature rather than into numerous categories. Ensuring this type of reliability in data is critical in developing methods of measuring police effectiveness.

Although the department does not operate the dispatching system, calls for service classifications should be reviewed periodically to determine if dispatchers are classifying calls classes correctly, if calls are escalating prior to officer arrival, and if dispatchers are providing accurate information.

## Improve Data Quality

The domestic violence analysis determined that calls are an unreliable measure of the extent of domestic violence in Raleigh, but cases identified as domestic violence are also unreliable. The department’s Family Violence Intervention Unit maintains a database on cases that are assigned to the unit. Unfortunately, the purpose for maintaining the database is not clear. The data appear primarily to provide summary reports of the unit’s activities, such as reviewing the number of cases.

The database contains all domestic violence cases assigned to the unit since 2002. The dataset comprises 11 variables: case number, date reported, UCR classification, incident location, date and time incident occurred, victim and suspect name, district, beat, and status (cleared by arrest, exceptionally cleared, pending, etc.).

Some personnel described the database as being useful in case assignment, ensuring, for example, that a repeat victim is assigned to the officer. There is no evidence that the database has been used to evaluate the effectiveness of the unit, monitor cases, or to conduct any type of analysis. To be most useful, the purpose of the domestic violence database should be carefully articulated to shed light on perceptions of domestic violence in Raleigh. It is widely perceived that domestic incidents escalate and while they certainly can, variables in the database should provide evidence of this, indicating for example, a progression in the severity of injuries over time. Analysis suggested that it is the frequency of calls—the time between recurrent calls—that may be as important as the severity or nature of the individual calls.

Analysis indicates that the domestic violence database has major problems:

- » Poor data quality is reflected by numerous data entry errors.
- » Data are not current, particularly case status and arrest information.
- » Data are poorly formatted for detecting patterns because names and addresses are not entered consistently.
- » Data are poor for identity resolution, and cannot distinguish persons with similar names or cases when victims may change their names.
- » There are a limited number of variables in the data and important additional variables would be useful for analysis and identifying patterns.

These data limitations are not unexpected. Studies have found that when data are not routinely used in a meaningful way, the quality is often poor. Since the purpose of the domestic violence database is not well known and analysis limited, there has been no reason to require that data have integrity and are reliable.

It is likely that improvements could be made, as review of the data revealed numerous data entry errors and data that were not current. Further, additional data variables would be useful for strategic analysis of domestic violence.

### **Data Consistency**

Data in the domestic violence database should be of consistent quality and entered in a timely way. The Raleigh domestic violence database contained more than 4,800 entries. When a database becomes this large it becomes difficult to find specific information when it is not entered in a consistent manner. The Raleigh domestic violence database contained numerous cases where the dates entered in the database were entered incorrectly. Similarly, street addresses were not entered consistently; victim and suspect names were misspelled or recorded differently. In one case, for example, a victim's name was listed as Susie, and in another case, Susan. This creates difficulties in analysis. One example follows.

Crime Location	Date Occurred	Time	Victim	Suspect	Arrest	Officer
107 S. Peanut St.	5/21/05	2257	Lorch, Shelia	Everette, Kenneth M.	Y	Nugent
108 S. Peanut St.	4/03/05	1105	Lorch, Sheila	Everette, Kenneth	Y	Layman

**Table 3.19.** Inconsistent Database Entries.

Most of these problems may be eliminated in the event of making separate columns for victims' and suspects' last, first, and middle names as well as separate columns for the numbers and streets in the database. It is extremely important to enter the subjects' names and street addresses consistently and correctly because database programs can miss important data because of such errors.

Data entry was particularly inconsistent when it involved a juvenile subject. Numerous entries have the word juvenile entered while in other examples the cell was left blank. The word juvenile should always be entered to fill in the blank cell. Race, sex, and age should still be entered regardless of whether the subject is a juvenile or adult.

Often, case status in the database was not current. It appears that the status was entered initially, but data were not updated to reflect the current status.

The domestic violence database could be used more powerfully to detect repeat victims and offenders, repeat addresses, and to measure the effectiveness of the unit and patrol officers in handling domestic violence. Some additional data should be added to the database and some modifications should be made to the current database.

Crime location should be separated into separate columns, for the house or apartment numbers, and a separate column for the name of the street. This makes it more efficient for sorting purposes. Analysts can concatenate columns for mapping, if necessary.

The complete names of victims and suspects should be entered into separate columns for each of their names: one column for the last name, another for the first, and so on, to make it easier to sort and match victim and suspect names.

### **Additional Data Elements**

Depending on the articulated purpose of the domestic violence database, additional variables should be entered, such as the following:

- » Type of location (victim's or suspect's residence, or residence of both)
- » Type of premise, such as multifamily or single-family property
- » Residence owned or rented; joint ownership of property
- » Day of week of the offense
- » Severity of injuries
- » Cooperative victim
- » Victim and suspect race, ethnicity, sex, and date of birth.

Further variables should be added about the victim and suspect, including these:

- » The relationship between victim and suspect
- » If disputants are in a current relationship or estranged
- » If disputants live together
- » Children in common
- » If there are witnesses to incidents, including whether children are present.
- » Case status should include, if an arrest occurs, the date of arrest and type of arrest (physical or citation), and whether more than one arrest occurred. Fields should be added to the database for protective orders and warrants.

The precise type of variables included should relate to perceptions about domestic violence cases, for example, family violence may be episodic while intimate partner violence escalates; persons who own property or have children in common may be more likely to repeat and less likely to separate. The most useful database will contain variables that permit domestic violence personnel to test and confirm their perceptions, and shed light on prioritizing cases and delivering the most effective interventions.

## Improve Repeat Victimization Analysis

Repeat victimization analysis provides an important measure of effectiveness. It is well established that domestic violence offenders exhibit a high rate of recidivism and victims exhibit a high rate of repeat victimization. Police data in West Yorkshire, U.K., showed that 42 percent of domestic violence incidents within a single year were repeat offenses; one-third of domestic violence offenders were responsible for two-thirds of all incidents of domestic violence.<sup>28</sup> Much repeat victimization occurs quickly after the initial incident. West Yorkshire police found that about 15 percent of all repeat incidents occurred within 24 hours of the initial offense. A similar study in Merseyside, U.K., found that 35 percent of repeats occurred within 5 weeks of an initial incident.<sup>29</sup>

The Raleigh Police Department routinely runs repeat call histories on addresses reporting domestic violence, but the call history is for only the preceding 28 days. A retrospective call history should be run on all addresses, victims, and offenders to detect call history for a longer period, perhaps up to 12 months, and may provide the most reliable picture of the disputants' history and thus the best window into their future violence. Increasing the time frame or "time window" for detecting repeats will provide a more reliable measure of repeat victimization. As seen in the domestic violence analysis, a short time window of 28 days misses much of the pattern occurring at certain addresses.

Repeat call analysis should not be based exclusively on address. Street address is used as the unit of analysis for detecting repeat victimization. But addresses often lack precision, such as the failure to include an apartment unit or building number for the

<sup>28</sup>Hamner, Griffiths, and Jerwood, 1999,

<sup>29</sup>Lloyd, Farrell, and Pease, 1994,

address of a multifamily premise. Further, analysis shows that recurrent domestic calls between the same two disputants are often recorded at different locations. While address should be used to identify repeat incidents, both the name of the victim and that of the offender should also be used to detect repeats.

Repeat call analysis should examine the changing role of disputants in domestic violence. In a substantial number of domestic reports, both disputants are arrested, meaning that each disputant is both the victim and the suspect. Further, repeat analysis shows that victims and offenders often change roles; that is, a person who is the victim in a domestic incident one week may be the suspect the next week. Further, research suggests that some victims are serial victims, who may be victimized by more than one offender; similarly, some offenders are serial offenders, who victimize different people over time. Thus, analysis should continue to monitor domestic violence by address, but should also identify repeat persons.

As a major indicator of effectiveness, the domestic violence unit can evaluate what proportion of new cases relate to repeat victims, offenders, addresses, or any combination of these. Ideally, we would not be able to predict domestic violence because it would not recur; that is, victims would not be subjected to sustained violence over time. Of course, that is not the case and this is why domestic violence is the most predictable offense that police address.

## Reduce General Classifications

Many of the counts of crime in Raleigh are composed of very general categories that mask important types of offenses; for example, two offense categories (Miscellaneous and All Other) comprise 48 percent of all Part II Crime and 28 percent of all crime reports. Since “other” will include very different types of incidents, analysis of “other” is not very useful for police. Although it is not required by UCR, efforts should be made to monitor subcategories for these two offense groups. In particular, offenses such as threats, harassment, and violation of 50B order should be clearly identified and the counts monitored. Miscellaneous reports comprised 18 percent (7,236) of all incident reports in 2003 (40,028).

## Distinguish Types of Domestic Violence

Research in the Raleigh Police Department suggests that there are important subsets of domestic violence, and they may require different police responses. Analysis suggests that there are at least three distinct types of domestic violence:

1. Some domestic violence escalates in severity over time. Although infrequent, it dominates the concerns of police managers about responding to domestic violence.
2. Much domestic violence does not escalate and it appears to be a one-time event or episodic over time.

3. Much domestic violence appears to be noncriminal and nonviolent in nature, and suggests that some victims may be more accurately classified as disputants, who become overly reliant on police to mediate their personal problems.

It is not clear that all domestic violence cases fall into these categories, but many do. The distinctions between the types present conflict for police officers. Even when domestic violence appears to be escalating and becoming more severe, police have few options. While police can encourage victims, they cannot make victims take protective steps, such as securing a warrant or protective order.

Crime analysis can be used to identify high-risk victims and offenders. Although the Raleigh Police Department has a professional domestic violence unit, the key to good handling of domestic violence is the initial responding officer. Data should be used more routinely to identify high-risk dyads, establish a mechanism for monitoring these dyads, and consider involving other more appropriate resources, such as social service or mental health providers.

Many cases classified as domestic violence in Raleigh do not appear to reflect violence, threats, or other criminal behavior or fear of such behavior but to reflect a pattern of citizens abusing police services. Many citizens in Raleigh call the police when there is no emergency. In 2004, there were more than 13,000 calls classified as “Talk With Officer” and many of these calls were initially classified as domestic.

Raleigh police may have become so attentive to domestic disputes that people come to rely on the police to solve family or interpersonal disputes, a phenomenon that Raleigh Lieutenant Miller labeled as “Failure to Cope.” The prevalence of the failure to cope is reflected in the growing contribution of “miscellaneous” incidents in Raleigh’s workload. Miscellaneous reports are the second most common type of reported incident for Raleigh, exceeded only by larceny.

## Measure Effectiveness

Arrests or case clearances are an appropriate measure of effectiveness for many crimes. The Raleigh Police Department reports that it clears approximately 68 percent of aggravated assaults, contrasted to the national clearance rate of around 60 percent. Since 40 percent of aggravated assaults in Raleigh are domestic (ABL), and the offender known to the victim, clearance rates (arrests relative to offenses) are likely not the best measure of police effectiveness.

Domestic cases are very different from other crime cases, such as robbery and burglary. In most investigative cases, the identity of suspects is not known to the victim; therefore, the key goal of the investigation is to identify and locate an offender, and then collect evidence to justify an arrest and prosecution. To measure investigative effectiveness, police often monitor case clearances, and may examine prosecution and conviction rates.

Domestic cases are quite different because the crimes committed involve a suspect known to the victim. These cases routinely have a witness, although this may often be the victim. And many of these cases may have physical evidence such as a bruise, puncture, or property damage. The victim often knows where the suspect lives, or can provide information for locating the suspect, such as a place of employment or a residence. The offender may even reside with the victim. Just as robbery is more often cleared than burglary, domestic cases are much more likely to be cleared by arrest, and are more likely to be cleared quickly, such as on the scene or shortly after the offense is reported.

In contrast to crimes committed by strangers, many domestic victims do not want the offender arrested. Such victims may impede police efforts to make arrests and are uncooperative witnesses. Some important variables influence the likelihood of arrest, victim satisfaction with police, and may also affect prosecution.

- » Need to clearly distinguish cases cleared by arrest, noting whether citation or physical arrest.
- » Need to clearly distinguish cases cleared on the scene.
- » Need to distinguish if victim is cooperative.
- » Need to distinguish the nature and duration of prior history, including calls for service and crimes.
- » Need to distinguish if injuries have occurred, and rate extent of injuries.
- » Need to distinguish if evidence is discernible, such as property damage or visible injuries.
- » Need to distinguish if there are third-party witnesses, including children.
- » Need to distinguish the role of alcohol and drugs; mental health problems; supportive environment such as other persons who can assist the victim, and so forth.

## Monitor Prosecution and Conviction Rates

While domestic violence cases may be more likely to be cleared by arrest than offenses between strangers, evidence suggests that such cases are less likely to be prosecuted. Uncooperative victims are one reason for low prosecution rates. But the likelihood of prosecution is also affected by the absence of evidence (photographs or property damage) and third-party witnesses. Regardless of the reason for not prosecuting, police need to get routine feedback on their cases. While the arrest may be sufficient punishment to deter future offending, some cases can be improved. For domestic violence and all other offenses, prosecution and conviction rates should be monitored routinely.

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## Appendix 3A: Data Sources for Domestic Violence Analysis

Code	Data type	Time period	Variables	Amount	Problems
BR1	2004 Domestic Violence cases by District	2004	Count of Domestic Violence cases assigned by district	1,819	Number of cases differs from ST4
BR2	2005 Domestic calls and Reports	1/1/05-2/13/05 (6 weeks)	Count of Domestic Violence calls and reports	428 calls, 158 reports	Six weeks data Calls are domestic not Domestic Violence Report type unknown
LM1	Arrests, Assault on Female	January 2005	Arrest date, suspect name, address, race, ethnicity, DOB LCR #, LCR description, charge	97 arrests	Poor data source, misses all female offenders, most assault on female not domestic
LM2	Simple and aggravated assaults	2000-2004	Month, number	Four years, by month	
MI	Domestic Violence assault arrests, time in custody, prosecution, conviction	January 2005	Case #, date reported, UCR, UCR descript, crime location, date occurred, time, victim and suspect name	149 cases # people?	Each case listed; if dual arrest, two cases listed
ST1	Domestic Violence Related cases District 24	2004	UCR, count, case status	850	
ST2	RPD Calls for Service	2004	Call type, count, district	199,968	
ST3	Reclassified Calls for Service	June 2004	Initial and final call classification	11,402	
ST4	Domestic Violence Cases	2004	Incident type, count, repeat v. one-time victim	1,621	Seems to be an error in computation of repeats
ST5	Sample analysis repeat Domestic Violence calls and addresses/District 24, sample cases	2004	Call history		Not representative
DW	Officer survey	June 2005	Recent domestic call, characteristics, views on DV	192 responses	
ABL	Incident reports	2004	Counts: Homicide, rape, aggravated assaults Sample: Simple assaults, residential burglary, disorderly conduct, vandalism, misc.	Varied by offense type	
M1	Domestic calls, incident reports	June 2005	Counts, incident type, arrest, victim and suspect relationship, gender, race, type housing, caller,	333 calls, 209 reports	
M2	Homicides	2005	Identified relationship between victim and suspect	15/3 Domestic Violence	Incomplete year

## Appendix 3B: Officer Survey

### RPD Officer Survey about Disturbance and Domestic Calls

#### Part I: Information about a Recent Call

For the first part of this survey, think about recent calls to which you have been dispatched. In particular, think about your most recent 911 call that involved persons in a domestic relationship. Consider calls of any nature, whether verbal dispute, TWO, burglary, 911 hang-up, assault or anything else. Use your memory of this specific call to answer the following questions.

1. How was the call classified by dispatch?  
\_\_\_\_\_ 10 code or abbreviation
2. Was the call classification the most accurate for this call?
  - Yes (Please skip to question 3)
  - No (Please answer a and b)
    - a. How should the call have been classified?  
\_\_\_\_\_ 10 code or abbreviation
    - b. Did you reclassify the call?
      - Yes
      - No (Please answer c)
    - c. Why not? (Check all that apply.)
      - Nature classifications were very similar
      - No case report taken so it wasn't necessary
      - Didn't take the time to do so, or overlooked
      - Didn't have time to add remarks
      - Other (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
3. Think about the types of information the dispatcher provided about the call. Use the following table to check what information was provided.

Type of information....	Dispatcher provided...
a. Description of complainant (e.g., neighbor, child, victim)	Yes No Not applicable to call
b. Relationship of disputants, or victim and suspect	Yes No Not applicable to call
c. Nature of complaint or dispute (e.g., fighting over money)	Yes No Not applicable to call
d. Information about injuries	Yes No Not applicable to call
e. Weapons involved	Yes No Not applicable to call
f. Information about prior police contact	Yes No Not applicable to call
g. Involvement of drugs and/or alcohol	Yes No Not applicable to call
h. Information about persons, such as suspect or children, on the scene	Yes No Not applicable to call
i. Other (Describe: _____ ) _____ )	Yes No Not applicable to call

4. Who called the police?

- Victim, or disputant
- Neighbor
- Child
- Other person in household
- Unknown
- Other (describe: \_\_\_\_\_ )

5. Who was present at the scene? (Check all that apply.)
- Victim (or disputant #1 if no crime)
  - Suspect (or disputant #2 if no crime)
  - Neighbor
  - Child
  - Other (describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
6. Had police previously responded to calls involving the victim, or disputants?
- No prior police contact
  - Some prior police contact, such as a few calls in preceding year
  - Extensive prior police contact, such as many calls in preceding year
  - Don't know
7. Were there any warrants or protective orders related to the victim, or disputants?
- Outstanding warrant(s)
  - Protective order
  - Both of the above
  - None of the above
  - Don't know
8. What factors led to the call? (Check all that apply.)
- Money problems
  - Drug/alcohol use of victim (or disputant #1)
  - Drug/alcohol use of suspect (or disputant #2)
  - Issues related to child custody
  - Problems with behavior of children
  - Other (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
9. What was the call disposition? (Check only one response.)
- Completed as requested (no arrest made and no report taken)
  - Miscellaneous or information report taken (no evidence of crime)
  - Crime report taken
  - Arrest made
  - Unable to locate complainant
  - Warrant advised
  - Other (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)

10. Did another officer respond with you to the call?
- Yes
  - No
  - For part of the call (Explain: \_\_\_\_\_)
11. How long did the call take, from dispatch to clear?
- 15 minutes or less
  - 16-30 minutes
  - 31-45 minutes
  - 46-60 minutes
  - Between one hour and two hours
  - More than two hours
12. How do you feel about the amount of time you spent on the call?
- Too little time
  - The right amount of time
  - Too much time
13. While handling the call, how concerned were you about your safety?
- Very concerned
  - Somewhat concerned
  - Somewhat unconcerned
  - Not concerned at all
14. What actions did you take in handling the call? (Check all that apply.)
- Completed case report
  - Separated disputants/Convinced one to leave
  - Transported victim (or one disputant) to another location
  - Mediated dispute
  - Made verbal warning to suspect
  - Arrested suspect
  - Arrested both disputants
  - Referred victim to services, such as Al-Anon or a shelter
  - Advised and counseled victim about likelihood of recurrence
  - Advised victim to secure warrant
  - Advised victim to secure protective order
  - Other (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)

15. Of the actions you took (#14), which was most effective? (Check only one.)

- Completing an incident report
- Separating disputants/Convincing one disputant to leave
- Transporting victim to another location
- Mediating dispute
- Making verbal warning to suspect
- Arresting suspect
- Arresting both disputants
- Referring victim to services, such as Al-Anon or shelters
- Advising and counseling victim regarding likelihood of recurrence
- Advising victim regarding securing a warrant
- Advising victim regarding protective order
- Other (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)

16. Of the actions you took (#14), which was least effective? (Check only one.)

- Completing an incident report
- Separating disputants/Convincing one disputant to leave
- Transporting victim to another location
- Mediating dispute
- Making verbal warning to suspect
- Arresting suspect
- Arresting both disputants
- Referring victim to services, such as Al-Anon or shelters
- Advising and counseling victim regarding likelihood of recurrence
- Advising victim regarding securing a warrant
- Advising victim regarding protective order
- Other (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)

17. Aside from your response, what additional resources would have been useful in handling the call and/or preventing a recurrence? (Check all that apply)

- Specialized domestic violence responder
- Social or family services
- Drug or alcohol treatment
- Mental health services
- Financial aid
- Education or skill training such as parenting

- Family members or friends
- Church or clergy member
- Other (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
- None of the above

18. If you advised (#14), is it likely that the victim will secure a warrant?

- Victim very likely to secure warrant
- Victim somewhat likely to secure warrant
- Victim somewhat unlikely to secure warrant
- Victim not at all likely to secure warrant
- Not applicable

19. If you advised (#14), is it likely that the victim will secure a protective order?

- Victim very likely to secure protective order
- Victim somewhat likely to secure protective order
- Victim somewhat unlikely to secure protective order
- Victim not at all likely to secure protective order
- Not applicable

20. If an arrest was made (#14), is it likely that the offender will be prosecuted?

- Prosecution very likely
- Prosecution somewhat likely
- Prosecution somewhat unlikely
- Prosecution not at all likely
- Not applicable

21. If you completed a report (#14), was this incident referred to a domestic violence officer?

- Yes (Please go to 22)
- No (Please answer 21a)
- Don't know (Please answer 21a)
- Not applicable (Please go to 22)

21a. Should the incident have been referred to a domestic violence officer?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

22. What was the living arrangement of the disputants, or victim and suspect?

- Living together
- Not living together
- Don't know

23. What was the relationship of the disputants, or victim and suspect?

- Persons in a current or previous intimate relationship (Please go to 23a)
- Family members (Please go to 23b)
- Other (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)

23a. If intimate partners, were they....

- Married
- Divorced, separated or previously married
- Current partners but not married
- Former partners but never married
- Currently dating
- Previously dating
- Other (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)

23b. If family members, were they...

- Parent, or legal guardian, and child (Age of child \_\_\_\_\_)
- Other relatives (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
- Other household members (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)

24. Are the disputants, or victim and suspect, likely to remain in the relationship?

- Very likely to remain
- Somewhat likely to remain
- Somewhat unlikely to remain
- Not at all likely to remain
- Not applicable

25. Is it likely that police will be dispatched to this, or another address, with the same victim and suspect, or disputants, within the next 30 days?

- Very likely
- Somewhat likely
- Somewhat unlikely
- Very unlikely

26. In clearing the call, how did you feel about the outcome? (Check only one box.)

- Irritated, because there was no crime and I had to complete a report
- Annoyed, because the problem should have been settled without police involvement
- No particular feelings, because there was no crime and I just settled things and left
- Satisfied, because I felt the situation was resolved and was unlikely to recur
- Frustrated, knowing the victim was unlikely to follow my advice
- Concerned about the victim, because the situation could repeat or escalate
- Other (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)

## Part II: General Views about Domestic Disturbances and Incidents

27. What training have you had in domestic violence?

- BLET (Year completed \_\_\_\_\_)
- In-service training
- Approx. number of hours \_\_\_\_\_
- Year completed \_\_\_\_\_
- Other (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)

28. How do you feel about the amount of domestic violence training you have received?

- Need much more training
- Need somewhat more training
- The right amount of training
- Too much training

29. How do you feel about the quality of domestic violence training you have received?

- Poor
- Fair
- Good
- Excellent

30. How do you define “domestic violence?” Please be very specific.

31. What has influenced the amount of domestic violence that occurs?

(Check all that apply.)

- Drug and alcohol problems have increased domestic violence
- Culture and behaviors of some immigrant groups has increased domestic violence
- Arresting suspects may increase future violence
- Many victims are financially dependent on offenders
- Judicial system is ineffective in handling domestic violence offenders
- Other (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)

32. What has influenced the amount of domestic violence reported? (Check all that apply.)

- Media has made citizens more aware of domestic violence and more likely to call police
- Making more arrests has increased reporting
- Financial independence makes victims more willing to report domestic violence
- Police attention to victims has increased reporting
- Laws protecting victims makes them more willing to report domestic violence
- Other (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)

33. Domestic calls are most common among...

- Hispanic families or partners
- African-American families or partners
- White families or partners
- Asian families or partners
- Other
- No racial or ethnic pattern

34. Most calls classified as domestic do not involve crimes.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

35. Most calls classified as disturbances actually involve problems between family members or domestic partners.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

36. Many disturbance and domestic calls come from family members or domestic partners who repeatedly call the police and even rely on police to settle their disagreements.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

37. Most domestic violence could be eliminated if victims were willing to leave the offenders.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

38. Although safety is always an initial concern, there is seldom a risk to officer safety in responding to disturbance and domestic calls.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

39. Dispatchers often fail to identify a domestic relationship in crime-related calls.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

40. Most calls dispatched as “talk with an officer” involve disputes between family members or domestic partners.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

41. Many 911 hang-ups involve disputes between family members or domestic partners.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

42. Most disturbances involving family members or domestic partners don't get worse over time.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

### **Part III: Personal Characteristics**

43. What of the following groups includes your age?

- 25 years old or younger
- 26-30
- 31-35
- 36-40
- 41-45
- More than 45 years old

44. What of the following best describes your highest educational level?

- High school
- Associate degree or some college
- Four-year college degree
- Degree or coursework beyond four-year degree

45. What is your gender?

- Male
- Female


46. Which of the following best describes your race or ethnicity?

- African-American
- Hispanic
- Caucasian
- Other

47. Which of the following groups best represents your years of sworn service in this agency?

- One year or less
- More than one year but less than 3 years
- Between 3 and 5 years
- Between 5 and 10 years
- Between 10 and 15 years
- More than 15 years

Please include any further comments you have about police and domestic incidents in Raleigh. Thank you for your assistance.



## Chapter 4

# Madison (Wisconsin) Police Department: Problem Analysis of Alcohol-Related Violence in Downtown

by Michael S. Scott and Nicole DeMotto

The problem examined is alcohol-related violence on and around State Street in downtown Madison, Wisconsin. State Street is a seven-block street connecting the university campus and the state capitol. It is the heart of Madison’s downtown entertainment and shopping district. The street is primarily used by pedestrians, with vehicle traffic limited to buses and commercial, maintenance, and emergency vehicles. The street comprises public spaces (including a two-block pedestrian-only mall and a small public park); a civic and performing arts center; and retail shops, restaurants, and bars.

The problem was initially selected for analysis through the needs assessment conducted to initiate the Institutionalizing Problem Analysis (IPA) project. Madison Police Department staff interviewed during the needs assessment were asked to nominate problems they believed were in need of greater attention and analysis. Alcohol-related violence was the problem consistently mentioned. When the needs assessment was presented to the Madison Police Department’s command staff, the commanders decided that this problem would be the top priority for examination under the auspices of the IPA project.


A preliminary analysis of calls-for-service data revealed that the Central District (in which State Street lies) consistently had the highest volume of calls among the city’s five police districts for at least the previous 7 years (see Table 4.1). The police sector in the Central District (Sector 403) similarly consistently had the highest volume of calls among the District’s 10 sectors over the same period (see Table 4.2). Moreover, certain types of calls for service (battery, liquor law violations, aggravated assault, fights, and disturbances) were increasing significantly in this sector during the past 4 years (see Figure 4.1).

District	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total
West	27,253	28,839	30,270	31,143	33,849	35,586	23,583	210,523
South	23,358	23,259	24,011	24,078	23,677	23,169	15,850	157,402
Central	43,290	42,614	43,473	43,582	45,182	43,268	26,526	287,935
North	23,759	23,719	25,381	24,942	25,751	25,647	16,793	165,992
East	19,218	19,696	21,299	21,229	22,046	21,588	15,140	140,216
Total	136,878	138,127	144,434	144,974	150,505	149,258	97,892	962,068

**Table 4.1.** Calls for Police Service in Madison’s Police Districts, 1998–2004.

Sector	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total
401	148	159	191	147	153	163	106	1,067
402	4,354	4,833	5,168	5,023	5,073	4,709	2,592	31,752
403	10,905	10,776	11,358	11,464	11,917	11,344	6,845	74,609
404	6,076	5,767	5,748	6,207	6,840	6,309	3,817	40,764
405	6,253	6,090	5,894	6,073	5,900	5,899	3,574	39,683
406	5,414	5,507	5,579	5,276	5,529	5,496	3,635	36,436
407	3,057	2,810	2,719	2,918	2,858	2,888	1,801	19,051
408	2,674	2,669	2,825	2,457	2,863	2,716	1,661	17,862
409	1,585	1,547	1,409	1,422	1,471	1,370	911	9,715
410	2,824	2,456	2,582	2,595	2,578	2,377	1,584	16,996
<b>Total</b>	43,290	42,614	43,473	43,582	45,182	43,268	26,526	287,935

**Table 4.2.** Calls for Police Service in Central District Sectors, 1998–2004.



**Figure 4.1.** Selected Call Types in Sector 403, 1999–2003.

At the time the problem was selected for examination there was also a spate of apparently random assaults of persons on and around State Street, the publicity from which was generating public concern about safety in that area. In addition, a new world-class performing arts center on State Street was due to open and the police department and city were concerned that alcohol-related violence and the consequent fear it generated might discourage attendance at the center and thereby undermine a major civic effort to attract a certain sort of night-life to the downtown.

The city, largely through the mayor's office, had identified that problems in and around bars warranted greater attention and proposed the creation of a city position of alcohol policy coordinator. In addition, the University of Wisconsin had an initiative underway to improve its response to alcohol-related problems among its students.

The police department had recently completed an analysis of its costs for responding to alcohol-related calls-for-service in the downtown area.

Although no systematic effort was made to compare Madison's problem with that in other jurisdictions, project staff were generally aware that other cities in Wisconsin—including Green Bay, LaCrosse, Appleton, and Superior—were similarly making efforts to address alcohol-related violence in their center cities.

Other problems nominated for examination during the needs assessment process were the following:

- » Drug-related violence (including home invasion robberies)
- » Thefts from autos
- » Burglaries (all types)
- » Financial crimes (fraud, worthless checks, forgeries, and identity theft)
- » Drug markets (especially the shift from open-air to indoor markets)
- » Mental-health-related problems
- » 911 hang-ups
- » Problems in the Allied Drive area
- » Thefts from autos
- » Graffiti
- » Retail theft.

At the outset of the project, two problems were selected for examination. The second problem initially identified was drug-related violence across the entire city. This was largely due to the experience of the previous year (2003) in which the city of Madison and Dane County experienced an extraordinarily high number of homicides, many of which were drug-related. The early months of 2004, however, saw the level of drug-related violence return to normal. It was then decided to perhaps just examine one or two emerging drug markets in the city, but eventually, even that study failed to generate sustainable interest and attention.

The geographical focus of the problem was initially all of downtown Madison, but preliminary analysis narrowed the focus to the State Street corridor. The project further honed in on alcohol-related violence that occurs in and around licensed liquor establishments.

The project broadened somewhat when at least four ancillary problems were identified in the target area:

- » Disorderly and nuisance behavior among chronic street inebriates
- » Accidental falls from balconies (usually by intoxicated young persons)
- » Problems associated with annual street festivals (the Mifflin Street Block Party and the Halloween event) which have culminated in large-scale rioting and disorder in recent years (the police department has a parallel inquiry underway to improve the community's response to these issues)
- » Illegal house parties.

## Problem History and External Factors

The Madison Police Department has a long history of addressing problems associated with alcohol in the downtown area. Indeed, it has long been almost the defining feature of policing in the downtown area. Among the measures adopted over the years to try to address the problem have been the following:

- » Foot patrols on State Street (both during the day and at night)
- » Police pressure on selected bar owners to improve bar management practices (under threat that the police would recommend to the city's Alcohol License Review Committee [ALRC] punitive action against the liquor license),
- » Proactive patrols by detoxification social workers to locate and transport to detoxification facilities chronic street inebriates who are on the verge of creating disturbances
- » Training bartenders and bar managers in responsible beverage service.

A Madison Police Department sergeant (Emil Quast) prepared a report to the ALRC of his analysis of the costs incurred by the police department responding to alcohol-related calls at bars and restaurants. He estimated that the total police costs were about \$1.37 million annually. His report recommended that the ALRC be more restrictive in issuing liquor licenses and more stringent in enforcing responsible bar management. He noted that an increasing number of restaurants were operating as nightclubs during late-night hours, but without adequate methods of accountability.

As noted above, the University of Wisconsin had established an initiative to control problem drinking among its students. The initiative, known as PACE (Policy, Alternatives, Community, Education) benefits from funding from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. An ongoing analysis and evaluation component is part of the

initiative. The initiative is particularly concerned with underage and binge drinking among students. The police department has maintained a close working relationship with PACE and regularly exchanges information and analyses with it. One highly publicized proposal that emerged from the PACE initiative was the negotiation of a voluntary agreement among bar owners with establishments near campus to abolish drink specials. Interestingly, this agreement fell apart under the threat of a lawsuit for violations of antitrust laws (a University of Wisconsin Law School professor provided encouragement for this lawsuit), although the lawsuit was subsequently dismissed by a judge. A wide variety of other responses are being implemented by university officials to address the alcohol-related problems among students, some of which undoubtedly will also help the police department in its efforts to control alcohol-related violence.

A number of incidents and events (many of which are described above) occurred during the course of the problem analysis that served to reinforce the value and significance of the initiative, but for the most part, none dramatically altered the course of the analysis. The analysis has proceeded systematically and methodically and remained on its original course, adjusting only as deemed appropriate by the project leaders (the Central District police commander and the Madison Police Department's problem analyst).

## Analysis Process

At the outset of the project, the police commander assigned to manage the project wrote an outline of the analysis plan. In it she identified three working hypotheses that would shape the problem analysis:

The basic plan for this problem analysis will focus on exploring three hypotheses of what drives the violent behavior in tavern areas in central Madison:

1. A uniform bar closing time places intoxicated individuals in competition for transportation, food, and continued companionship. When bar patrons believe that their needs, as they perceive them, are not being met, confrontation erupts and violent behavior ensues.
2. The concentration of tavern licenses (WI Class B), combined with the capacity of these taverns in a geographic area, bring together large numbers of intoxicated persons and provides an opportunity for potential offenders to meet potential victims.
3. The lack of guardianship by owners and/or managers who fail to monitor and control the consumption of alcohol in a tavern is directly related to over-serving of patrons.

At the outset of the project, the project consultant, Michael Scott, drafted a set of possible analysis questions (see Figure 4.2).

### **Incidents**

- » What do we mean by alcohol-related? The offender had been drinking? The offender was impaired by alcohol? The victim had been drinking? The victim was impaired by alcohol? The offense occurred in or near a licensed establishment?
- » What types of incidents are of special concern? Fights, assaults, drunk driving, disorderly conduct, noise, public urination, vandalism, broken glass or other litter, open-container violations, panhandling, robbery, harassment, chronic public intoxication?
- » How are incidents currently classified as being alcohol-related?
- » What level of alcohol-related problems would be considered tolerable? On what basis should this be determined?

### **Offenders**

- » Are there any patterns related to who is causing most of the problems? By age group? Gender? Social group (e.g., college students, high school students, nonstudents, organized gangs, transients, local residents, out of town visitors, etc.)?
- » Are there known chronic offenders? If so, how much of the problem is attributable to them? What is known about them?

### **Victims**

- » Who is concerned/complaining about the problems (e.g., police, merchants of nonlicensed establishments, crime victims, area residents, elected/appointed officials)?
- » Are victims wholly innocent or do they contribute to the problems?

### **Locations/Times**

- » What are the geographic boundaries of the area of concern?
- » Where, within the target area, do incidents cluster (at the block level, at the address level, within an establishment)?
- » Are problems more acute indoors or outdoors?
- » In what way and to what extent do licensed establishments contribute to the problems? What role do licensed establishment staff (bouncers, ID checkers, bartenders, wait staff, managers, owners, private security) play in controlling or contributing to the problems?
- » On what days of the week and at what times of the day do problems cluster? During what special events/periods do problems become most acute (e.g., Halloween, St. Patrick's Day, rush week, after Badger athletic events, etc.)?

### **Current Responses**

- » What special responses by the Madison Police Department are in effect now (e.g., extra foot, bicycle, squad car patrols around high-risk locations and times; licensed premises checks; ALRC actions; collaborations/protocols with the University of Wisconsin; collaborations/protocols with door staff/private security; collaborations/protocols with managers of licensed establishments)?
- » How effective is the ALRC in regulating/controlling the operations of licensed establishments?
- » Is there a code of good business practices for licensed establishments?
- » What responses are in effect for: detox facility, jail, Tavern League, the university?

### **Project Management**

- » Who should be involved in the various stages of this project (problem identification and analysis, responses, assessment/monitoring)
  - ◁ Patrol (officers, supervisors, commanders)
  - ◁ Neighborhood officers
  - ◁ Detectives (detectives, commanders)
  - ◁ Representatives of licensed establishments
  - ◁ Representative of detox facility
  - ◁ Sheriff's office (jail)
  - ◁ University police
  - ◁ Prosecutors (city attorney, district attorney)
  - ◁ Downtown merchants association
  - ◁ ALRC
  - ◁ Other city officials
  - ◁ CIS.
- » Who are the core project team members (involved at all stages) and who are the support members (involved as needed)?
- » Who owns this project (who is responsible for seeing it to conclusion)?
- » Who will be responsible for collecting/analyzing/reporting data?
- » How often should a project working group meet?
- » What is the project timeline?

**Figure 4.2.** Possible Questions for the Analysis of Alcohol-Related Violence in and around Licensed Liquor Establishments in Downtown Madison.

The project's problem analyst drafted the following analysis plan:

## **Research Plan**

### **Liquor License Analysis**

2004 Wisconsin Class B liquor license holders are to be separated according to primary business purpose. The three classifications are tavern, restaurant, and special event. By definition, a tavern is any establishment whose sale of alcohol accounts for more than 50 percent of its gross receipts for alcohol and food. Density maps of each type will be created with a weighting method based on capacity. A grid overlay analysis will count the number of licensed establishments per cell, as well as capacity of each grid cell.

Stenographer Julie Cross obtained a list of 2004 Wisconsin Class B liquor license holders from the city of Madison Clerk's Office and created an Excel spreadsheet containing the information. The capacity of many license holders is not available. The city of Madison Fire Department will be contacted for information regarding tavern capacity. Community Policing Team Officers will collect capacity information from taverns, if it is not available from the fire department.

### Incident Analysis

The 2003 selected incidents—battery, liquor law violation, aggravated assault, fight in progress, and disturbance—will be analyzed. The level of injury will be weighted based on the following criteria:

Injury	Weight
None	0
Minor	1
Lacerations	2
Broken Bones	3
Tooth Loss	4
Other Major	5
Internal	6
Unconscious	7

**Table 4.3.** Level of Injury.

Analyst Nicole DeMotto will review all aggravated battery reports and all fight-in-progress reports and review a random sample of the remaining selected calls for service to assess the level of injury and the number of incidents involving alcohol for Central District in 2003.

Theory: The concentration of Wisconsin Class B licenses combined with the capacity of these taverns in a geographic area bring together large numbers of intoxicated persons, thereby providing an area for potential offenders to meet potential victims.

Hypothesis 1: As the number of establishments per cell increases, the number of offenses ought to increase.

Hypothesis 2: As the capacity of establishments per cell increases, the number of offenses ought to increase, as well.

Hypothesis 3: As the number of establishments per cell increases, the level of injury ought to increase.

Hypothesis 4: As the capacity of establishments per cell increases, the level of injury ought to increase, as well.

### Temporal Analysis

Theory: A uniform bar closing-time places intoxicated individuals in competition for transportation, food, and continued companionship. When patrons believe their needs, as they perceive them, are not being met confrontation erupts and violent behavior ensues.

Theory: The lack of guardianship by owners and/or managers who fail to monitor and control the consumption of alcohol in a tavern is directly related to over-serving patrons.

The time of day and day of the week will be analyzed to identify peak days and times for calls for service. University athletic events and other university sanctioned will be noted.

Hypothesis 1: The peak time for offenses is around bar closing time.

## Progression of Analysis

Some of the analysis tasks were sequenced, while others were conducted simultaneously. The first task was to begin reading and coding police reports. The process lasted from September through March. The liquor license data was entered into a database, after which the liquor license analysis was conducted. The primary goal(s) of analysis were to determine which of the theories and hypotheses about the problem were supported by evidence.

## Existing Data

The primary source of police data used was Incident Data and Dictated Narratives (police reports) for the year 2003. The specific incident types (and corresponding reporting codes) were 5 Battery, 28 Liquor Law Violation, 29, Aggravated Assault, 37 Fight in Progress, and 38 Disturbance. Key incident variables included the address of occurrence, date of incident, time of incident, incident type police district and police sector. Key Dictated Narrative variables included basic victim information, basic suspect information, offense data, type of force, offense circumstances, and resulting injuries.

## Incident Data

Incident data were available on demand but are not very accessible for analysis purposes. The routine queries in the New World Records Management System are inadequate for data analysis and can be accessed only by a printed report. The report cannot be reformatted using existing tools. Slowly but surely, reports are being created in Crystal Reports but the problem analyst is the only person who has access to Crystal Reports.

The reliability and accuracy of location and geographic data are questionable. Data for 2004 could not be used because a data translation glitch caused districts and sectors to populate incorrectly. It is unknown how many records were populated incorrectly. New World has 1.2 million address reference numbers, yet the city has approximately 142,000 addresses, which includes apartment numbers and suite numbers. It is difficult to analyze how many incidents occurred at a specific address. Data must be geocoded to derive the correct district and sector. Dictated Narrative reports have headings that often do not match the incident types available.

Timeliness was less of an issue for this project because data for the year 2003 was used, but data entry and transcription are routinely several weeks behind. Officers assign a

priority level to cases when they dictate their reports, which gives the stenographers and data entry clerks an indication of how quickly the report should be completed.

Data collection consisted of routine data transfers from Dane County computer aided dispatch (CAD) into our Records Management System. Stenographers transcribe Dictated Narrative reports daily and data entry clerks use the narrative reports to fill in additional information into the case report in New World. Data are stored in the police department's AS400 New World Database. Prior to the arrival of the problem analyst, very little data analysis was conducted on Incident Data and Case Offense Data.

One of the greatest limitations to the existing data is that they are not in a format that can be quickly and easily analyzed. The New World database is largely used for storing just enough data to submit yearly Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) data. Most of the available fields are left empty despite the fact the information may exist in the Dictated Narrative Report. In some cases, key pieces of information, which would have been beneficial to the study, were absent from the Dictated Narrative Report. For example, many incidents involve students from the University of Wisconsin, yet student status was not generally captured. The Madison Police Department has very little understanding of the New World database, which makes simple query and analysis tasks a monumental effort. Beyond that, the department does not have a quality control process to review and assess data quality.

Most of the data needed to conduct the analysis could be found in the Dictated Narrative, which meant reports had to be read and coded for analysis. A form called the Incident Analysis Addendum was created to code Dictated Narrative Reports. A group of light-duty officers and interns read the reports and captured key data elements. The coded reports were entered into the Alcohol Addendum Database which was created specifically for this project.

A significant amount of data cleaning was needed to facilitate data analysis. First, addresses are stored in the Records Management System as identification numbers. The individual components of the address needed to be linked to the address identification number. The parsed address was then concatenated into a single field. The concatenated address was used for geocoding and statistical analysis.

Second, some addresses are not validated against a standard database. The Dane County Communications Center validates call for service data against a standard address table, but the Madison Police Department Records Unit frequently changes the call for service address to match the address of occurrence. Unfortunately, the updated addresses are not validated, which can result in misspellings and inconsistent use of addresses. Locations were geocoded and unmatched addresses were examined to see if a match could be identified. If a match could not be identified, it was deleted.

	<b>CAD Data</b>	<b>Offense/Incident Reports</b>
Availability	Available	Available
Accessibility	Not Very Accessible	Accessible
Reliability and/or accuracy	Not Very Reliable/Accurate	Reliable and Accurate
Timeliness	Not Very Timely	Timely
Routine method of collection	Yes	Yes
Routine method of storage	Yes	Yes
Routine analyses	Limited	Limited
Limitations	Data Quality	Data Quality
Augmentation	No	Extensive
Data Cleaning	Extensive	Low

**Table 4.4.** Police Data Types.

There were other data that might have been useful for analysis. Records from local hospitals or from EMS for detoxification services would have provided an indication of the number of individuals who were intoxicated or incapacitated by alcohol. Unfortunately, those records were not made available to us because of patient confidentiality.

The Dictated Narrative Reports were the best source of data despite the limitations of easy data analysis. Once the data were captured in the Alcohol Addendum Database, analysis was relatively quick. The officers of Central District were a significant resource. They were always willing to explain various trends and fill in data gaps with their personal experiences.

## Data Collection

The city of Madison Clerk’s Office provided a paper document containing information regarding liquor license holders. The data contained the address of the business, the type of license, and conditions for maintaining the license.

## Analysis Findings

The preliminary study illustrated the scope of the larger issue of alcohol-related disorder in downtown Madison. The Central District experienced 2,599 disturbances, 934 liquor law violations, 803 batteries, 652 fights, and 243 substantial batteries in 2003. The sector with the greatest number of these incidents was Sector 403, which is where the greatest density of liquor license is also located.

Table 4.5 represents the percentage of Central District incidents which took place in Sector 403.

47%	Aggravated Battery (Substantial Battery)
49%	Battery
42%	Disturbance
59%	Fights
60%	Liquor Law Violation

**Table 4.5.** Central District Incidents in Sector 403.

Liquor law violations represent the police department's efforts to proactively address alcohol-related disorder, but a 182 percent increase in liquor law violation enforcement between 1999 and 2003 did not lead to a decrease in alcohol-related disorder. In fact, the opposite actually occurred. Battery increased 80 percent, aggravated assault increased 47 percent, fights increased 73 percent, and disturbances increased 44 percent between 1999 and 2003.

In general, weekends had the greatest number of incidents and the bulk of those incidents happened around bar time. The only anomaly was a spike around 10:00 a.m.

For the most part, the findings of the study support the prevailing thinking about alcohol-related disorder. The important factor this study brought forward was a dramatic visual representation of the issues through maps, tables, and charts. The police department had been articulating issues verbally for years to no avail, but the images of density maps and bar charts depicting the issues seemed to have an impact on policymakers.

First and foremost, the analysis identified areas with significant concentrations of liquor licenses and significant concentrations of alcohol-related disorder. Areas of high alcohol-related disorder are also areas of high concentrations of liquor licenses. The initial response ought to be tightening the supply of alcohol in downtown Madison.

If the department uses 2003 as a benchmark, we can assess the effectiveness of strategies deployed to address alcohol-related disorder.

## Organizational Impact of Analysis

Analysis showed that the department is not collecting valuable information that would aid in researching this issue. For example, one would expect that a large student population would have a significant impact on alcohol-related disorder. Unfortunately, we do not collect information on student status in most cases. We cannot confirm the role that University of Wisconsin students play in alcohol-related disorder. The department is hoping that the adaptation of incident-based reporting and field reporting will facilitate data collection.

One of the biggest issues with our CAD data is the distinction between the initial incident code and the final disposition. The department changes the initial incident code to match the final disposition, but it does not store the original incident code. This can be problematic when trying to identify how a call came into dispatch and identify the final outcome of the call.


For the purpose of analysis, the narrative police reports are not easy to read. The difficulty in reading the reports is related to the function of police reports in the department. First, the police report is used by the officer to show why he or she made the decision to act or not act. In many cases, the officer's feelings and thoughts are included in the report to justify an action. For example, an officer might describe in detail the level of fear that he or she had to justify for using pepper spray. The second function of the police report is to provide the city or district attorneys with information they need to prosecute a case. However, the information is generally superfluous and makes it awkward to read the report. Nearly every report begins with, "I was dressed in a full Madison Police Department military-style uniform, driving a marked squad. I identified myself as an MPD police officer." The addition of superfluous information for the benefit of prosecutors and the detail involved in justifying every action an officer took adds several pages to the report. It obscures both the victim's and the suspect's sides of the story. From an analytical perspective, police reports do not contain enough information of analytical value, despite the length of the report.

We discovered that a large part of the data needed for the analysis was captured inconsistently. For example, student status was primarily collected if the student ID was used for identification. Injuries were also captured sporadically.

We increased the priority of field reporting and incident-based reporting in response to capturing more data. Field reporting will help the department capture more data in a more timely fashion.

One of the most important outcomes from analysis was the creation of the Report Processing Workgroup consisting of officers, supervisors, detectives and patrol officers. The goal of the Report Workgroup is to increase the accuracy and timeliness of police data. Members are added or changed on an as-needed basis, depending on the nature of the issue. The first goal of the workgroup was to develop methodologies for implementing Incident Based Reporting and Field Reporting. The Field Reporting Pilot Project began in May 2005. The Field Reporting plan was implemented citywide in late fall 2005. The Report Workgroup will begin assessing other elements of police reporting and quality control issues after the successful implementation of Field Reporting.

In addition, the mayor's office was pleased with the analytical products resulting from the research. He has directed the formation of an Alcohol Related Disorder Taskforce to address alcohol issues in the city of Madison. The taskforce will help the Alcohol Policy Coordinator identify and prioritize alcohol issues, in addition to offering strategies for resolving the problem.



## Chapter 5

# Chula Vista (California) Police Department: Problem Analysis of High-Call Volume Locations

by Rana Sampson

All addresses in this chapter have been changed  
to protect the confidentiality of the residents and  
business owners.

Chula Vista, California, rests between National City on its north and the city of San Diego to its south. The city is 50 square miles in size, with its east end sprouting new homes at a rapid pace as part of a more than 10-year residential development boom. The west side of town is much older and poorer. It is dotted with strip malls, apartment complexes, three trolley stations, low-end motels, and trailer parks. The west side ends at the Pacific Ocean; the sea line is relatively undeveloped, but has a small marina. Although Chula Vista is in Southern California, it is not a beach city.

The 2000 census reported 173,556 people in Chula Vista, but 5 years out people believe the population now slightly exceeds 200,000. The police department, with about 225 sworn and about 110 civilians, provides services to an increasingly diverse population. Crime clusters predominantly on the west side but is moving east, as well. As apartment complexes are both in the east and parts of the west, domestic violence calls dot these throughout Chula Vista, particularly around those clusters. And although gangs are present, also predominantly on the west side, their presence is being felt in east Chula Vista, particularly in the high schools.

The Chula Vista Police Department, as with the other sites participating in this project, agreed to analyze a problem and institutionalize problem analysis with the help of a local crime consultant. While the main focus of the project was institutionalization of problem analysis, studying a problem in depth was the second outcome, perhaps demonstrating that more in-depth analysis is useful on a regular basis. Through the study of a problem, the police agency could learn about the challenges of institutionalization and begin to work through them. The objective of the study was to build and develop the knowledge, skills, and routine practice of problem analysis so that it becomes routine within the participant agencies. This project began in December 2003.

## Selecting a Problem

The Chula Vista Police Department, unlike most of the other departments selected, has a strong, recent history of problem analysis; in fact, it is a department known for the strength of its problem analysis capacity. Police Chief Rick Emerson has led the department since 1992 and he has increasingly felt that policing should operate on more exact information. In the early 1990s, his crime analysis unit consisted of two people. The surge in the city's growth required predictions about his staffing needs and service capacity, which required more than guesswork, particularly because the city operates within a growth management framework. Planning was essential. Five years ago, while many police agencies cut civilian positions because of budget cuts, Chief Emerson persuaded the city council to hire additional analysts. Through a combination of grants and city funding he hired a "tough-on-crime" analyst, an intelligence analyst, and a crime researcher. Each reported to a different part of the organization. And in 2003, the police department hired a school crime analyst through an additional grant. Chula Vista's strong, recent history in problem analysis began with these hires.

Karin Schmerler, the department's crime researcher, possesses an extremely strong background in problem solving. She was formerly with the Police Executive Research Forum, and earlier, while with the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, she oversaw some of the problem-solving programming. Nanci Plouffe, the tough-on-crime analyst, possesses extremely strong tactical crime analysis, mapping, and database skills that she combines with her more recent knowledge of problem solving for quick crime-data production. These two have teamed with others to study several significant safety problems in Chula Vista during the last 5 years: bullying in schools, theft of and from automobiles in parking lots, motel crime, and traffic collisions. Their expertise is well-known in crime analysis circles and they are in high demand as conference speakers on the topic of crime analysis.<sup>30</sup>

At the beginning of the project, we held discussions to select a problem for more in-depth study. The initial group included Lieutenant. Don Hunter, Lieutenant. Gary Wedge, and Tough on Crime Analyst Nanci Plouffe, Research Analyst Karin Schmerler, Intelligence Analyst Mark Goldberg, Crime Analyst Steve Morris, and School Crime Analyst Melanie Culuko. We discussed different ways of selecting a problem including surveying officers, community surveys, surveying those staff that would be doing most of the analysis, or selection of the problem by the chief. For the theft of and from autos in parking lots analysis completed the year earlier, the analysts surveyed officers and reviewed community surveys so they thought that, given the recentness of that project, they had a good sense of what the officers might find important, thereby obviating the need for an officer survey. They believed the officers might be most interested in domestic violence or disturbances (415s in California police parlance).

When the author interviewed Chief Emerson, he expressed an interest in crimes taking place around alcohol establishments because of the frequency that police were asked to weigh in on applications for liquor licenses, but he was willing to see what the group came up with.

The group looked at data to see what was on the rise and to see what problems might be more suitable for propelling institutionalization. As we learned from the vehicle crime project, many officers believe that drug use fuels a good portion of Chula Vista crime. We discussed drug call data but the narcotics sergeant was initially reluctant to allow us to review it. The author called the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) seeking Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) data because we wanted to examine drug prevalence and trends among arrestees in San Diego County to see if we could learn more from survey data about the markets from which users purchased drugs in Chula Vista. The data offered little help in identifying markets because only a few nonspecific questions about markets are asked during the interview protocol. While the data showed that new markets were on the rise in South Bay (Chula Vista's location), the area also contains National City and large parts of San Diego, thereby limiting the relevance of that data for Chula Vista.<sup>31</sup> We thought of adding questions

<sup>30</sup>Karin Schmerler is the author of *Problem Oriented Policing Guide #30 Disorder at Budget Motels* (2005) and *Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crime and Reducing Crime and Disorder through Problem-Solving Partnerships*, and a coauthor of *Primary Data Collection: A Problem-Solving Necessity*. Nanci Plouffe is coauthor (with Rana Sampson) of "Auto Theft and Theft from Auto in Parking Lots in Chula Vista, CA: Crime Analysis for Local and Regional Action" in *Understanding and Preventing Car Theft, Crime Prevention Studies*, volume 17 (2004).

ADAM data 2002 for San Diego. [www.sandag.org/uploads/publicationid/publicationid\\_940\\_2394.pdf](http://www.sandag.org/uploads/publicationid/publicationid_940_2394.pdf)

to the survey so that we could learn more about Chula Vista drug markets from arrestees (researchers conduct the surveys, not the police) but were told by SANDAG personnel that the instrument is standardized and cannot be altered. In prior years, an addendum with questions could be added but federal funding for the project had just ended and it was no longer possible. Looking for a different inroad into drugs and crime, we read a winning Herman Goldstein International Award in Problem Oriented Policing project from Lancashire (U.K.) Constabulary. The project identified repeat narcotics users who were most engaged in crime and were persuaded to enter programs tracking their reduced criminality. The approach was based on careful analysis and tailored interventions, but we did not have a strong interest in such a project because we believed that there were strong data limitations involved in identifying users most involved in crime.

We also looked at the top ten calls for service received by the Chula Vista Police Department to see whether the analysts were interested in any of them as potential projects, and learned that false burglary alarms is the number one call for service.

While it might seem a natural problem to select, the chief had expressed apprehension several years earlier about taking the problem on. We examined other potential projects, as well.

1. The Chula Vista Police Department did not have a database containing information about the 1,000 or more apartment complexes in the city. Such a database, which would include the number of units in each complex, would allow the department to compare crime and call rate variances in apartment complexes across the city. Given the leverage the police have over apartment complex owners, having more precise information about how much trouble a certain location produces could be useful.
2. The Chula Vista Police Department operated its own 911 call-taking/dispatch center. Certain call categories used by California police had many subparts that often overlap with other call codes, making it difficult to do a simple call analysis. For instance, there are 14 types of disturbances under the 415 disturbances classification code:

Disturbance Calls 415s	Call Code
415 GANG MEMBER	41599G
415 BARKING DOG	415DOG
DOM VIOLENCE JUST	415DVJ
DOM VIOLENCE NOW	415DVN
DOM VIOLENCE RPT	415DVR
415 FAMILY	415FAM
415 FIGHT	415FIG
415 JUVENILE	415JUV
415 NEIGHBOR	415NBR
415 NOISE	415NOI
415 PARTY	415PTY
415 SUBJECT	415SUB
415 TRAFFIC	415TFC
415 THREATS	415THR

**Table 5.1.** Types of Disturbance Calls.

Overall, more than 200 codes are used to distinguish call for service. At first glance this level of detail might seem like a researcher’s dream come true, but a number of the call codes overlap. Also, how a call is assigned is more dependent on how the 911 caller describes the event and how the dispatcher perceives the event than what the incident might actually be (particularly if no crime report is taken because an officer taking a report is more likely to correct an incorrect or imprecise dispatch code). Disturbance 415 codes may look precise until one looks at the whole series of codes and find there are separate domestic violence (243, 273TR) and assault codes (243) that make the coding and analysis of calls even more complicated.

Domestic violence was the third-highest call for service in Chula Vista. The tough-on-crime and research analysts, constantly scanning for gaps in systems, had been hearing from officers that many of the domestic violence calls they investigated were verbal disputes, not physical assault. Was it important to know if this were true? Did this require digging into the domestic violence calls to see what they were all about and to determine, among other things, how many of the calls are really verbal arguments not violence. Would the police department benefit from adding a “v” at the end of one of the codes now to indicate it is verbal not physical? Studying that problem might be extremely worthwhile

Disturbance by a person was the number two call for service in Chula Vista. It, too, would have seemed worthwhile to explore to see what types of disturbances and which patterns were most prevalent in different places.

Noise complaints and party codes, the fifth-highest call for service, presented similar problems.

We also were curious about the number of crimes that take place indoors and outdoors in Chula Vista because they seemed to have several implications affecting prevention targeting, patrol activities, and even how one begins to think about cracking down crime. Also, might some indoor crimes, such as shoplifting, be easier to prevent than crimes, such as street robberies, and some outdoor crimes, such as open-air drug markets, be easier to prevent than certain indoor crimes, such as domestic violence?

We also felt that it was important to know what kinds of locations produce certain numbers of different crime. What percent of robberies and thefts, for example, do convenience stores, banks, or apartment complexes account for?

The Chula Vista Police Department heavily invested in school resource officers, but the analysts also knew that school crime information was inadequate. Approximately 10 percent of the department's sworn personnel were in schools. An officer might be at a school the entire day but use only one call code when entering the school—public relations contact—yet be engaged in many different activities. When the information was not recorded in the CAD system, it was more difficult to piece together the percentages of time these officers spent on different school-related activities unless one reviewed and tracked officer activity sheets.

Other than its crime-prevention unit, the Chula Vista Police Department had little interaction with neighborhood organizations or other organized community groups, particularly at the beat level. In fact, many suggest that Chula Vista, unlike many communities, had very few organized groups. Would it have been helpful to undertake an inventory of Chula Vista organizations that could interface with the police. Certainly it was worthwhile but it was not a specific crime and disorder problem, although it could facilitate work on crime and disorder problems.

We discussed whether a motel project, underway for 2 years at that point, would have been a viable project to assist, but the research analyst was not interested in assistance.

## Examining a Specific Problem

The police department used Friday as an overlap day when substantially more officers worked. With extra personnel on duty, the department was able to provide training to many of its officers and also conduct what it called Friday projects in the field. These projects allowed a squad to spend the entire day on a problem. Officers and sergeants selected a problem and typically consulted the tough on crime analyst about hot spots. For the most part, the solutions the squads used on Fridays—surveillance and field interviews—are traditional. Although crime analysis data showed that the projects were not effective, they continued, accompanied by gentle prodding from crime analysts who encouraged officers and sergeants to try something different.

At the same time that we continued to discuss possible problems to select, the author did many ride-alongs with officers on different beats. It became clear that many officers had time to do problem solving and that none with whom she rode with was engaged in it. During her ride-alongs, the author noticed that officers' proactive time other than on the overlap Fridays, were spent trying to find stolen cars or stopping cars for traffic violations to show that they were active officers. They would run license plate and property and gun queries, among other things, on their patrol car laptops, but they could not retrieve accurate location call history. Dispatchers could provide the information, but only when asked because it was not seen as important, particularly if an officer saw his or her patrol assignment as clearing up dispatched calls instead of clearing up problems.

The author also wanted to see what well-respected officers did in the field so during her ride-alongs, she asked officers whom they respected most as a patrol officer. Two officers were mentioned frequently, Joe Picone (Beat 24) and David Oyos (Beat 11). She accompanied both on their patrols. The officers were active with arrests and auto theft recoveries, meticulous, and appeared to know a lot about their beats. They talked to people on the beat about other people. Even they appeared to have time for proactive work and asked the tough-on-crime analyst for crime information in their beats.

On a different ride-along answering a call regarding a mentally ill woman in a trailer park, the officer learned from the fire captain, who had arrived in answer to a medical assistance call, that the fire department had helped the woman more than a dozen times in the past 6 months. Further discussion revealed that the fire department had more beat-level information about repeat calls than did police patrol officers

We spoke about this incident along with other topics at the next IPA meeting. Although a call history of patrol cars was needed, we learned that improving call history data on the patrol car laptops was not possible any time soon because of other technological priorities in the department. Nor was a workload analysis of patrol possible because the retrievable data contained errors making the information. It, too, was not a priority.

At a February 2004 meeting attended by the Chula Vista team (described above) and the chief, we discussed repeat locations, Friday projects, and problem selection as projects. We decided that as a way to give information to beat officers that would motivate them to work on actual problems, the tough-on-crime analyst would create and distribute a beat profile for sergeants and lieutenants containing top 10 types of calls for a particular shift and top locations for the shift on that beat using a 6-month data set for each beat. In a letter sent to patrol lieutenants (see Appendix A), Lieutenant Hunter suggested that the information could be used as the basis for problem solving, particularly in lieu of the type of work completed for Friday projects.


Our team, led by Lieutenant Hunter, discussed the value of recruiting two officers to start work on a beat problem, then sought additional feedback from patrol officers about respected patrol officers. Ultimately, Lieutenant Hunter approached Officer Joe Picone (Beat 11) and Officer David Oyos (Beat 24), whose names were frequently mentioned to the author on her ride-alongs.

The team refined the beat profile by looking at data in different ways and from different databases, and used its knowledge of risky places (*Become a Problem Solving Crime Analyst: In 55 Steps Step # 26*) to pull out some highly specific information for patrol officers in their areas. The analysts, using 1-year data sets collected information for Beat 11. We called it “Looking for Crime Series in the Beat.” We examined call data for different types of calls and crimes and looked at different types of places where calls and crime cluster in the officers’ beats (Beat 11 and Beat 24).<sup>32</sup> We did the following for the profiles:

- » Reviewed all repeat calls for service locations
- » Determined the names for the different addresses (Exxon, Vista Park Apartments) and the type of location (gas station, apartment complex, motel, hotel, school). We removed typical hot-spot repeat locations such as hospitals, intersections, amphitheatre, the event arena, the water park
- » Examined calls to the beat to find strong clusters of certain types of calls (disturbances, disputes, assaults, domestic violence, 911 hang-ups, and people with mental illness
- » Identified the top call locations
- » Determined the number of units in each apartment complex
- » Cleaned the apartment complex calls of unnecessary calls such as for car impounds and divided the number of calls by the number of apartment units allowing us to compare apartment complexes in a beat and across town
- » Compared apartment complexes with high call/unit ratios to the list of crime-free multihousing properties in Chula Vista
- » Identified several apartment complexes, one condo complex, one bar, and four private residences for potential investigation by the officers
- » Identified types of locations (bars, private residences) that appeared to have a disproportionate level of calls.

Two officers and their sergeant, Randy Smith, viewed a PowerPoint presentation describing the different problems on their beat using 1 year of calls for service information. It contained the four worst apartment complexes/mobile home parks, the two worst alcohol establishments, the two worst condominium complexes, the four worst single-family residences, and if relevant, the worst retail stores on the beat. The officers expressed interest in working on one of the problems in each of their beats. Figure 5.1 on the following page shows Beat 11.

<sup>32</sup>There are 10 police beats in Chula Vista.




**Figure 5.1.** Display of Problems on Beat 11.

We provided the following information for the problem apartment complexes:

- » **Apartment Complexes:** Impounds screened from calls for service (CFS)
  - » **Greenlinks Mobile Home Park: 118 trailers, 124 CFS = 1.05 calls per unit**
    - ◁ Not in crime-free multihousing
    - ◁ Repeat units: 20 separate trailers with repeat CFS
    - ◁ 12 separate domestic violence calls; 18 additional disturbance calls.
  - » **245 Pinelawn: 134 units, 96 CFS = .72 calls per unit**
    - ◁ Not in crime-free multihousing
    - ◁ Repeat units: 12 separate apartments with repeat CFS
    - ◁ 21 domestic violence incidents; 14 additional disturbance calls.

Figure 5.2 on the following page shows Beat 24:



**Figure 5.2.** Display of Problems on Beat 24.

Again, we provide more detail on the apartment complexes:

- » **Apartment Complexes:** Screen out impounds
  - » **Heritage Village Apartments:** 422 units, 196 CFS = .46 calls per unit
    - ◁ Represents 2.5 percent of all CFS to Beat 24.
  - » Greenlawn Apartments: 336 units, 132 CFS = .40 calls per unit
    - ◁ Not in crime-free multihousing.
- » **The Oceanview Apartments:** 168 units, 75 CFS = .45 calls per unit
  - ◁ Represents 1.1 percent of all CFS to Beat 24.
- » **Aspen Apartments:** 110 units, 77CFS = .70 calls per unit
  - ◁ Represents .9 percent of all CFS to Beat 24.

We also provided details about the condominium complex, whose addresses were separate building that constituted the Maple Condominium complex.

- » 1580 Maple: 167 CFS, number of units uncertain
  - Represents 2.4 percent of all CFS to Beat 24
- » 1555 Maple: 54 CFS or .8 percent of all CFS to Beat 24
- » 1595 Maple: 41 CFS or .6 percent of all CFS to Beat 24
- » 1565 Maple: 18 CFS or .3 percent of all CFS to Beat 24
- » 1575 Maple: 16 CFS or .2 percent of all CFS to Beat 24
- » 1585 Maple: 11 CFS or .2 percent of all CFS to Beat 24

Such calls for service activity was unusual for a condo complex and the officers suggested that one family was the problem. Calls at this condo complex included assaults, burglar alarms, burglaries, vehicle burglaries, domestic violence, graffiti, grand and petty theft, people exhibiting mental illness, narcotics, vandalism, vehicle theft, weapon threats, family disturbance, fights, gang activity, juvenile problems, parties, neighbor disputes, 911 hang-ups, and runaways.

Figure 5.3 shows the information that we provided for problematic single-family homes in Beat 24.




Figure 5.3. Problematic Homes.

Officer Oyos needed a week to select a problem, while Officer Picone immediately selected the Maple Condominium complex.

The project was unveiled at a meeting of all sergeants, lieutenants, captains, and the chief several days later, and following the meeting, Lieutenant Richard Coulson volunteered as the patrol project coordinator and Lieutenant. Hunter sent a letter to officers soliciting their interest in becoming one of the Beat 11 patrol officers beginning with the new rotation of shifts, July 1, 2004. The Chula Vista Police Department needed 6 officers to give coverage to a beat 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. Officers were to stay on the beat for a full year (unlike other officers who could rotate out of their beats during that time). The six officers who were selected from among the many who volunteered were given extra information about the beat, including crimes and calls for service, and additional training about addressing crime problems on the beat. We gave the officers photocopies all crime reports that occurred at the locations in the previous years so that they could familiarize themselves with the names and events. We provided the officers with information about apartment complex problems so they would know about efforts to solve problems in other places. We discussed the role of a place manager (such as a landlord or property manager) in controlling crime and asked the officers to meet with the owner or property manager to see if they would be helpful and to see what they think are the problems. The officers reported on their efforts every 2 weeks.

One analyst gave Officer Picone information about a home owners association because it represented the owners of a condominium complex. Officer Picone initially thought that it was one family (gang affiliated) responsible for all of the problems at the Maple Condominiums. After talking to the condo complex residents, Officer Picone found that there were many more problems. A number of problem families and many opportunities for crime/disorder at the complex (unprotected cars and condo property, no access control) contributed to the problems, so Officer Picone broadened his view of how to address some of the other problems. Certain families in different units had long histories of problems; for example, one condo unit accounted for more than 60 calls for service during a 4-year period (see Appendix B).

Another Officer, Scott Schneider, asked the tough-on-crime analyst for calls and crime information for a large apartment complex at 99 H Street, just outside of Beat 11 because he wanted to become involved in problem solving.

Within a few weeks the three officers had persuaded property managers and the home owners association to make changes at the complexes. At shift change, unfortunately, Officers Oyos and Picone received the transfers they had put in for before the project began. Officer Picone tried to interest someone else in his project but those interested did not work his beat. He tried to work on his project after he was transferred, but was too busy in his new assignment to devote time to the project. Officer Oyos was

unable to work further on his project. Officer Schneider, too, was later transferred out of the project to a special assignment that he had applied for earlier. It was difficult to maintain momentum with the loss of the initial officers so soon into the project.

Given that the IPA project was to last only 18 months, leaving less than a year for the completion of the grant, the team decided that engaging officers in beat-level problem solving might offer the best chance for the institutionalization of problem analysis. The Chula Vista Police Department had already done high-quality problem analysis but it had yet to become a problem solving police agency. Patrol appeared unaffected by the higher level analysis work that had been done prior to this project, community groups and organizations did not pressure police to tackle crime, and beat officers felt no urgency about identifying chronic problems and finding longer term solutions. If institutionalization was the goal, having patrol address some beat problems might engage them and help institutionalize problem analysis more firmly in the department. We believed that a simple level of analysis and use of very basic data sources could reveal a lot about beat problems and help spur institutionalization. Lieutenant Hunter believed that if officers took an interest in the beat project, problem solving will spread to the rest of patrol and then to detectives.

In addition to the information described above, analysts provided the new Beat 11 officers with the information listed below collated in a binder, creating a beat portfolio.

- » Demographic information about the beat.
- » Home ownership levels.
- » Percentage of calls for service compared with the population. Beat 11 accounts for 9 percent of calls for service for Chula Vista but has only 7 percent of the population.
- » Overview of call data: 5 percent of locations produced 50 percent of calls in the beat. The most frequent Beat 11 call was domestic violence, the most frequent police activity was car stops (triple the number of domestic violence calls). Forty locations in Beat 11 constitute 40 percent of all Beat 11 calls for service.
- » Maps for distinct crimes in their beat: vehicle crime hot spots, burglaries, robberies, narcotics calls, stolen auto recoveries.
- » Beat 11 parolee information including photos, personal statistics, and last known address.
- » Resource contact information, including code and environmental problems, and crime-free multihousing.
- » John Eck's article titled *A Problem-Solving Protocol for Police and Community Members* (Version 7, September 6, 2003).


Each Beat 11 officer selected one of the identified problems or a problem from a list of locations in a descending order of calls for service locations for their beat. If the officer wants to develop a skill in turning around a problem apartment building then he or she could pick one of the problem apartment complexes. If an officer wants to build his or

her skills turning around a problem family, one of the problem single residences would be a good choice. All officers chose a location that represented the top 25 call locations in Beat 11.

- » **Officer Craig Doyle:** Park View Apartments, 551 to 581 McIntyre Street, 120 units, 105 calls for service, .9 calls for service per unit, representing 1.2 percent of all calls to Beat 11.
- » **Officer Scott Schneider:** Glenwood Trailer Park, 184 Mercer, 44 trailers, 102 calls for service, 2.3 calls for service per unit, representing 1.2 percent of all calls to Beat 11. Scott initially chose a problem apartment complex one block outside of Beat 11 on H Street when assigned to Beat 12. At shift change, he moved to Beat 11 but kept up his work on the H Street apartment complex and, in addition, adopted Glenwood Trailer Park from Beat 11.
- » **Officer Anthony Molina:** Presidential Greens Trailer Park, 288 Mercer, 117 units, 99 calls for service, .08 calls for service per unit, representing 1.1 percent of all Beat 11 calls for service.
- » **Officer Eddie Ferko:** Exxon convenience store/gas station, 60 Mercer, 89 calls for service, representing 1 percent of all Beat 11 calls for service.
- » **Officer John English:** 250 to 290 Autumn Avenue, six identical fourplex apartment buildings all on the same side of the street, 24 apartments, 83 calls for service, 3.5 calls for service per unit, representing 1 percent of all Beat 11 calls for service.
- » **Officer James Petray:** Blue Bayou Bar, 618 H Street, 80 calls for service, representing .9 percent of all Beat 11 calls for service.

Why was the problem of concern to the department?

Each was a durable hot spot. Maple Condominiums, for example, experienced 300 calls for service during the 5 years before the project started, and calls rose to 500 for the year leading up to April 2004. Figure 5.4 shows the increase in calls from 2002 to mid-2004 for the Blue Bayou Bar.



**Figure 5.4.** Calls for Blue Bayou Bar.

Apartment complex crime is a problem in nearby jurisdictions, as well. For many years, although less so recently, the San Diego Police Department used a problem-solving approach to turn around problem complexes. National City, near Chula Vista, did the same. A number of the efforts from both places won Goldstein awards. In the last 15 years, some mobile home parks in different parts of the country also have experienced problems when there is lax management. A very small portion of single-family homes and a very small portion of bars are typically a problem, no matter what jurisdiction.

## Problem History and External Factors

In July, August, and September, after the departures of Officers Oyos, Picone, and Schneider, the team heard from others in patrol interested in participating. Lieutenant Hunter formed a new beat beginning the October shift change: Beat 21. He and Lieutenant Dickey selected six additional officers. They were given beat information similar to that for Beat 11 and each officer selected a problem.

Another event strongly influenced progress. The crime analyst specifically hired under the grant and who was working biweekly with the officers was let go December 2004. Between July and December he had become the point person for the officers on their projects. At times he accompanied officers to meetings with property managers, met with the crime-free multihousing coordinator, and perhaps most important, he set up the monthly meetings with the officers and the rest of the team. In between, he contacted officers to see if they needed anything.

## Analysis Process

Initially, officers may have thought that problems were caused by certain individuals, but once they looked at the problems realized that individuals caused problems because they were taking advantage of poor property management practices and other unguarded opportunities.

The tough-on-crime analyst provided each officer with calls for service information and crime data about the problem, along with photocopied crime reports for every crime occurring at the location in the previous year. Officers surveyed or interviewed tenants in each apartment complex or mobile home park before seeking solutions to problems.

The primary goals of analysis were to determine why the incidents and crimes were happening disproportionately in these particular places and to try to reduce the number or severity of the problems.

## Existing Data

The following types of existing police data were used for analysis:

- » Calls for service, 1-year periods, and then longer trend lines of calls for service to see if the problem at a location was increasing or decreasing
- » Crime reports, 1 year
- » Crime-free multihousing information from the Chula Vista Police Department crime-free multihousing coordinator
- » Repeat call information by beat, 1 year
- » Top beat locations for domestic violence
- » Narcotic locations for a beat, narcotics supervisor, and calls for service
- » Workload analysis data.

Calls for service have some inherent problems; they can be calls or claims, and not necessarily true. Nevertheless, where there is smoke there is fire, even if it is not the fire you thought it would be. Also, not all calls are crimes. In addition, calls for service need cleaning so that they can be used in calls-per-unit analysis; for example, removing calls such as impound calls because a car is parked illegally in an apartment complex lot or is repossessed. Finally, an absence of calls is not the same as an absence of crime. Not all people call the police or after calling several times about the same problem they become disillusioned that the problem remains after the police have responded.

We also reviewed workload analysis data we reviewed to see if officers had time to problem solve while in patrol, but we found so many errors in the reports that we put that undertaking aside.

## Primary Data Collection

Additional data were collected for this analysis, including the following:

- » Interviews of Chula Vista Police Department 911 dispatchers
- » Calls to addresses to determine the type of property at the locations (apartment complex, trailer park, old age home, etc.)
- » City finance local tax/liens information
- » Visits to all selected problem locations
- » Ride-alongs by crime analysts and consultant
- » Interviews with officers
- » Meetings with officers
- » Officer surveys of residents at apartment complexes and trailer parks
- » Officer meetings with owners and property managers
- » Officer interview with store managers
- » Officer meetings with crime analysts

- » Photos of problem property and parts of problem properties
- » ABC permit holder interview
- » Interview with building codes personnel.

Additional data were collected from these sources:

- » Reverse address directory (book)
- » Tax assessor property database
- » Parolee data
- » ADAM arrestee drug use data.

In addition, we read several publications, some on police technology and some on specific crime such as drug use.

## Analysis Findings

Each officer appeared to learn something different. We asked officers to fill out a project form describing the work they did. Each of these is contained in an Appendix.

Scott Schneider (Beat 12): Appendix C

Craig Doyle (Beat 11): Appendix D

Eddie Ferko (Beat 11): Appendix E

James Petray (Beat 11): Appendix F

John English (Beat 11): Appendix G

Anthony Molina (Beat 11): Appendix H

Sarah Sharpe (Beat 21): Appendix I

To generalize, probably all of the officers learned that what they initially thought were the problems were not the case. Some places with high calls for service had vigilant managers (but perhaps an absence of good tenant screening: McIntyre Avenue), several officers learned about the difficulty of gaining property owner interest in turning around crime (Exxon, Presidential Greens). Some learned that the property owners actually cared about their property and their tenants (Presidential Greens), and others learned that some place managers have very little authority (Exxon). Probably most learned that place management practices are key to controlling crime.

As for the author, she learned several things. First, just how much domestic disturbances are present in different apartment complexes and that more needs to be done to understand the dimension of the problem in Chula Vista and what might be effective under different circumstances to turn it around. Second, how much officers can do with a bit of information about chronic problems in their communities.

## Organizational Impact of Analysis

After reading the crime reports by other officers for their locations several officers told the author of this document that they could see that some reports were poorly written and that well-written reports really made a difference.

Officers would benefit from training about how to select and begin a project. Supervisors and lieutenants would benefit from training in supervising and managing problem solvers if the department decided to pursue this approach further. Some of the crime analysts would benefit from training so they could access some of the more basic data systems.

As part of the project, the author encouraged the project team to produce a crime analyst training manual. With so many new hires and no formal training for crime analysts, each new hire is dependent on the ones who are already there to teach them crime analysis. It is difficult for the crime analysts to find time to train others. Some new hires have no experience working with computer programs such as Access or Excel, and certainly no experience with crime mapping or extracting data. In fact, most would have no awareness of how many databases the Chula Vista Police Department has and certainly would not know how to find or access them. To remedy the problem, Nanci Plouffe took the lead and with the assistance of the other analysts put together a draft manual. It is in Appendix J. Appendix K contains additional suggestions for inclusion in the manual.

We also learned that unless officers are monitored, those with less initiative do not follow up. Supervisors can monitor their officers fairly easily but must take the time to do it.

As far as evaluating outcomes, officers needed more information about calls for service. Not all reductions indicate that problems have lessened and not all increases suggest that the problem has increased. Officers should review calls for service and keep track of them in an ongoing way. We set up a system that enabled dispatchers to make copies of calls for service incidents at the locations the officers took on and place them in the officers' mailboxes so they would have ongoing updates of their locations.

## Appendix 5A

**Date:** March 18, 2004  
**To:** Watch Commanders  
**From:** Lt. Don Hunter  
**Re:** Beat Profiles

Over the past several months discussion at the Tough on Crime (TOC) meetings has focused on transform the TOC program so it more easily facilitates on going problem solving. These discussions centered around effectiveness and sustainability of “Friday Projects.” Officers were focused on series information and tactical intervention efforts directed at those series. This is only one of several important function of patrol officer must perform. The functions are routine response, emergency response, crime case documentation, and problem solving.

TOC is intended to drive problem-solving efforts. To this point it has only driven tactical intervention efforts. The nature of the CVPD shift plan does not allow the flexibility to use “Friday project” teams when they would be most effective on crime series, unless the most active series day happens to be a Friday. On going crime and disorder problems require the ability to affect responses any time of day and any day of the week.

To facilitate more emphasis on problem-solving TOC has prepared beat profiles. The profiles identify the most prevalent crimes and calls for service, as well as the most common location requiring a patrol response. The profiles are specific to beat and shift and days of the week. These profiles allow officers, as well as supervisors, to easily identify repeat call location. This in turn allows deeper analysis of these location so responses can be implemented to reduce calls for service.

The profiles and the corresponding responses will form the basis for discussion at the TOC meetings. They also provide a tool for supervisors to assure officers are aware of crime and disorder issues on their beats. And that they analyze the issues and develop responses. Please assure your staff receives their profiles and uses them to help direct their patrol.

## Appendix 5B

<b>Cfs To Unit 83, 1580 Mendocino By Type, In Order Of Frequency From 1/1/2000–4/2/2004</b>			
	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
Disturbance-Family	11	17.5	17.5
Disturbance-Juvenile	6	9.5	27.0
Disturbance-Person	6	9.5	36.5
Disturbance-Fight	4	6.3	42.9
Runaway Juvenile	3	4.8	47.6
Wanted Subject	2	3.2	50.8
Domestic Violence	2	3.2	54.0
Suspicious Person	2	3.2	57.1
Check A Person's Well Being	2	3.2	60.3
Extra Patrol	2	3.2	63.5
Weapon Threat	2	3.2	66.7
Narcotics	2	3.2	69.8
Incident Follow Up	2	3.2	73.0
Assist Other Agency	2	3.2	76.2
Pedestrian Stop	1	1.6	77.8
Terrorist Threats	1	1.6	79.4
Arrest Felony	1	1.6	81.0
Drunk In Public	1	1.6	82.5
Unknown Problem	1	1.6	84.1
Vicious Dog	1	1.6	85.7
Disturbance-Neighbor	1	1.6	87.3
Underage Drinking	1	1.6	88.9
Emergency Call Hang-Up	1	1.6	90.5
Incident Evaluation	1	1.6	92.1
Disturbance-Party	1	1.6	93.7
Molest	1	1.6	95.2
Vandalism	1	1.6	96.8
Disturbance-Gang Member	1	1.6	98.4
Vehicle Theft	1	1.6	100.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

## Appendix 5C

### Crime/Safety Projects

**Name:** Scott Schneider

**Beat:** 11

**Date:** 01-11-05

**Problem location:** Park Place Apartments 706 H St

**Type of location:** Apartment Complex w/125 one-bedroom units

**How was the problem identified?**

I spoke with Nanci Plouffe, the Crime Analyst, and asked for potential POP project locations in Sector One.

**Between all the other problems the data identified in your beat, why did you choose this problem?**

Past experience in the complex, and the belief that there was the potential for great change.

**When did you start working on this problem?**

May 2004

**What was the initial data you were given about the problem?**

The apartments had a disproportional number of CFS compared to other apartment complexes in the area. On average, 706 H has anywhere from 20% to 50% more CFS/UNIT compared to other apartment communities in the 600–700 block of H Street.

**What did the calls for service reveal about the problem?**

The largest problem appeared to be domestic violence, and there were a few apartments which seemed to be responsible for many of the CFS. Approximately six of the units were repeat locations.

**What did the crime reports for the year leading up to your project reveal about the problem?**

Again, that there were a few problem apartments which were generating many of the CFS.

**What were the next steps you took to further improve your understanding of the problem?**

I put together a resident survey and distributed it door-to-door. I also sat down with the managers and spoke at length with them about perceived problems in their apartments and possible solutions. Additionally, I reviewed several POP guides and looked into the CFMH Program.

**What did you learn from visiting the location, interviewing the place manager, and doing an environmental walk through of the location?**

There was potential for great improvement through improved tenant screening, enforcement of apartment rules, and some environmental and cosmetic changes.

**What would you say the problem is?**

There was no single identifiable problem. The apartments were simply an eyesore in the neighborhood, and were responsible for too many CFS.

**What conditions do you think contribute to the problem?**

Primarily a lack of guardianship.

**What do you think needs to be done to reduce the problem?**

Strategy or Countermeasure	Likelihood of Implementation	Comments
1. CFMH	Excellent	Should be certified by 02/05
2. Improve manager/police relationship	Excellent	Continued through regular visits and extra patrols.
3. Enforcement	Excellent	Several drug dealers were arrested, and problem tenants who were not complying with complex rules were evicted.

**What responses have you implemented so far?**

CFMH, enforcement

**Any results yet? If so, what?**

We are still evaluating the CFS data to determine what, if any, effect the changes have had on CFS. The management tells me they are pleased with the changes and the new relationship with the police department. Residents have also approached them with compliments on the changes being made. Appearance-wise, the apartments look significantly better. Up to this point, there does not appear to be any significant reduction in CFS. The CFS need to be examined to determine if the types have calls have changed, and if they increase CFS is a result of residents taking a more active role in the safety and security of their community by reporting more crimes.

**What else are you planning to do to measure impact?**

I plan to do a new survey with residents after the one-year mark. I will also continue to monitor CFS because, as time goes on, I believe the positive impact will be more apparent.

**Please list a hurdle that you currently working on in your project.**

The manager does not have a lot of people to assist him with the renovations and repairs around the property. The property is nearly ready for CFMH certification, however window screens still need to be repaired or replaced.

## Appendix 5D

### Crime/Safety Projects

**Name:** Craig Doyle

**Beat:** 11 **Date:** 01/24/05

**Problem location:** 551 – 581 McIntyre Avenue, Chula Vista, CA

**Type of location:** 120 Unit Multi-Housing Community

#### How was the problem identified?

- » Crime Analysis from 07/03 to 07/04
  - ◁ 105 Calls for Service
  - ◁ .9 Calls for Service Per Unit
  - ◁ Ranked 12th on the Calls for Service List

#### Between all the other problems the data identified in your beat, why did you choose this problem?

- » The opportunity to work with a proactive resident manager.
- » Use of CPTED to better the community's environment and prevention of crime.
- » Determine why there was a high volume of calls for service, even with an aggressive resident manager.

#### When did you start working on this problem?

- » July 2004

#### What was the initial data you were given about the problem?

- » Beat 11 Project Book
  - ◁ Contained information on:
    - Calls for service
    - Statistics
    - List of additional resources (i.e. code enforcement)
    - List of Parolees on Beat 11
    - Previous Crime Reports

#### What did the calls for service reveal about the problem?

- » 36 of the 105 calls for service were Domestic Violence related which resulted in:
  - ◁ 9 Crime reports
  - ◁ 2 Arrests

**What did the crime reports for the year leading up to your project reveal about the problems?**

- » Very few residential burglaries and auto theft.
- » Moderate drug activity.
  - ◁ That domestic violence was the most common report taken and was generated from chronic/repeat offenders.

**What were the next steps you took to further improve your understanding of the problem?**

- » Establish relationship with resident manager to further understand the individuals causing problems within the community.
- » Reviewed history of parolees with last known address within the community.
- » Conducted a CPTED review of the property.

**What did you learn from visiting the location, interviewing the place manager, and doing an environmental walk through of the location?**

- » Several of the individuals that were generating the chronic calls for service were either being dealt with or going to be dealt with civilly through eviction.
- » A version of the crime free lease addendum was in place although a newer version needed to be implemented.
- » The property is very well maintained and manicured.
- » Several CPTED issues would need to be addressed for certification.
  - ◁ Peep holes in doors.
  - ◁ 2-3" screws for door strike plate.
  - ◁ Lighting and fencing.
  - ◁ Large trees pruned.

**What would you say the problem is?**

- » A resident manager who does not have all the tools and resources needed to properly screen potential residents.
- » Domestic Violence related issues have a significant impact on calls for service.

**What conditions do you think contribute to the problem?**

- » Average resident screening.
- » Large amount of Military residents, which traditionally have a potential for domestic violence issues.

### What do you think needs to be done to reduce the problem?

Strategy or Countermeasure	Likelihood of Implementation	Comments
1. Proactive/Zero tolerance domestic violence enforcement	High	
2. Educate resident manager	High	Attended manager training.
3. Survey residents	Moderate	Less than desirable response (32%)
4. Effective civil action (eviction)	High	
5. Complete CPTED review and sign off	Moderate	Issues regarding review may be difficult to sell to ownership
6. Crime Free Multi-housing Certification	High	Ultimate goal, which will better educate the residents.

### What responses have you implemented so far?

- » Proactive/Zero tolerance domestic violence enforcement.
- » Resident manager training for CFMH.
- » Resident survey.
- » Civil/eviction notices.

### Any results yet? If so, what?

- » Reduction in domestic violence calls
  - ◁ March 04 to June 04
    - 11 calls for service
    - 6 crime reports
    - 1 arrest
  - VS.
  - ◁ Sept. 04 to Dec. 04
    - 5 calls for service
    - 2 crime reports
    - 1 arrest
- » Resident Manager attended CFMH training.
- » Resident survey conducted and tabulated.
  - ◁ Responding residents feel safe within the community.
  - ◁ Concerned with noise and unwanted visitors within the community.
  - ◁ Many residents have resided in community less than six months.

- » Several chronic offenders evicted by resident manager for civil and contractual violations.

**What else are you planning to do to measure impact?**

- » Conduct a community forum to explain the importance of Crime Free Multi-Housing.
- » Continue to track and assess the calls for service and crime reports taken from the community.

**Please list a hurdle that you currently working on in your project.**

- » The Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) process.
  - ◁ Continuing to stress the importance of the program to the resident manager and the community.
  - ◁ Acknowledging the costs associated with the expectations of the CPTED process.

## Appendix 5E

### Crime/Safety Projects

**Name:** Eddie Ferko

**Beat:** 11

**Date:** 01-28-05

**Problem location:** 60 Mercer

**Type of location:** Convenience Store

**How was the problem identified?**

I found that this store was listed at #17 for calls for service in the Beat 11 project.

**Between all the other problems the data identified in your beat, why did you choose this problem?**

I felt that I had a personal interest in the convenience stores, since I frequent convenience stores while on and off duty.

**When did you start working on this problem?**

I had a difficult time choosing between the Exxon Store at 60 Mercer and the 7-11 at 289 Mercer. Both locations had the same amount of CFS, however when I did choose the Exxon it was August 17, 2004.

**What was the initial data you were given about the problem?**

CAD CFSs over the past 2 years.

**What did the calls for service reveal about the problem?**

Majority of the CFS were alcohol theft related.

**What did the crime reports for the year leading up to your project reveal about the problem?**

Very few crime reports were taken. I believe only one or two crime reports. The majority of the CFS had dispositions in which the officers advised the complaining party and gave them a call record number.

**What were the next steps you took to further improve your understanding of the problem?**

I personally research each CFS in the CAD system recorded the type of problem "synopsis" and Disposition.

**What did you learn from visiting the location, interviewing the place manager, and doing an environmental walk through of the location?**

Store was very clean and open. No clutter was noted within the store and the property outside the store. Manager was open, however felt the store was not a problem compared to the last store he worked and/or managed (in South San Diego).

**What would you say the problem is?**

Petty theft’s (Beer Runs) and disturbances.

**What conditions do you think contribute to the problem?**

Easy access to display items i.e. Beer especially after hours. One employee working at peak theft hours between 2200 and 0200 hours and particularly on Friday, Saturday, and Wednesday nights.

The target is the cold beer, located in a cooler in the southwest portion of the store, farthest from the entrance; the clerk’s view of this location can be blocked by customers lined up at the checkout area. Culprits wait until clerk is busy dealing with customers at checkout and then they snatch the beer and walk around perimeter aisles to the exit and flee with their goods.

**What do you think needs to be done to reduce the problem?**

Strategy or Countermeasure	Likelihood of Implementation	Comments
1. Remove open display (warm beer)	Not likely	Distributors & store policy w/ location of product
2. Remote locks on Refer. Doors.	Good	Store due for remodel poss. \$ issue
3. Relocate CCTV	Good	Need to place rear of isle & outside
4. Add TV monitor near beer cooler	Good	Potential Suspects would see themselves on TV
5. Place photo’s of past suspects on entrance door	Good	Near entrance/exit door
6. Keep training up with employees on alarm system	Good	Alarm system gas 2-way monitoring system

**What responses have you implemented so far?**

Met on Feb 4th with district manager and the loss prevention manager for the area and contract security. They were going to install a camera and speaker outside to address loitering, look at putting a camera out by the gas pumps, move a camera inside over to the beer cooler area for better visualization and include a TV monitor so people can see they're under surveillance, and post pictures of beer-dash suspects.

**Any results yet? If so, what?**

None yet!

**What else are you planning to do to measure impact?**

Just learned about Loss Prevention manager position. One LP for 400 stores covering Southern California and AZ. Appears to be the contact person for making major changes to the store in lieu of store manager and/or District Manager. It appears that the LP has more clout than the store manager or District Manager with corporate officials in Corona, Ca.

**Please list a hurdle that you currently working on in your project.**

Store is due for a remodel. No one seems to have an answer when the construction is scheduled to begin. Could occur next month or next year. It appears that recommendations will be implemented when store is going thru remodel. To cut cost's and save time.

## Appendix 5F

### Crime/Safety Projects

**Name:** James Petray

**Beat:** 11

**Date:** 1-21-05

**Problem location:** 618 H St. (Blue Bayou Bar)

**Type of location:** Bar

#### **How was the problem identified?**

The problem was initially identified through officer observation. I noticed I was responding to a significant increase of violent and gang related calls within the past year at the bar.

#### **Between all the other problems the data identified in your beat, why did you choose this problem?**

There appeared to be an increase in serious crimes in the bar parking lot including assaults with weapons, robberies, gang violence, drug dealing, and prostitution. The clientele and the problem appeared to be spreading out to the entire block of H St. Furthermore, there were three other bars within the same block that were not generating nearly as many radio calls for service.

#### **When did you start working on this problem?**


This project was started on 6/04.

#### **What was the initial data you were given about the problem?**

I received analysis regarding how many calls for service police responded to during the last year, peak hours and days police were called to the bar, types of calls CVPD were responding to, and crime reports that were taken from the address.

#### **What did the calls for service reveal about the problem?**

The calls for service revealed that the Blue Bayou generated significantly more than any bar in Beat 11. Particularly interesting was that there are three bars within the same block. Statistics and analysis revealed that calls for service would be almost triple by the end of the year than previous years. What was interesting was that calls for service dramatically increased when the Blue Bayou changed ownership and management.



**What did the crime reports for the year leading up to your project reveal about the problem?**

The crime reports did not reveal much about the problems occurring at the bar. The address of 618 H St. grouped all of the businesses in the strip mall together. Many of the crime reports were taken from the lot but do not show a particular relationship to Blue Bayou. There were a few violent calls reported that probably did stem from the bar. However, it seemed there were relatively few crime reports taken given the high volume of calls for service. I believe many of the calls for service such as drunk in publics, fights, etc., were called in but not necessarily reported in the form of a crime or arrest report. In conclusion, the lack of reports specifically originating from the bar was not representative of the problem occurring there.

**What were the next steps you took to further improve your understanding of the problem?**

1. Observation—I took as much time as possible to conduct surveillance on the bar during peak days and times.
2. Contact—I spoke with the bar owners and manager. I also spoke with bar security.
3. Research—I looked at the number and type of calls for service as well as the crime reports taken.

4. Crime analysis—I met with crime analysts to graph and chart the times and days the problems were occurring. I also requested a long-term (by year) overview of calls for service.
5. On-site inspection—I visited the site and looked at potential environmental factors contributing to the problems.

**What did you learn from visiting the location, interviewing the place manager, and doing an environmental walk through of the location?**

After visiting the location I noticed a few environmental factors. The bar is set back in the corner of the strip mall and is not very visible from the main streets. The lighting is very dim.

The bar itself has surveillance cameras that monitor the parking lot. Bar security guards mainly monitor the entrance/exit and do not walk through the lots. There is a small security manager's office inside the bar that is locked and cluttered. There is a bar area, dance floor, and place for a DJ. The clientele is mainly composed of males (many in the military).

**What would you say the problem is?**

There are many factors leading to the problems. In my opinion the main problems are assaults in the bar lot (particularly violence from gang members), robberies, assault with deadly weapons, over-serving (leading to drunk in public and drunk driving), drugs, and suspected prostitution. The clientele that is drawn to the bar, in my opinion, contributes to a large portion of the crime in the 600 block of H St. Particularly, I noticed that many of the bar customers went to the Denny's (692 H St.) just down the street after bar closing. These same customers were often found loitering in the lots (often blaring loud music from their cars) and fighting in the lots. I suspect they may be responsible for a few robberies that also occurred in that area.

**What conditions do you think contribute to the problem?**

1. The type of clientele—because of a gang injunction introduced in San Diego a number of black gang members were forced to find entertainment elsewhere. Crips and PHD (Pimps and Hoes Daily) members have been documented in FIs in the bar lot.
2. The location—The bar is set back in the corner off the street. Customers exiting the bar are “hidden” from the main streets. Police must drive into the lot in order to monitor the bar. Police driving down H St. or Mercer cannot get a good view into the lot of the bar.
3. Type of establishment—Alcohol consumption brings a higher propensity for violence and crime.
4. The managers—The bar owners and managers were initially appeared cooperative with police. However, they ceased working as a partnership with CVPD.

5. Bar security—Lack of education. They did not monitor or enforce security in the bar lot.
6. Over-serving—There were a number of calls for service regarding drunk in public and 5150s (most likely also drunk in public). I have also personally arrested or contacted two people for drunk driving, which originated in the bar.
7. Music—Hip-Hop and Rap music. The POP guide on assaults in and around bars states that “Newspaper articles and reports from some police agencies suggest that certain forms of music, such as hip-hop, attract aggressive and violent crowds, but it is unlikely that the musical form itself generates aggression, at least not directly.”<sup>33</sup>

### What do you think needs to be done to reduce the problem?

Strategy or Countermeasure	Likelihood of Implementation	Comments
1. Gain cooperation from managers/owners	Possible	Initially cooperative, refused to continue working with PD
2. Monitor bar	Good	Enforce laws, patrol lot
3. ABC enforcement	Good	Random bar checks
4. Train security	Possible	Owners properly train security; monitor lot
5. Prevent over-serving	Good	Need bar cooperation, ABC can monitor and enforce.
6. Remove problem customers	Good	Gangs, repeat offenders, military

### What responses have you implemented so far?

I have implemented a number of responses to the problem.

1. Gained initial cooperation from the owners. They initially cooperated in a number of ways including
  - » Establish and enforce a stricter dress code
  - » Put up “No Loitering” signs on the bar and in the lot
  - » Hired off-duty police officers (from other cities) to patrol the bar lot during peak days
  - » Trained their security to patrol the bar lot
2. In the last quarter of 2004 officer doubled the amount of extra patrol in and around the bar.
3. Extra gang enforcement, in the area (specifically targeted at PHD). Beat 11 officers and Street Team constantly worked problems related to PHD. There has been an obvious reduction of PHD gang members in the city and at the bar.

<sup>33</sup>Scott, M. S. *Assaults in and Around Bars*. Washington, D.C.: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2002.


4. Organized a number of Friday projects that focused on the problem at the bar. One Friday project was implemented to enforce any ABC and city code violations at the bar. I worked with SIU ABC officers and a Code Enforcement Officer to complete a bar check. A number of violations were documented.
5. Spoke with a number of bouncers at the bar. I taught them to monitor the entire lot, including the lot near Mercer. Also, explained to call the CVPD if they were confronted with situations they could not handle.
6. I attempted to organize a meeting with bar owners and manager on numerous occasions. My intention was to inform them of the problems, show them the data, and provide them with solutions. As of yet, they have not been cooperative.

**Any results yet? If so, what?**

Owners have hired off duty police officers (from other cities) to help monitor and enforce the bar and parking lot. They have also established a dress code to limit gang member and prostitutes from entering the bar. Lastly the owners placed “No Loitering” signs up at the bar and in the lot to deter people from hanging out in the lot.

Constant gang enforcement, particularly enforcement of PHD has led to a decrease in gang activity and prostitution at the bar. However, it has not eliminated the problem.

Calls for police service at the bar for the 4th quarter of 2004 are starting to show a decrease.



I think this may be particularly due to the enforcement and implementation at the bar. However, the time of year (winter/off season) also has to be taken into account.

**What else are you planning to do to measure impact?**

I plan to continue monitoring calls for service. Also, constant observation of the bar during peak times and days are important. Simple observation of the types of customers, laws, and any visible violations are important. Radio calls are a good indicator of success but do not always tell the entire story. For example, bar employees may not call the CVPD to reduce calls for service or to cease drawing police attention.

**Please list a hurdle that you currently working on in your project.**

The major hurdle I am working on right now is gaining the cooperation from the bar owners and management. There are a number of solutions and ideas that cannot be implemented without their cooperation. I believe that with full cooperation and participation on their behalf the effectiveness of my project could be greatly increased.

Also, a main focus of the project is to reduce calls for service but keep business flowing legitimately and safely for customers and citizens. Gang members and rowdy military people need to be removed. I would like to find a way to keep the business at the Blue Bayou but change the type of customer that frequents the bar. I am not sure if this is feasible. Without cooperation from the owners my focus and goals may change.

## Appendix 5G

### Crime/Safety Projects

**Name:** John English Beat: 11 Date: 01-07-05

**Problem location:** 254 – 288 ½ Autumn Ave.

**Type of location:** Apartment Buildings Individually Owned

#### How was the problem identified?

Tough on Crime Analyst identified location as having high calls for service. Various types of problems to include internal and external factors.

#### Between all the other problems the data identified in your beat, why did you choose this problem?

- » Recognized area as problematic due to location
- » Absentee managers
- » Lack of crime free multihousing
- » Drug use/sales
- » Gang problems/tagging

#### When did you start working on this problem?

July 2004

#### What was the initial data you were given about the problem?

- » All calls for service for a one-year time frame to include the disposition of the officers' interaction.
- » All crime reports written that pertain to this location for one year (reviewed to identify problems).

#### What did the calls for service reveal about the problem?

Internal factors: domestic violence, 415 families, 415 neighbors, juvenile problems, drug sales, lack of management

External factors: Lack of crime prevention through environmental design, appearance of buildings. Alley to the rear of apartments, businesses to rear. Lack of parking. Code compliance issues.

#### What did the crime reports for the year leading up to your project reveal about the problem?

- » Certain apartments accounted for majority of calls for service to include domestic violence and neighbor disputes.
- » Majority of repeat offenders.

**What were the next steps you took to further improve your understanding of the problem?**

1. Face-to-face with residents
2. Walk through of target locations
3. Resident surveys completed, handed out, returned
4. Attempt to locate owners to set meetings
5. Community Relations involvement (Richard Preuss)
6. Walk through with code compliance. Identified issues.

**What did you learn from visiting the location, interviewing the place manager, and doing an environmental walk through of the location?**

- » The location is run down, has CPTED issues. The external factors considered are present.
- » Absentee managers

**What would you say the problem is?**

- » Lack of management on site
- » Bad tenants
- » Lack of “CPTED”
- » Internal and external up-keep on property
- » Rental agreements
- » Repeat offenders
- » Business in immediate area
- » Alley to rear of buildings
- » Parking problems
- » Code issues
- » Lack of crime free multi-housing

**What conditions do you think contribute to the problem?**

- » All stated on previous page

**What do you think needs to be done to reduce the problem?**

<b>Strategy or Countermeasure</b>	<b>Likelihood of Implementation</b>	<b>Comments</b>
1. CFMH	Good	As long as owners take partnership
2. Code compliance	Good	Limited to only certain enforcement
3. DVRT- Domestic violence counseling	Poor	Up to resident to take advantage
4. Enforcement	Good	Officer initiative

**What responses have you implemented so far?**

- » Code compliance has gotten involved putting pressure on owners to change certain things with apartments. Working with area businesses to change certain conditions.
- » Community relations trying to set up meetings with owners to get CFMH implemented.

**Any results yet? If so, what?**

- » Code compliance has gotten good response. Certain buildings are putting money back into their properties.

**What else are you planning to do to measure impact?**

- » Considering at this time.

**Please list a hurdle that you currently working on in your project.**

- » Locating and meeting with owners.

## Appendix 5H

### Crime/Safety Projects

**Name:** A. Molina

**Beat:** 11

**Date:** 1-13-05

**Problem location:** 288 Mercer (Presidential Greens)

**Type of location:** Mobile Home Park

**How was the problem identified?**

“Calls for Service” was researched for the years 2000 through 2004 and printed for the last few years to see the trend in calls and crimes in the park.

**Between all the other problems the data identified in your beat, why did you choose this problem?**

The initial reason was because of the high calls for service compared to similar communities in the same general area. After driving through the park and talking with residents, I realized the community was made up of mainly concerned residents who valued and cared about where they lived. A handful of the residents were the ones causing the problems.

**When did you start working on this problem?**

July of 2004

**What was the initial data you were given about the problem?**

“Calls for Service” data broken down by year, month, and basic categories of crime. Crime Reports from the last year.

**What did the calls for service reveal about the problem?**

My first impression, upon reading the data, was that the problems spread across the board and across the park. I wasn't sure if I would need to target specific groups of people or the park as a whole. If had to target both, I wasn't sure how much focus to devote to either one.

**What did the crime reports for the year leading up to your project reveal about the problem?**

After reading the reports, I realized most of the calls for service centered around a handful of residents. About 12 homes on the property of nearly 150 homes were responsible for 44 of the 100 calls for service between July of 2003 to July of 2004. Many of the reports indicated internal or domestic problems in the homes.

**What were the next steps you took to further improve your understanding of the problem?**

I contacted the manager and assistant manager. I let them know about my project and asked for their cooperation. They provided me with phone numbers for the owner and the owner's son, who assists him. I also drove through the park several times. I took photographs for an initial assessment. I spoke to residents. I asked the manager what residents were causing problems.

**What did you learn from visiting the location, interviewing the place manager, and doing an environmental walk through of the location?**

I saw that the manager and assistant manager were trying to do a lot on their own for people in the park. I didn't realize how much they actually cared about the residents. I heard from one of the residents say that the manager paid one of the tenant's rents because they had a hard time financially one month. I realized the problems in the community were not because of the management's inattention. After speaking with the manager about who she felt was causing the most problems in the community, I compared the information to my data. The units she mentioned were consistent with the data. I confronted management about some of the obvious safety hazards and areas of the park that needed immediate attention. She was very responsive with most of the items I mentioned on our first meeting.

**What would you say the problem is?**

The management is not afraid to evict when necessary. The problem lies within their pre-screening of new renters. They do not have much of a screening process. They just now started doing credit checks. So the problem residents are replaced by more problem residents.

Another issue is that management sees things that need fixing or attention but the response from the owner is slow. They have been trying for two years to get more lighting up in dark areas for safety. I asked them about this after driving through one night and noticing all the alleys were dark except one.

Some of the problems are caused by outside influence, i.e., guests and transients walking through.

**What conditions do you think contribute to the problem?**

- » Lack of screening new tenants.
- » No signs or enforcement of trespassers on the premises.
- » Slow response from the owner towards management

### What do you think needs to be done to reduce the problem?

Strategy or Countermeasure	Likelihood of Implementation	Comments
1. Crime Free Addendum	Very Likely	
2. "No Trespass" signs	Likely	
3. Some Evictions	Likely	
4. General Upkeep (lighting)	Likely	
5. Management Training	Very Likely	

### What responses have you implemented so far?

- » Upon invitation, the manager and assistant manager attended the Crime Free Multi-Housing class at the police department
- » I've followed up with the manager several times about the lighting.
- » I've provided the manager with the "Crime Free Lease Addendum" for them to implement into their contracts.
- » I've spoken with some of the "problem" residents personally on calls and on "knock and talks".
- » I had a meeting with the management and owner along with the analyst and community relations representative to speak about the project.
- » I had the manager put on a block party for residents to attend. The analyst, the community relations representative, and myself attended and spoke to the residents.
- » I'm in the process of handing out anonymous resident surveys to find out what observations the residents are making and what concerns they have.
- » I spoke with the management about drafting a "no trespass" letter for the police department to enforce trespass laws. I spoke with them about having signs made and posted.
- » I spoke with the owner's son and management about evictions. They've already evicted one "problem" resident listed in my initial assessment. They are in the process of further evictions.

### Any results yet? If so, what?

One of my goals is to reduce the number of calls for service by at least 30 percent. The last check showed calls for service were up. Much of that, however, was attributed to my follow-ups being listed as calls for service. Aside from that, I have yet to see a drop in calls for service. I will need to run an updated calls for service check to confirm.

As for other items: The management has been receptive to my suggestions. They cleaned up an area I observed as a hazard for weeks. They've made arrangements with SDGE to have more lighting put up. They've attended suggested training. They painted parking spaces for tenants and have taken an active role in getting rid of abandoned and inoperative vehicles by contracting a tow service. As a result, the community is looking much better than when I initially drove through and took photographs.

**What else are you planning to do to measure impact?**

The ultimate measurement will be done by checking for a decrease in calls for service at the end of the year, minus calls made strictly as officer follow-up. Another measurement will be based upon responses to the survey I'm currently handing out.

**Please list a hurdle that you currently working on in your project.**

Although management has been cooperative, they have been a bit slow to respond to many of my suggestions. I've had to follow-up with the same items many times. They usually get around to them but it takes time. Also, sometimes it's a question of getting the owner to sign off on things. He is slow to respond but usually follows through after constant follow-up on my part.

## Appendix 5I

### Crime/Safety Projects

**Name:** Sarah Sharpe

**Beat:** 21

**Date:** 1/7/05

**Problem location:** Palmetto Trolley

**Type of location:** Trolley Lot

#### **How was the problem identified?**

Crime Analyst identified this location as generating high calls for service for patrol officers.

#### **Between all the other problems the data identified in your beat, why did you choose this problem?**

The entire block of 600 Palmetto was identified as a problem. The trolley station is a prime location for traffic, both vehicle and pedestrian, due to its being close to the border and large shopping areas.

#### **When did you start working on this problem?**

October 2004

#### **What was the initial data you were given about the problem?**

Top 25 in CFS in beat 21; breakdown of CFS w/in the trolley lot; times the crimes/CFS were occurring; days of week CFS/crimes were occurring.

#### **What did the calls for service reveal about the problem?**

The highest CFS/crimes happened near the end of swings into the beginning of graves. There was also a wide variety of CFS within the trolley lot.

#### **Crime Statistics**

10-01-04 to 01-14-05

- » Arrest = 6
- » Assault = 5
- » Domestic Violence = 3
- » Disturbances = 15
- » Robbery = 3
- » Vehicle Theft and Tampering = 14
- » 162 Calls for Service during time period

**What did the crime reports for the year leading up to your project reveal about the problem?**

Violent crimes were occurring often (robberies, assaults), as well as high property crimes (vehicle burglary and vehicle theft)

**What were the next steps you took to further improve your understanding of the problem?**

Requested daily printouts of CFS w/in the designated problem area; established rapport with employees of Food-4-Less, trolley, recycling center, and property security; developed a survey for people in the area we contacted.

**What did you learn from visiting the location, interviewing the place manager, and doing an environmental walk through of the location?**

Our statistical info varied greatly from that of trolley security; there was very low visibility between the trolley lot and Food-4-Less lot; trolley security conducts little to no enforcement with regard to loitering on the platform; lighting is poor w/in the lot, specifically at the south end.

**What would you say the problem is?**

The convenience this shopping center provides to the transient population. With the close proximity to the border, people utilize the trolley to come to the recycle center to turn in cans/plastics for cash and/or visit the Food-4-Less, which has the lowest prices in the county.

**What conditions do you think contribute to the problem?**

Low staffing of patrol officers/trolley security do not allow for consistent enforcement; the ease of buying 40 oz. cans of beer at Food-4-Less and for a cheap price; the bench near payphones provides opportunity to loiter.

### What do you think needs to be done to reduce the problem?

Strategy or Countermeasure	Likelihood of Implementation	Comments
1. Educate Food-4-Less employees on liability for selling alcohol	Good	Help them understand how they are contributing to the problem of habitual drunks by selling 40oz cans.
2. Have trolley security take more responsibility for their area	Fair	History has shown trolley security does not want our info and is less that willing to work with us.
3. More lighting at trolley lot	Good	
4. Limit number of ingress and egress for traffic	Fair	There are 3 ways to enter/exit trolley lot. Difficult to monitor all three for activity.
5. Remove bench on west side of Food-4-Less	Good	Takes away opportunity for loitering and hiding alcohol when police pass.
6. Zero tolerance attitude	Good	

### What responses have you implemented so far?

- » Education of Food-4-Less employees—now they ID everyone coming in to buy alcohol—no ID—no alcohol.
- » Contacted trolley headquarters reference crime stats.
- » Utilized surveys to contact people in and around lot.
- » Zero tolerance attitude—cited/arrested for anything illegal
- » Established rapport with staff w/in respective businesses.
- » Extra patrol presence.

### Any results yet? If so, what?

- » Less loitering around pay phone/bench at Food-4-Less
- » Recycle hours have changed (8 a.m.–8 p.m.) as a result of our suggestion.
- » Bushes/trees have been cut back and pruned allowing greater visibility.
- » Received “thank you” letter from property security reference greater presence of police = safer feeling.
- » Our initial survey was conducted during day watch hours (8am-5pm). The results revealed that the majority of the people utilize the trolley and surrounding area for travel. Essentially they are there to go to work and to return home. There overall safety rating was high, however the majority of people said they would not use the trolley at night due to gangs, fights, etc.

**What else are you planning to do to measure impact?**

- » Re-contact survey during peak crime hours to see if public perception has changed.
- » Run calls for service and compare to same time frame last year.
- » Run crime stats to see if violent crimes have gone down.

**Please list a hurdle that you currently working on in your project.**

Attempting to contact representative at Sunbelt Property—they own the Food-4-Less lot.

## Appendix 5J

### City Overview

The city of Chula Vista is San Diego County's second-largest municipality. The city covers approximately 51 square miles and is located 7 miles south of the city of San Diego and 7 miles north of the Mexico border. The population as of January 1, 2003 was 201,210, with a median age of 35 and a median income of \$49,065. The ethnic breakdown of the population is as follows:

Hispanic – 49 percent

White – 31 percent

Asian – 13 percent

Black – 6 percent

Other – 1 percent

### Organization

Chief Rick Emerson oversees the police department and reports directly to the city manager. The police department consists of four divisions, each commanded by an upper level manager. (Refer to Organization Chart in the Appendix)

A police captain commands the Administrative Services division. This division includes 70.88 sworn and civilian positions in the Professional Standards Unit, Crime Lab, Animal Control Facility, Police Support Services, and the jail.

### Professional Standards

The Professional Standards unit is located on the second floor of the of the police facility and is responsible for all hiring for the police department and conducting background checks on sworn and civilian employees. This unit also facilitates all training and travel needs within the department. All citizen and department complaints and investigations are processed through this unit.

### Crime Lab

The Crime Lab is located on the third floor of the police facility. It is managed by a civilian mid-manager and is staffed by two evidence technicians, two latent print examiners, three evidence control assistants, one office specialist, and a lab intern. The lab processes and stores all evidence obtained by officers.

### Animal Care Facility

The Animal Care Facility is a full-service animal shelter located at 130 Beyer Way in Chula Vista. This facility is managed by a civilian mid-manager who also serves as the veterinarian. The staff at the facility includes 6 animal control officers, 3.65 kennel attendants, 1 registered veterinary technician, 1 customer service representative and

2.48 office specialists. The Animal Care Facility is responsible for all animal control needs within the city as well as pet adoptions, barking dog calls, animal cruelty complaints, and pet licensing.

## **Police Support Services**

Police Support Services is managed by a civilian mid-manager and consists of 5.5 police records specialists, 4 police records transcriptionists, 1 community service officer, 1 customer service representative, 1 senior office specialist, 1.5 police cadets, 1 crime information system specialist, and 3 police data specialists. The unit is responsible for the maintenance and data entry of all police records. Police Support Services is also responsible for customer service support at the front counter of the police facility.

## **Detention Holding Facility**

The 40-bed Detention Holding Facility is managed by a police lieutenant and is located in the basement of the police facility. The staff includes 14 authorized police service officers and 1 senior office specialist.

The Fiscal Operations/Research division is managed by a command-level civilian manager and includes 11.98 civilian positions. Within Fiscal Operations/Research are Budget & Analysis, Payroll, and Research & Development. The division handles all monetary functions within the department. Three public safety analysts within R&D provide analytical support to the department through problem-solving initiatives.

The Operations division is the largest division in the police department. Currently, it is commanded by the assistant chief and consists of 193.55 sworn and civilian positions. Included in the Operations division are Patrol, Communications (Dispatch), Traffic, Street Team, Technology, and Community Relations. This division is responsible for the day-to-day tactical operations of the police department.

The Investigations Division is commanded by a police captain and managed by a police lieutenant. The Division consists of 96.25 positions (73 sworn) assigned to 8 individual units and is located in the north wing of the police facility, separate from the Operations Division. The division is made up of three sections: Criminal Investigations, Special Investigations, and School Resource Officers. Criminal Investigations includes the Crimes of Violence Unit, Family Protection Unit, and Property Crimes Unit. These three units are housed together in an office on the second floor of the police facility. Special Investigations include the Special Investigations Unit and Narcotics Enforcement Team. These units are located in an office on the ground floor directly below the other investigative units.

### **Family Protection Unit**

The Family Protection Unit provides a continuum of follow-up investigative services and social service interventions. The unit is currently staffed by one sergeant, six agents, one community service officer, and one secretary. In 2003, the unit received and reviewed 1,965 cases involving domestic violence, child abuse, elder abuse, and sexual assault, as well as more than 2,000 referrals from Child Protective Services and Adult Protective Services. The unit is also responsible for tracking the more than 300 sex registrants living in the city of Chula Vista, and ensuring that they comply with the conditions of their registration.

### **Crimes of Violence Unit**

The Crimes of Violence Unit provides follow-up investigative services on cases involving both minor and serious acts of violence. It is currently staffed by one sergeant, six agents, one officer, two part-time civilian cold case investigators, and one secretary. In 2003, the unit received and reviewed 1,012 cases. Those cases included murders, kidnappings, robberies, officer-involved shootings, gang related crimes, hate crimes, missing persons, felony and misdemeanor assaults, and violence related vandalisms.

The unit also includes the Cold Case Homicide Team, which was formed in 2002 to investigate unsolved homicides that are no longer being actively investigated. The team consists of two half-time civilian positions. One position is filled by a retired Chula Vista sergeant who has extensive investigative experience, and the other is filled by a former crime lab manager whose expertise lies in the processing and analysis of forensic evidence.

### **Property Crimes Unit**

Theft is the largest category of crime in any city. The Property Crimes Unit provides follow-up investigative services on theft-related cases. Property Crimes is currently staffed by one sergeant, seven agents, two community services officers, and one secretary. In 2003, Property Crimes received and reviewed 5,957 cases. Those cases included residential, commercial, and vehicle burglary; grand and petty theft; fraud; forgery; identity theft; auto theft; and nonviolent vandalism.

### **Special Investigations Unit**

The Special Investigations Unit conducts sensitive investigations in the areas of intelligence, major narcotics, vice, police-regulated businesses, and public corruption. The majority of its cases are proactive, and the unit's responsibilities also include homeland security, threat assessment, dignitary protection, and the development and delivery of training on a variety of intelligence-related topics.

The unit is supervised by a sergeant, and includes 10n sworn officers (6 agents, 4 officers, including 5 agents and 3 officers assigned to task forces), one community service officer, and one intelligence analyst.

### **Narcotics Enforcement Team**

The Narcotics Enforcement Team is responsible for the identification and apprehension of drug offenders. It focuses primarily on street-level narcotics, responding to narcotic complaints submitted by citizens and other law enforcement agencies, and initiating investigations based on intelligence received from various sources. This team can be a great source of information about problem locations.

The Narcotics Enforcement Team is also supervised by a sergeant, and is currently staffed by four sworn officers (two agents, two officers).

### **School Resource Officers**

The School Resource Officer Unit is the only uniformed unit in the Investigations Division. This unit is tasked with providing basic patrol services and some follow-up investigation to all public schools with the city of Chula Vista. The unit has 2 sergeants supervising 20 sworn officers (2 agents, 18 officers) and 1 civilian secretary. Schools generate a high number of calls for service, with bullying being the most common problem. To help combat this problem, an analyst is assigned to work with the school resource officers on bullying.

## **Analysts**

Five civilian public safety analysts are within the various divisions of the police department. Each has a specific function, but work together as a team. The function breakdown is as follows:

- » Research/Higher-level problem analysis initiatives (R&D)
- » Tough on Crime/Crime Analysis (Patrol)
- » Intelligence Analysis (SIU)
- » Bullying Project (2-year grant position, R&D)
- » Institutionalizing Problem Analysis (1-year grant position, R&D).

Each analyst plans and prioritizes his or her own work with minimal supervision. These positions maintain a high degree of autonomy and require a great deal of initiative. To familiarize you with the kinds of work expected of our analysts, a section later in this manual describes the kind of initiatives analysts in this department engage in.

## Police Dictionary

At times it can seem like the officers have a language of their own. Some of the more common police terms are listed below:

### Ten Codes

- 10-0 Cover unit requested
- 10-1 Reception poor
- 10-7 Out of service
- 10-8 In service/Available for assignment
- 10-9 Repeat last transmission
- 10-16 Prisoner
- 10-19 Police station
- 10-20 Location
- 10-21 Telephone call/Please telephone
- 10-22 Cancel/Disregard
- 10-28 Vehicle registration request
- 10-29 Check wants/warrants
- 10-97 Arrived at location

### Eleven Codes

- 11-6 Shots fired/Shots heard
- 11-7 Prowler
- 11-8 Person down
- 11-10 Report
- 11-11 Check the area
- 11-13 Injured animal
- 11-14 Animal bite
- 11-41 Ambulance needed
- 11-42 No ambulance needed
- 11-44 Dead body
- 11-45 Suicide/Suicide attempt
- 11-48 Transportation
- 11-50 Pedestrian stop/Field interview
- 11-60 Water leak
- 11-80 Serious injury accident
- 11-81 Injury accident, nonlife threatening
- 11-82 Noninjury accident
- 11-83 No detail accident

- 11-84 Traffic control
- 11-85 Tow truck needed
- 11-88 Disabled vehicle
- 11-99 Officer needs immediate help

**Police Codes**

- Code 3 Emergency/Lights and siren
- Code 4 No further assistance required
- Code 5 Stakeout/Surveillance
- Code 6 Stay out of area
- Code 7 Lunch
- Code 8 Restroom break

**Phonetic Alphabet**

A	Adam	N	Nora
B	Boy	O	Ocean
C	Charles	P	Paul
D	David	Q	Queen
E	Edward	R	Robert
F	Frank	S	Sam
G	George	T	Tom
H	Henry	U	Union/Unit
I	Ida	V	Victor
J	John	W	William
K	King	X	X-Ray
L	Lincoln	Y	Yellow
M	Mary	Z	Zebra

**Common Crime Codes**

- 187 PC Homicide
- 207 PC Kidnapping
- 211 PC Robbery
- 215 PC Carjacking
- 243 PC Battery
- 245 PC Assault with a deadly weapon
- 261 PC Rape
- 288 PC Lewd acts with a child
- 314 PC Indecent exposure

415 PC	Disturbance
422 PC	Criminal threats
459 PC	Burglary
487 PC	Grand theft
488 PC	Petty theft
505 PC	Reckless driving
594 PC	Vandalism
602 PC	Trespass
647(b) PC	Prostitution
647(f) PC	Drunk in public
13700 PC	Verbal domestic violence
11550 HS	Under the influence of a controlled substance
11350 HS	Possession of narcotics
11357 HS	Possession of marijuana
11359 HS	Possession of marijuana for sale
11364 HS	Possession of drug paraphernalia
11377 HS	Possession of controlled substance
11378 HS	Possession of controlled substance for sale
10851 VC	Auto theft
20001 VC	Hit and run with injuries
20002 VC	Hit and run
5150 WI	Mental subject

### Common Terms

11-5	11550/Under the influence (i.e., The suspect was really 11-5)
415	Argumentive (e.g., the family was getting 415 with the officer)
B Girl	Prostitute (reference to 647(b) PC)
HBD	Has been drinking
NFD	No further description/details
GOA	Gone on arrival
UTL	Unable to locate
Code Red	Tape record the conversation
Deuce	23152 VC/Driving under the influence
RP	Reporting party
WMA/WFA	White male adult/White female adult
WMJ/WFJ	White male juvenile/White female juvenile

BMA/BFA	Black male adult/black female adult
BMJ/BFJ	Black male juvenile/Black female juvenile
OMA/OFA	Oriental male adult/Oriental female adult
OMJ/OFJ	Oriental male juvenile/Oriental female juvenile
HMA/HFA	Hispanic male adult/Hispanic female adult
HMJ/HFJ	Hispanic male juvenile/Hispanic female juvenile

### **Patrol Unit Assignment**

Unit One	Chief Emerson
Unit Two	Assistant Chief Zoll
Unit Three	Captain Dyke
Unit Four	Captain Miranda

Each part of a unit number has significance. For lieutenants, sergeants, and agents, the first number of their unit identifies the shift. The second two numbers are assigned based on seniority. For patrol officer units, the first digit of the unit number identifies the shift and the second two digits represent the assigned beat.

The letter designators following any unit number are as follows:

- L – Lieutenant
- S – Sergeant
- A – Agent
- J – Single officer
- F – Two officers riding together
- E – Training unit
- X – Additional unit not assigned a specific beat

For example, 200L is the senior patrol lieutenant in the department assigned to second shift, 121J is the first-shift officer riding alone assigned to beat 21, 335X is a third-watch additional unit not assigned to a specific beat.

### **Police Rank Identifiers**

- » Chief: Four stars on collar
- » Assistant Chief: Two stars on collar
- » Captain: Two bars on collar
- » Lieutenant: Single bar on collar
- » Sergeant: Three stripes on arm beneath Chula Vista Police Department patch
- » Agent: Two stripes on arm beneath Chula Vista Police Department patch
- » Officer: No stripes

Note: Slanted hash marks near the cuff on long-sleeve shirts designate 5 years of service each.

### **Incident Disposition Codes**

Disposition codes are normally two characters that designate how the call ended. The first character designations are as follows:

- » C: Call for service
- » O: Officer observation
- » V: Voided case number
- » X: Cancelled

The second character designations are as follows:

- » 5: False alarm, PD 508 Issued
- » A: Arrest other
- » C: Arrest infraction
- » F: Arrest felony
- » H: Traffic citation (Hazardous)
- » I: Field interview
- » K: Checked OK, No further action taken
- » M: Arrest misdemeanor
- » N: Traffic citation (Non-hazardous)
- » P: Parking citation
- » R: Report taken
- » U: Unfounded
- » V: Voided case number
- » W: Traffic warning
- » X: Cancelled
- » Z: Arrest warrant

As an example, a call coming into dispatch that ended in a felony arrest would have a disposition code of CF. An officer observation call that ended in a field interview would have a disposition code of OI. A third character is used for special projects; for example, we are currently using “G” to designate gang related calls for service, “M” to designate calls involving military personnel, and “B” to designate both gang and military involvement. In this case, a call coming into dispatch that resulted in a crime report being taken that involved gang members, would have a disposition code of CRG. This gives us the opportunity to gather information about crime and disorder problems that are not captured anywhere else.

## Sectors/Beats

The city is separated into three patrol sectors by geographic location. Sector One encompasses the northwest portion of the city and extends from the bay to Interstate 805 and from Highway 54 south to L Street. Sector Two covers the southwest section of the city from the bay east to La Media and from L Street to the southern boundary of the city. Sector Three is the portion of the city that resides east of Interstate 805 with the exception of Beat 24, which is in Sector 2. Beats are geographic areas within a sector assigned to an individual patrol unit. There are 10 police beats within the city, 4 in Sector One, 4 in Sector Two, and 2 in Sector Three. We divide the city into beats so that officers can develop some geographic responsibility. We try to keep officers assigned to a particular beat whenever possible.

## Types of Analysis

### Problem Analysis

Problem analysis involves the use of a systematic approach to examine crime or disorder problems and determine long-term resolutions to those problems. Problem analysis focuses on dealing with conditions that create problems and finding ways to prevent the crime or disorder from occurring in the future. In many cases, primary data collection such as surveying citizens, customers, offender, victims, and property management are necessary to truly understand the problem. Other city departments, community members, local business, service organizations, and other stakeholders also play a key role in the analysis phase. Pre- and post-evaluation measures determine the effectiveness of strategies put into place. Enforcement may be included in the response phase, but is unlikely to be the sole, long-term solution to any problem.

The SARA approach is generally used in problem-solving initiatives and is based on four phases of problem resolution:

**Scanning**—Preliminary review of information to identify a group of similar or recurring crime or disorder problems.

**Analysis**—Utilizing several sources of data to determine what factors contribute to the crime or disorder problems. These factors can include who, what, why, when, and where along with who is responsible and who is affected.

**Response**—Implementing a customized action plan based on the findings identified in the analysis phase.

**Assessment**—Determining the impact on the crime or disorder problem after the response has been implemented using pre- and post-measures.

### **General Crime Analysis (Tactical)**

Traditional crime analysis focuses on crime reporting, identifying crime trends, pattern and series analysis, and predictive modeling. Crimes are analyzed by examining the modus operandi, geographic location, time of day of occurrence, and suspect descriptions to determine if they are part of a pattern or series. Crime patterns are a group of offenses that have similar characteristics but cannot be attributed to a single person or group of persons. In traditional crime analysis, crime series are a group of offenses with unique or similar characteristics that are believed to be committed by a single person or group of people working in concert.

Crime analysis also includes reporting crime statistics to state and federal agencies and providing public information on crime or disorder to citizens, the media, the department's community relations unit, or other requestors as appropriate.

### **Time and Crime (Temporal Analysis)**

With crime, there are often patterns relating to time of day, day of week, or seasons of the year. It is important to conclude such information if time and date have an impact on crime or incident patterns. In temporal analysis, crimes or incidents are analyzed by comparing the day of week, time of day, month-to-month, or seasonal variations. For certain crime types, the sequence of events and length of time between events are important to include in an analysis. For most typical day of week and time of day analyses, we have an MS Excel table that uses macros to calculate the most likely time of occurrence during each day of the week. This MS Excel file is located in K:\usr\analysis\mostlikely2000.xls.

### **Location and Crime (Spatial Analysis)**

Crime concentrates by place and is not spread randomly. Crime and disorder problems often cluster, creating hot spots and hot dots. Spatial analysis is used to establish whether the location or aspects of the location affect crime or incident patterns. Crime mapping is generally used to show clusters or hot spots of crimes or incidents. Once a location is identified, it is important to analyze why the incidents are occurring at that particular location. Physical and environmental characteristics of the property as well as distance between incidents can play a key role in the location analysis.

### **Victim and Crime (Repeat Victimization)**

Repeat victimization occurs when the same person or location experiences more than one crime or incident within a specified period. Persons or places that have been victimized in the past may have an increased risk of being victimized in the future.

Repeat victims can be difficult to identify using our current data sources. People who have common names, move to new locations, or are victims of crimes away from home may be missed during the analysis. Identifying numbers such as social security or driver's license numbers are not extractable using ARJIS and, as a result, can not be used to show revictimization.

### **Offender and Crime (Intelligence Analysis)**

Intelligence Analysis is the analysis and dissemination of information related to criminals and criminal organizations involved in activities such as drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, and other types of criminal conspiracies. Whereas crime analysis focuses on crime patterns and trends, intelligence analysis tends to focus more on the criminals themselves, their tactics, and their relationships to other criminals.

### **Intelligence analysis includes the following types of products:**

- » Intelligence Briefs: Tactical in nature, usually related to officer safety and/or criminal tactics
- » Intelligence Reports: Information related to criminal conspiracies, including recommendations for further investigation
- » Threat Assessments: Potential threats arising from individuals or groups
- » Vulnerability Assessments: Potential vulnerabilities of a particular site or event, and a recommendation of strategies for reducing those vulnerabilities
- » Link Charts: Graphic display of known or suspected associations between subjects of an investigation, as well as their vehicles, residences, businesses, etc.

## **Criminological Theory**

### **Rational Choice Theory**

Rational Choice Theory, developed by D. Cornish and Ron Clarke, supports the belief that offenders benefit from crime and therefore go through a decision-making process during the commission of the crime. Through the theory, one tries to understand how and why the offender makes those choices. This theory shares a similar foundation to Situational Crime Prevention and concentrates on the motivated offender, the opportunity to commit the crime, and the offender's decision to engage in the criminal act.

### **Routine Activity Theory**

Routine Activity Theory, developed by Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson in 1979, believes that three primary elements must exist for a crime to occur:

1. A suitable target is available. Suitable targets can be a person, place, or a thing. It is important to note that all targets are not suitable. Ron Clarke has developed an acronym to describe suitable targets:  
CRAVED: Concealable, removable, available, valuable, enjoyable, and disposable
2. A motivated offender is present. The offender assesses the situation to determine whether a suitable target is available and whether there is a capable guardian.
3. A lack of a capable guardian. Capable guardians are anyone or anything that could possibly deter a criminal act in that particular location. These guardians can include lot managers, employees, security guards, police patrols, and even security cameras.

### Crime Pattern Theory

Brantingham and Brantingham developed Crime Pattern Theory in 1984. It centers on the belief that offenders will commit crimes in places with which they are familiar. Offenders develop knowledge of the locations through their daily routines. It would be far more risky for the offender to commit a crime in a location with which he is unfamiliar because he might get lost or he would have to devote too much time to learn the habits or routines of the guardians of the locations.

The following matrix, created by Rana Sampson, shows the relevance of routine activity theory, crime pattern theory, and rational choice theory as shown in Auto Theft and Theft From Autos in Parking Lots in Chula Vista, California.

Evidence	Applicable Crime Theory	Reasoning
Auto thieves selecting unguarded parking lots in Chula Vista	Routine Activity Theory  Crime Pattern Theory  Crime Pattern Theory	Offers multiple suitable targets in settings that lack capable guardship  Parking lots beside shopping areas and commuter stations are places that offenders may frequent during their non-criminal activities offering opportunities to surveil the level or absence of guardship there Unguarded settings with multiple suitable targets can become crime hot-spots  Victimization is often higher at locations that attract large numbers of people such as parking lots
Targeting Older Toyotas	Rational Theory	Offender effort expended to steal older Toyotas is minimal when using older keys on vulnerable door locks and ignition system
Offenders choosing parking lots where parkers leave their vehicles unguarded for longer periods	Rational Choice Theory and Routine Activity Theory	Offenders risk of apprehension is low in lots where parkers will be gone for long periods of time
Theft rates are highest in the three San Diego County border communities within a 15 minute drive to Mexico	Rational Choice and Routine Activity Theory	Offenders can cross the border before a victim notices their vehicle has been stolen
Trolley lots had highest risk rates of all the target area lots	Routine Activity Theory	Offers offenders a selection of vehicles where the only capable guardian (the vehicle's owner) left the area using mass transportation and is unlikely to return soon

### **Situational Crime Prevention**

The primary focus of Situational Crime Prevention, a theory developed by Ron Clarke in 1992, is to make settings less conducive to criminal activity. The goal of Situational Crime Prevention is to block opportunity at the time when an offender is making the decision to offend. This theory separates crime prevention into five primary objectives:

1. Increase the effort needed to commit the crime.
2. Increase the risks associated with the crime.
3. Reduce the rewards.
4. Remove the excuses.
5. Remove the provocations.



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